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INTRODUCTION
Promoting access to affordable medicine for poor countries
is considered an important goal to a wide range of actors
including not only poor countries, but also rich countries,
patent owners, and scholars.' However, promoting such access
has thus far been a challenge. In fact, over the last decade,
changes in international laws that require most countries of the
world to patent drugs have arguably impeded access to low-cost
generic drugs.2
This Article posits that a major hurdle to actually
addressing access issues is that there are fundamentally different
views of patent policy ("patent perspectives") that have a
significant impact on how facts, laws, and proposed solutions are
viewed. Unless and until there is a better understanding of the
existence of these different views, viable solutions are likely to
remain elusive.
It is well documented in the field of social science that all
individuals perceive new information based on pre-existing
"schemas." This Article suggests that different views of patent
policy similarly function as schemas. Although there are many
1. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution of 12 July 2007 on the TRIPS
Agreement and Access to Medicines, 2008 O.J. C 175 E/59; INCENTIVLS FOR GLOBAL
PuBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 1-32 (Thomas
Pogge et al. eds., 2010); GLAXOSMITHKLINE, 2010 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT
2 (2010), available at hittp://ww.gsk.coi/responsibility/downloads/GSK-(R-2010-(R-
at-GSK.pdif; see also World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2. 41 I.L.M. 544 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Public Health
Declaration], available at http://ww,.wto.org/cnglish/t hcTOV10c/m(iniistc/iminOlc/
mindecl trips-e.htn (stating that the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") "can and should be interpreted and implemented" in
a manner consistent with public health, including access to medicine).
2. The most important change to international law is the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, which requires all members of the World
Trade Organization-including countries at all levels of developnent-to provide
patents on drugs. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
art. 27(1), Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization. Annex IC. 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS],
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.
3. E.g., SUSAN T. FIsKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 97-99 (2d ed.
1991); ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 17-19 (1999). A
schema has been defined as a "mental structure which contains general expectations
and knowledge of the world." MARTHA AUGOUSTINOS & IAIN WALKER, SOCIAL
COGNITION: AN INTEGRATED INTRODUCTION 32 (1995); see infra note 54 (describing use
of the term schema in this Article).
2011]
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views of patent policy that exist along a continuum, the two most
divergent views are the ones that dominate discussion and thus
play a key role in how laws are developed and interpreted. On
one end of the spectrum, there is a view of patents as a privilege
granted by the state and inherently subject to limitations-
especially if necessary to promote other social policies, such as
access to medicine-this is referred to as the "privilege view."
On the other end of the spectrum, patents are considered
essential to promoting innovation, with more protection
considered to be necessarily beneficial to promoting more
innovation; this view is referred to as the "uber-right" view
because it suggests a very strong right. The existence and impact
of these competing perspectives are well illustrated with respect
to recent seizures of in-transit generic drugs that allegedly
infringed local patent rights. Consider the following situation:
An Indian company makes a generic IV medication and ships it
to Nigeria through the Netherlands, a traditionally popular
destination Jor global transport of goods. The drug is unpatented
in both India and Nigeria, such that it can be made as a low-cost,
generic version of the patented drug sold as Ziagen. However, the
drugs are seized at the Amsterdam airport by Dutch customs
authorities pursuant to [a European Union ("EU!")] regulation
that has been interpreted to consider in-transit goods to infringe
local patent rights.4
4. Technically, Dutch patent law would not consider in-transit goods to infringe
patents. See I PATLNTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 121:27, § 121:5 (Henry D.
Tecgarden ed., 4th ed. 2011), available atWestlaw PATWORLD (discussing importation
as a patent right but not specifically including in-transit imports). However, the
European Union ("EU") regulation has been interpreted by a Dutch court to permit
suspension of in-transit goods on grounds of patent infringement based on the legal
fiction that the good was manufactured in the country where suspensions occur. See
Rechtbank's-Gravenhage 18 juli 2008, 311378/KG ZA 2008, 08-617 m.nt.
(Sosecal/Sisvcl) (Neth.). An unofficial English translation of the Sisvel v. Sosecal
decision is available at http://www.cplawpatcntLog.coi/PDFDecember09/Thc%
20Hague%20)(%2OSisvel%20v%20Sosecal%20EN.pdf. See also Council Regulation No.
1383/2003 Concerning Customs Action against Goods Suspected of Infringing Certain
Intellectual Property Rights and the Measures to Be Taken against Goods Found to
Have Infringed Such Rights, 2003 O.J. L 196/7 [hereinafter Customs Action
Rcgulation].
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Suspensions of drugs, like the one above, have prompted
very different reactions. Brazil and India have decried the
suspensions as "baseless" and clearly in violation of international
law under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property ("TRIPS").? The EU, on the other hand,
suggests that a few instances have been overblown and asserts
that its laws are clearly consistent with TRIPS, although generally
with no explanation.6 In addition, patent owners refer to
suspended generic drugs as "counterfeit,"7 and also suggest that
generics are not "safe or effective" simply because they were not
made by the patent owner.8
Whether nations can consider in-transit goods to infringe
patent rights and thus be subject to suspension by customs
5. See. e.g., Intervention by India-TRIPS Council june 2009, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY WATCH, http://wwv.ip-watch.org,/wveblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/
intelvention-by-india-scizure-of-generic-drug-consignmcnts-at-ec-ports.pdf (last visited
Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Intervention by India, June 2009] (stating that "[t] he fact
that the drugs were subsequently reilased arc [sic] a proof that the allegations were
baseless"); Intervention by Brazil, TRIPS Council,. INTELLLCTUAL PROPLRTY VATCH,
http://www.ip-watch.org/wveblog/wvp-content/uploads/2009/06/brazil-statement-trips-
june-09.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Intervention by Brazil, June 2009],
(stating that TRIPS does not allow suspension of goods in transit). Health Advocates
have also echoed the sentiments of India and Brazil. See, e.g, Letter from Christian
Wagner-Ahifs, BUKO Pharna-Kanpagne et al., to Margaret Chan, Dir. Gen., World
Health Org. 3 (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.haiweb.org/07032009/
18%20Feb%202009%200pen%201Letter%20to%2OWHO%20on%201)utch%20seiziure%
20of%20generics.pdf (last visited Sept. 23. 2011) [hereinafter NGO Lctter to (han,
Feb. 2009] (stating that the EU seizures are "clearly inconsistent" with the Doha
Declaration and TRIPS).
6. See infra notes 211-21 and accompany text (suggesting that suspended drugs
were minimal and misconstrued); see also infra note 240 and accompanying text
(suggesting that suspensions are in full compliance with TRIPS, but without any
detailed analysis).
7. In the first reported suspension of in-transit drugs, patent owner Sanofi Aventis
initially asserted that the drugs were suspended as "counterfeit," but subsequently
stated that the drugs violated patent and related protection for clopidogrel. LettCI
fron Patent Dcpt. Sanofi Aventis to Betalactanicos S.A. (Oct. 29, 2008), available at
http://online.wsj.com,/public/resources/docurments/eudrugs2009letter2.pdf
[hereinafter Sanofi Letter 1]: Letter fron Annemarie Kaspen, Sanofi Aventis Legal
Counsel, to C.A. Franco, Sals Manager, Betalactaninos S.A. (Nov. 24, 2008), available
at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/eudrug200i9etter2.pdf
[hereinafter Sanofi Lctter 21.
8. Letter fron B.E.M. van Kessel, Attorney for Eli Lilly to the Board of Directors.
Cipla Ltd. (Dec. 9, 2008), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
docunen s/cudrugs2009Ltter3.pdf [hercinafter Eli Lilly Leter] (stating that Cipla's
product "iay not be safe or effective" because it is not made by the patent owner Eli
Lily or any of its global licensees).
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officials provides a new opportunity to consider not only a
proper interpretation of TRIPS but also the importance and
impact of competing patent perspectives. As this Article
demonstrates, no one is immune from perspectives; even
scholars may be influenced by perspective.9 Moreover,
perspectives may play a central role in the development of new
laws. For example, simultaneously with the suspensions of drugs
in the EU, the EU and other countries negotiated a new
international agreement called the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement ("ACTA").io As will be explained, this new
agreement reflects more of an uber-right view that stronger
patent rights are socially beneficial.
This Article provides an interpretation of the relevant
provisions of TRIPS and the ACTA concerning suspensions of
in-transit goods as a backdrop to understanding the significance
of the patent perspective schemas discussed above. In particular,
this Article suggests-consistent with social science on schemas
in general-that countries, companies, and scholars may all
have patent perspective schemas that influence their view of
facts and interpretation of laws. The schemas may help explain
differing interpretations of whether EU suspensions of drugs are
consistent with TRIPS. Brazil and India's views that the EU's
actions were inconsistent led to official requests for
consultations," which is the first step to a formal legal dispute
before a World Trade Organization ("WNTO") panel.1 Although
9. See infra notes 290-97 and accompanying text (discussing interpretations by
Daya Shanker and Frederick Abbott).
10. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (Apr. 15, 2011) [hereinafter ACTA],
available at http://trade.cc.curopa.cu/doclib/docs/2011/iay/tradoc_147937.pdf.
The Agreement has not yet been formally signed and wvill enter into force when six
instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval have been deposited. Id. art. 40.
11. Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Union and a Member State-Seizure
of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter Brazil
Consultation Request], available at http://tradlec.curopa.cu/doclib/docs/2011/
february/tradoc 147567.pdf; Request for Coisultations by India, European Union and a
Member State-Seizure oj Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010)
[hereinafter India Consultation Request]. available at http://w1w.worldtradelaw.net/
cr/ds408-1%2 8 cr%29.pdf.
12. See Understanding on Rules and procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes arts. 4(5), 4(7). 6. Apr. 15, 1994. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
[Vol. 35:1
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the countries seem to have reached an understanding that
obviates the need for a formal panel at this time, an
interpretation of TRIPS, together with the impact of the
different patent perspectives on interpretations is nonetheless
important. 3 Not only may the current understanding collapse
but there is also a related issue concerning what the ACTA
permits or requires for in-transit suspensions of drugs.14
Accordingly, this Article addresses appropriate interpretations of
TRIPS and the ACTA concerning suspensions of in-transit
drugs, together with the impact of patent perspectives on these
interpretations. In addition to these legal interpretations, the
analysis of patent perspectives should promote a better
understanding of why questions concerning the proper balance
between patent rights and access to medicine are so contentious
as a first step to resolving them.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides
fundamental information about intellectual property rights and
how drugs enter the global marketplace. Part II introduces the
two patent perspectives, including how the existence of these
perspectives is supported by social science. Parts III and IV then
demonstrate the impact of perspectives on how facts and laws
are perceived. This Article concludes with considerations of the
importance of the patent perspectives for understanding and
anticipating broader global conflicts concerning the intersection
of patents and access to medicine.
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994); see also
Sue Ann Mota, TRIPS: Ten Years of Disputes at the WTO, 9 COMNPUTFR L REV. & TFCH.J.
455, 462 (2005) (providing explanation of the dispute settement process and noting
that consultations are a necessary step before a formal WTO panel is requested).
13. See, e.g., Press Rcease, India Ministry of Conmerce and Indus., India EU
Reach an Understanding on Issue of Scizure of Indian Generic Drugs in Transit (July
28, 2011), wailable at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx-relid=73554; William
New, EU-India Agreenent in W/TO Dispute Raises Bar for EU Drug Seizures, IP-AVTCH (July
30, 2011), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/07/3)/cu-india-agreement-in-wto-
dispute-raises-bar-for-eu-drug-seizures/.
14. In addition, even if the WTO eventually rules on this issue. that may not
resolve the issue definiiively for [hose with a schema that is inconsisLtent wit the WTO0
interpretation.
2011] 7
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I. BACKGROUND
This Part explains intellectual property rights related to
drugs, as well as regulations that promote drug safety, to lay a
foundation for understanding why certain claims concerning
suspensions of in-transit drugs are improper. First, this Part will
clarify and distinguish the intellectual property rights that have
been implicated for in-transit drugs-patents and trademarks.
Second, this Part will address how other issues involving drugs in
the marketplace can influence global access to medicine and
define key terms relevant to global trade in drugs.
A. Intellectual Property Rights
There is one commonality to all types of intellectual
property rights. Namely, that they are limited by national
boundaries. There is currently no such thing as a global patent
or trademark. Rather, a company that wants global protection
must seek and obtain protection in each country where rights
are desired.lb For example, a US patent gives its owner rights
against others in the United States, but not Canada; to obtain
rights against others in Canada, a Canadian patent is necessary.i
In addition, although an inventor may seek and obtain a patent
15. Some have suggested, however, that there should be limited versions of global
patents or trademarks. E.g., Edward Lee, The Global Trade Mark I (Apr. 4, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http: /papers.ssrn.colm/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id= 1804985 (advocating global trademarks with respect to the limited category
of "well known marks"); Commission Communication to Member States on Europe
2020: A Strategy for Smart. Sustainable and Inclusive Growth 12 (2010), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eui/LexUriServ/LexUriSer.do-uri=
COM:2010:2020:FIN:EN:PDF (proposing an EU--wide patent).
16. E.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 4 bis (1),
Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (noting that "patents applied for in the various
countries ... shall be independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other
countries ... "); see also WORLD INTLLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PATENTSCOPL: WIPO GUIDE
TO USING PATENT INFORMATION 4 (2010), http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/
patents/434/wipo-pub_1434_03.pdf (explaining that patents are applied for and
enforced in different countries)
17. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35:1
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in these countries, the scope of the patent rights may differ since
each country decides on the scope of its own protection. 8
Vhile all intellectual property rights share the principle of
territoriality, there are important distinctions between the
different rights. Identifying what rights are at issue is important
since there are different scopes of protection related to different
rights, as discussed in this section. Accordingly, this section
discusses the intellectual property rights most pertinent to
selling drugs-patents and trademarks.
1. Patents
A patent is an official document granted by a nation that
entitles its owner to certain rights." The patent owner typically
can exclude others from the patented invention for a limited
time that is usually less than twenty years.20 In particular, the
patent owner has the right to exclude others from making,
using, selling, or importing the patented invention within the
nation that granted the patents:' This right to exclude provides
a powerful commercial benefit, such that the owner of a
patented drug can generally charge a premium price for the
patented drug since no one else can make the identical drug.2 2
18. E.g., JAKKRIT KLANPOTH, PATLNT RIGHTS IN PHARTMACLUTICALS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: MAIJOR CHALL1ENGES FOR THE FUTURF 8 (2010) (stating that patents are
territorial and national in natulre); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text
(explaining territorial limits of patents).
19. See BiACK'S lAW DICTIONARY 970 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a patent as "the
governmental grant of a right, privilege, or authority").
20. See e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2) (2006) (stating that the US patent tern begins
on the date that patent issues and ends twenty years from the application date); TRIPS,
supra note 2, art. 33 (stating that patent term must end no later than twenty years fron
the date of filing). Notably, although the patent term ends twenty years fron the
application date, there are no patent rights while the patent application is pending,
such that the actual term is twenty years, less the timie spent examining the patent. For
example, the average amount of time to evaluate a US patent application is currently
34.6 months; therefore, the average patent term is slightly less than seventeen years.
U.S. Patents and Trademark Office, Patent Pendency Statistics-FY09,
http: /www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/patcntpendency sp (last visited Sept. 3 2010).
21. Eg. 35 U.S.C. 271 (a) (2006) (providing patent infringement where one
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells the patented invention. within the United States")
(emphasis added); TRIPS., upa note 2, art. 27.
22. Although there nay be competitive drugs within the same class (such as acid
reflux or depression), patented drugs within a class do not usually compete based on
price unlike generic drugs, such that each patented drug within a class usually still
commands a substantial premium in price. See Z. john Lu & William S. Comanor,
2011] 9
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Today, most countries are members of the WTO, and as
such, must provide patent rights for all "inventions."2 3 In
particular, countries can not categorically exclude all drugs from
patentability24-a major change in the laws of some countries
that previously did not permit patents on drugs.2 However,
because patent obligations under TRIPS only apply prospectively
to new inventions, some member states in full compliance with
TRIPS may nonetheless continue to make drugs that were
unpatented and unpatentable before TRIPS. For example, India
can continue to make certain HIV drugs as generics since they
were unpatentable before 2005, when India was required to
grant patents on new drugs.26 Even though these drugs may be
patented in other countries (such as the United States), because
patents are territorially limited, the same drug could be legally
Strategic Pricing of New Pharmaceuticals, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 108, 115-17 (1998);
Co.NG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONG. OF THE UNITED STATES, How INCREASED COMPETITION
FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAs FITECTED PRICES 23-24 (1998).
23. See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://wwvw.to.org/english/thewto e/whatis_e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov.
23, 2011) (providing a list of WTO inembers); see also TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27
(requiring that, inventions that meet certain criteria be granted patents).
24. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27; see also CARLOS CORREA. INTEGRATING PUBLIC
HEALTH CONCERNS INTO PATENT LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11.1 (2000),
available at http://apps.who.int/Icdiinedocs/fr/d/ Jh2963c/6.htil ("Literally
interpreted, Article 27.1 does not permit the exclusion from patentability of medicines
in general or, arguably, of specific groups thiercof."); JAY4SHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE W1O AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 109 (2001) (explaining
that TRIPS does not permit exclusion of pharmaceuticals from patentability).
25. Prior to TRIPS, fifty nations did not permit patenting of drugs, with some even
prohibiting methods of creating drugs from patentability. E.g., Unitcd Nations
Conference on Trade & Dev., THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRILS 30
(1996), available at http: //www.unctad.org/ cn /docs/itl cn.pdf. This exclusion
helped to promote access to lower Cost medicine. See e.g., WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION. GLOBALIZATION AND ACCLSS TO DRUGS-HEALTH ECONONICS AND
DRUGS SERIES, No. 007 19-21 (1998), available at http://apps.wvho.int/medicinedocs/
en/d/Jwhozip35c/3.4.3.html#Jwhozip35c.3.4.3 (noting that some countries chose to
exclude drugs from patentability, which enabled them to freely imitate products
patentced in other countries and also avoid the high Cost of patentced drugs).
26. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 65(4) (permitting a W1O country that did not
previously provide patents on products to delay doing so for an additional five years
beyond the other transitional provision); see also DANIET GERV,AiS, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 519 (3d ed. 2008) (stating that
countries, such as India, had until january 1, 2005, to provide patent protection on
drugs if they had not previously provided such protection).
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made in countries without patent protection for the drug, such
as India. In addition, a country that did not previously provide
patents on drugs, such as Brazil, could legally import drugs from
India without violating Brazilian or Indian patent laws.
2. Trademarks
A trademark is a word, slogan, or symbol that identifies and
distinguishes the goods of an entity from those of others.2 In
other words, a brand name, such as Vioxx or Prozac, is a
trademark.28 A trademark owner has the right to prevent others
from using its mark, or a similar mark, if consumers would likely
be confused.29 Accordingly, the owner of the trademark Prozac
could prevent another company from using the word "Prozic" to
market a similar drug because consumers would likely be
confused. Patented drugs are often sold with a trademark, such
as the trademark Rogaine, whereas unpatented drugs (including
drugs where the patent has expired) are referred to as generics
and generally sold using a non-proprietary chemical name.0
Goods that are sold using identical marks as the trademark
owner of the identical product are referred to as "counterfeit"
trademark goods. 1 This includes goods commonly referred to as
"knock-offs," such as relatively inexpensive watches, bags, and
27. Eg., 15 U.S.C. 1127 (2006) (delining trademark as a term that includes any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thercof that is used by a person
"to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown").
28. A trademark can also include phrases, images, or packaging, so long as it still
satisfies the basic requirement of distinguishing the product from others. For example,
a trademark can include distinctive packaging, such as the curved shape of a Coca-Cola
bottle. COCA-COLA, Registration No. 0696147 (registered for "Bottles, jars or Iask
with bulging, protruding or rounded sides; Flasks with bulging or protruding sides; Jars
with bulging or protruding sides").
29. See, e.g, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
30. For example, the term ibuprofen is the generic name for a product that
contains that ingredient as the primary active ingredient, whereas Pfizer makes its own
version of ibuprofen under the trademark "Advil." While Pfizer can prevent other
companies from using the term "Advil" to sell ibuprofen, it cannot prevent competitors
from using the nonproprietary term ibuprofen.
31. See, e.g:, 15 U.S.C. 11 l6(d) (2006) (delining counterfeit in the context of
clarifying that courts can order the seizurc of goods with counterfeit marks); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320 (2006) (defining counterfeit in the context of creating criminal liability for
trafficking in goods using counterfeit trademarks).
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clothing sold on the street that simulate expensive, brand-name
items. Similar to knock-offs of luxury consumer goods,
counterfeit drugs involve the unauthorized use of one or more
trademarks and are often sold for much less than the legitimate
product.32
Trademarks are enforced through two different
mechanisms. Intentional and unauthorized counterfeit
trademarks may be enforced through the judicial system and
policed by customs officials.3 Since a counterfeit trademark is by
definition identical to a brand name, it can be easy to spot even
by someone not trained in trademark law. However, when a
trademark is used in a manner that is likely to cause confusion,
but without rising to the level of a counterfeit use, infringement
is much more difficult to determine. Traditionally, this has been
the subject of unpredictable litigation.34 This is especially true
because even if there might be arguable confusion, there are
legitimate defenses, such as "fair use" of the mark.35
32. An examplc of a counterfeit drug would be one sold as "Vioxx." but not made
by the owner of the trademark Vioxx.
33. E.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADLMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPLTITION § 25:10-25:11 (4th ed. 2011).
34. The "likelihood of coniusion" test involves multiple factors, wvith no single one
being dispositive, such that conclusions are considered unpredictable. See generally
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study oJ the MultiJactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006). For example, trademark infringement is analyzed based
on whether there is "likelihood of confusion." One might assume that a well-known
mark is less likely to result in confusion, but courts have sometimes concluded
othenvise. E.g., Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., 963 F.2d 350, 355 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (finding likelihood of confusion between Playdough and Fundough for
similar modeling compound and not considering it persuasive that consumers are
familiar with Playdough brand in finding likelihood of infringement); McDonald's
Corp. v. Druck and Gerner, DDS., 814 F. Supp 1127, 1134, 1139 (N.D.N.Y. 1993)
(finding trademark infringement where there was no evidence McDonald's planned to
enter defendant's dental business, yet the Court was suspicious of defendant's good
faith in selecting "McDcntal" name). Trademark infringement may also involve drugs.
E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc. 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding the
herbal antidepressant name Herbrozac too similar to Prozac, and thus infringing its
trademark).
35. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2006) (listing some defenses to what wvould
othenvise be infringement). In addition, a major issue with trade dress-what a
consumer would normally consider product packaging-is that there is no protection if
the trade dress is lunctional, regardless of any coniusion. See, e.g., Shire US, Inc. v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348. 350 n.2 (?d Cir. 2003); see alsoJerceny A. Greene & Aaron S.
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B. Drugs in the Marketplace
Now that the parameters of how drugs are protected by
intellectual property rights have been delineated, this section
turns to how drugs are regulated and sold in the commercial
marketplace. In particular, this section both explains how the
safety of drugs is governed by issues beyond intellectual property
rights and also clarifies some key terms that have been
repeatedly conflated in the context of in-transit seizures.
1. Drug Safety
Drug safety and efficacy are serious issues, but patents and
trademarks play little role in governing these matters. Drugs may
be substandard (poor quality) if they fail to meet scientific
specifications, or have become contaminated. Alternatively, fake
drugs contain ingredients different than indicated on the label,
or no active ingredient at all. However, patent and trademark
requirements are not relevant to safety issues. A patent can be
granted on a drug without any evidence that it is safe or effective
since the patent standards do not require evaluation of such
concepts. Similarly, a trademark signifies that a product is from
a particular source to help guarantee consistency, but does not
guarantee safety or efficacy since these are not requirements for
trademark protection.
In most developed countries, there is a domestic regulatory
agency that evaluates whether drugs are safe and effective before
they can be legally sold to consumers; drugs that do not go
through this process are illegal and considered unsafe., The
domestic regulatory agencies, such as the United States' Food
and Drug Administration, generally evaluate drugs and only
approves drugs for sale that are shown to be safe and effective
Kesselheim, 1Why Do the Sane Drugs Look Different? Pills, Trade Dress, and Public Health,
365 NLw ENG.J. MED. 83. 83 (2011).
36. Those who sell illegal drugs may be sub ect to criminal prosecution. See 21
U.S.C. 333 (2006). However, that does not necessarily prevent all illegal drugs from
reaching consumers. Indeed, to the extent that patented drugs are expensive. there is
an incentive for consumers to buy illegal drugs when there is no inexpensive
alternative. See General Information on Counterfeit Drugs WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/lledicines/sclviccs/countrfit/overview/Cn/idcxl1.htLiL (last
visited Sept. 24, 2011).
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based on scientific data." If a drug is not granted approval, it
cannot be lawfully sold. The same basic standard applies to new,
as well as generic drugs. However, a generic drug may be
approved based on more limited tests that show it is
"bioequivalent" to a previously approved (and usually patented)
drug, such that it is considered equally safe and effective.38
Whereas consumers in developed countries who buy legal
drugs are assured that the drugs are safe and effective, this is not
the case in a number of developing countries. Some poor
countries lack the resources-both financially and in terms of
technical expertise-to effectively analyze and monitor drug
safety." Some countries overcome this resource issue by relying
on the approval of other countries. For example, India will
approve drugs that have been approved in other countries, such
as the EU and the United States, with minimal testing in India.40
37. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006) (setting "safe and effective" as basic standard for
new drugs).
38. See id. 355(j) (2) (A).
39. WHO Policy Perspectives on Aledicines-Effective Aledicines Regulation: Ensuring
Safety, Efficacy and Quality, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Nov. 2003),
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4921e/s4921e.pdf. There are tremendous
costs associated with drug regulation. For exampic, in 2010 the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") budget wvas about US$2.4 billion. See Food and Drug
Administration: FY 2011 President's Budget Request All Purpose Table-Total Program Level
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/
ReportsMan ualsForns/ Reports/ BudgetReports/ UCM202312.pdf (lastvisited Sept. 24,
2011). This cost is underscored by the fact that roughly half the cost of drug regulation
is underwritten by fees fron drug companies that apply to the FDA for regulatory
approval. See, e.g., White Paper-Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUE4): Adding Resources
and Improving Performance in FDA Review of New Drug Applications, FooD AN) DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/PrescriptioniDrugUser
Fee/UCM i49130.pdf (last updated May 3, 2010). In addition, the World Health
Organization ("WHO") estimates that as many as one third of all countries have
limited or no ability to regulate drugs at all. WHO Policy Perspectives on Medicines, supra,
at 1.
40. Drugs & Cosmetics Act. No. 23 of 1940. INDIA CODE, 122 A(2), Schedule Y,
available at http://indiacode.nic.in: see also Sandhya Srinivasan, Trial by Fire. ECON. &
POL. WKLY., Aug. 29-Sept. 4, 2009, reprinted in INFOCHANGL (India) (Sept. 2009),
http://infochangeindia.org/health/analysis/trial-b)y-fire.html. In addition, the 'World
Health Organization ("WHO") prequalifies drugs for HIV. malaria. and tuberculosis.
See Prequalfcation Program, WORLD HEALTH ORG. http://apps.who.int/prequal/ (last
visited Sept. 24, 2011).
[Vol. 35:1
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However, other countries attempt to regulate their own drugs,
yet are ineffectual due to corruption.4 1
2. Terminology
Now that the landscape of intellectual property rights and
drug safety has been outlined, this section aims to explain
terminology that has been particularly confusing with respect to
in-transit drugs. In particular, this section explains what the
term "generic" means with respect to drugs and then how the
term "generic" is different from "counterfeit."
a. What is a Generic Drug?
What constitutes a generic drug may be confusing in the
global marketplace. This can be due to the fact that the word
"generic" may be used to refer either to the use of a generic
trademark (such as ibuprofen), or to suggest that the drug is
unpatented (yet equivalent to a previously patented drug). 4 In
addition, the same chemical compound may be patented in one
country, yet available as an unpatented generic in another. This
is a reflection of the fact that patents are territorially limited,
such that a US drug patent has no impact on whether that drug
is or is not patented in another country." Thus, a drug to
prevent strokes and heart attacks that is sold under the
trademark Plavix in the United States at a premium by patent
owner Sanofi AventiS44 is available as a cheaper generic drug in
41. Corruption is identified by the WHO as a major impediment to ensuring
access to quality medicine. See, e.g., Guitelle Baghdadi-Sabeti & Fatima Scrhan, WHO
Good GovernanceforAledicines Program me: An Innovative Approach to Prevent Cor uption in
the Pharmaceutical Sector, WORIi HEALTH ORG. 6 (2010), http:,//vw.who. int/
hcalthsystlns/topics/finantcing/healthreport/25GGM.pdf.
42. See supra Part I.A.2.
43. e Supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
44. The patent owner can sell a patented drug for a premiiun until the patent
expires, which, in the case of the drug sold as Plavix, is May 2012. See Patent Terms
Extended under 35 LTSC § 156, UNITED STATES PATENT AN) TRADEM\ARK OFFICE,
http://wwwuspto.gov/patcnt1s/rcsources/ter is/156jsp (last visited Sept. 25, 2011);
Matthew Perrone, FDA Extends Plavix Patent by 6 Months, ABC NEWS. Jan. 25, 2011,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business /ireStory id= 12758125. Although there is
technically no law that prCv ents a patent owner from maintaining the same price, the
entry of cheaper generics typically results in the patent owner substantially reducing
the drug's cost.
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India under the non-proprietary name clopidogrel because
there is no applicable Indian patent.
This Aiticle addresses an especially confusing and
previously uncharted area of nomenclature-what to call a drug
that is unpatented (and generally referred to as generic) in the
country of origin and destination, but might arguably infringe a
patent while in-transit. Many assume that a drug made as a
generic should always be considered a generic drug. This Article
will follow popular convention in referring to a drug as
"generic" if made as such, but with the important caveat that
this label does not mean to suggest that the "generic" drug
cannot infringe while in-transit.
b. Generic vs. Counterfeit Drugs
Another frequent point of confusion in discussions of in-
transit drugs involves the use of the word "counterfeit,"
particularly, concerning whether a generic drug is counterfeit.
The term "counterfeit" may refer to a counterfeit trademark, or
alternatively, to a drug of dubious quality and safety.
As noted above, the term "counterfeit" has a special
meaning for trademarks-it refers to the unauthorized use of a
mark that is identical to a trademark. For example, the use of
the mark "Tylenol" on a bottle of painkillers that is not made
(or authorized) by the owner of the trademark Tylenol would be
a counterfeit. Based on the trademark definition of the term
"counterfeit," some contend that the word "counterfeit" can
never apply to generic drugs that do not purport to use any
mark of the original brand owner, let alone the identical mark.
The term "counterfeit," however, is often used more
broadly. In particular, the term "counterfeit" may refer to sub-
standard medicines or falsified medicine. For example, a drug
may fail to contain adequate amounts of the active ingredient
listed, or none of the active ingredient. hile such drugs are
clearly problematic from a public health perspective, they raise
very different concerns than a counterfeit trademark. Some
health advocates strongly oppose the use of the term
"counterfeit" in connection with fake drugs and prefer to refer
[Vol. 35:1
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to drugs as "sub-standard" or "adulterated" to avoid confusion
with counterfeit trademarks and to emphasize what is at issue. 5
Some public health advocates seem to assume that the term
counterfeit can only properly refer to counterfeit trademarks
and that any other use of the term counterfeit is a purposeful
attempt to blur the lines between health and intellectual
property issues to justify increased intellectual property ("IP")
rights.4'
There may be an overlap in some cases. For example, an
unauthorized drug could have a counterfeit trademark on its
packaging.47 However, that does not mean that all products with
counterfeit trademarks are falsified. In addition, a generic name
of a drug is not a counterfeit trademark. Although it is true that
the only multilateral agreement on the definition of counterfeit
is with respect to trademarks, it is nonetheless used more
broadly. For example, both the Food and Drug Adminstration
("FDA") and the World Health Organization ("WHO") state
that counterfeit drugs include branded and generic products.48
Since generic drugs are by definition sold without a trademark,
45. See, e.g., EYE ON THE BALL: MEDICINE REGULATION-NOT IP ENFORCEMENT-
CAN BEST l)ELIVER QUALITY MEDICINES, OXFAM 23 (2011), http://www.oxfan.org/
sites/www, .oxfaim.org/filcs/cyc-on-thc-ball-icdicine-rcgulation-020211 -n.pdf
[hereinafter EYE ON THE BALL] (stating that the term "counterfeit" has little meaning
in the context of public health discussions, based on the trademark definition of
counterfeit); Counterfeit, Substandard and Generic Drugs, CAMPAIGN FOR ACCESS TO
ESSENTIAL MEDS., MEDICINS SANS FRONTIFIRES, http://www.isfaccess.org/main/access-
patents/counterfeit-substandard-and-generic-drugs/ (last updated Apr. 2009).
46. See, e.g., EYE ON THE BALL, supra note 45, at 24; Kaitlin Mara, Pointed
Exchange of Views at WHO Briefing on Counterfeit Drugs, IP-WATCH
(Mar. 31, 2010, 2:49 IM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/03/31 /flare-
up-in-who-brifing-on-countcrfcit/; Catherine Sacz, WHO Members to Work to
Disentangle Problem of Fake Medicines, IP Issues, IP-WATCH (Feb. 25,
2011, 12:24 AM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/02/26/who-
imembcrs- to-work-to-disentangle-problcim-of-fake-mcdicines-ip-
issues/.
47. An unauthorized drug with a counterfeit trademark is not the only possibility.
A falsified drug may not use any trademark, but instead be false in that it fails to
contain the stated ingrcdicnt(s).
48. See, e.g., Counterfeit Drugs Questions & Answers, FOOD AND I)RUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafcty/ucml69898.htm (last updated Sept. 8, 2011)
(cxplaining what constitutes a counterfeit drug and clarifying that counterfeit drugs
may include generic or brand name drugs); Substandard and Counterfeit Medicines,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Nov. 2003), http://www.who.int/mediaccntre/factsheets/
2003/fs275/cn/ (stating that "both branded and gencric products are subject to
counterfeiting").
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the use of the word "counterfeit" in this Article generally refers
to a sub-standard drug.4 9
II. A NEWFRAME WORK
This Part provides an analytical framework that explains
why there has been confusion and conflation of facts and law
concerning in-transit suspension of drugs. Although advocates
are known to use issue framing and rhetoric, there may be a
more fundamental phenomenon that gives rise to issue
framing. 0 In particular, this Article posits that many
misstatements stem from fundamentally different perspectives of
patent policy. These perspectives are important both to
understanding some of the statements that have been made and
to understanding, predicting, and addressing future actions.
This new theory may help fill in gaps left by traditional
patent theories. In particular, while there are a number of
theories concerning why countries grant patents, 1 those
theories are largely irrelevant to the current reality in which
countries set patent standards according to international
agreements that have trade benefits and not because of an
inherent agreement in patent theory.52 In addition, while some
49. The one exception to this is in the case study concerning in-transit
suspensions where some parties use the term "counterfeit" in ways that are ambiguous;
these references are retained as important to evaluating the patent schemas at issue.
50. The power of rhetoric and issue framing is widely recognized with respect to
the development of international laws that promote patent rights. See, e.g., SUSAN K.
SLLL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 5-6 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 2003); Amy
Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property,
117 YAiF I.J. 804, 809 (2008).
51. For example, patents can be seen as a "natural right" of inventors, or granted
as a "utilitarian" tool to promote innovations. However, these general theories
concerning the existence of a patent system do not provide guidance on how to fine
tune a patent system to consider social goals beyond innovation, such as access to
medicine.
52. Although some suggested that developing countries would benefit from
enhanced patent rights, that view was, and continues to be, challenged. Rather, TRIPS
was concluded despite the patent requirements because developing countries were keen
to gain greater access to the markets of wealthy W1O members. See generally GFRVAIS,
supra note 26, at 336 (noting that the patent section was one of the most contentious
aspects of negotiation); Arie Reich, The 170 as a Law-Hatrmoniing Ins itution, 25 U. PA.
INT'L ECON. L. 321, 362 (2004) (suggesting that the WTO and TRIPS succeeded
[Vol. 35:1
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scholars have suggested that patent rights should be either
maximized or minimized consistent with traditional patent
theories, these arguments assume that one approach is
necessarily correct?3  In contrast, the patent perspectives
presented here, based on social science support, suggest that
there may be different views of patent policy, each of which will
lead to different perceptions of facts and laws.
This Part is divided into two sections. The first section
provides an overview of social science information relevant to
the patent perspective theory. The next section explains the
patent perspectives based upon lessons from social science.
A. Social Science Foundation
1. Schemas
Social science literature repeatedly documents that people
receive and understand new information based upon certain
pre-existing "schemas," 4 which are developed through direct
because it was a package deal). Developing countries opposed inclusion of patcnts and
wanted to limit intellectual property rights to only counterfeit trademark and pirated
copyright goods. See, e.g., Connunication from the Permanent Mission of India to the
Indian Negotiating Grp., Standards and Principles Concerning the Availability Scope and Use
of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, MTN.(N(, N, 1 /W/37, [ 2-4 (July 10,
1989).
53. In particular, patent rights and exceptions arc often referred to as promoting
either a "liability" or "property" rule. See. e.g:, Robert P. Merges, OJ Property Rules,
Coase, and Intellectual Propety, 94 COiUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994). Those who
support the use of compulsory licenses of patentcd drugs arc considered to promlotc a
liability rule whereas those who oppose such licenses are considered to promote a
property rule.
54. This Artidc uses thc term "schema" broadly to refer to any organizing
principle, hypothesis, script, or prototype that functions as a mental organizing system.
See Reid Hastic, Schematic Principles in Human MWenory. in 1 SocIAL COGNITION: THE
ONTARIO SYM POSIUM 39. 39-47 (Edward Tory Higgins & Mark P. Zanna eds. 1981); see
also MARTHA kUGOUSTINOS ET AL., SOCIAL COGNITION: AN INTEGRATED INTRODU CTION
68 (2d ed. 2006) (defining a schema as a "cognitive structure" which "contains general
expectations and knowledge of thc world"). Use of thc term "schena" and related
social science concepts such as "categories" and "concepts" are used differently by
different social science scholars. See, e.g., Ronald (hen & Jon Hanson, Categorically
Biased: The Influence ofKnowledge Structures on Law and Legal Thety, 77 S. CA L. RLV.
1103, 1131-32 (2004) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, Categoricall Bised]. In addition,
thc terms "script" and "meta-scripts" have been used. Ronald (hen & Jon Hanson, The
Illusion o Law: The Legitmating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law. 103 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 3-4 (2004) [hereinater Chen & Hanson, The Illusion oj Law]. However, one
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experience, as well as communication with others.5 Individuals
rely on schemas in processing information, drawing conclusions,
and generally perceiving their every day life.5 In addition,
individuals are likely to remember facts consistent with
schemas.57
Schemas often function as an unconscious lens through
which information is perceived. One simple schema is a
stereotype-including not only gender and racial stereotypes,
but also stereotypes about occupations (such as lawyers as
mercenaries).58 A schema could also be a bias that does not rise
to the level of a broadly-recognized stereotype. For example, a
schema could involve a bias that perceives more complexly
written articles as better.59 Schemas may be more complex; for
unifying trend of particular pertinence to this Article is that they focus on a mental
concept that serves as a lens through which future experiences are viewed.
55. See, e.g:, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY, 158-60 (Alan E. Kazdin ed., 2000).
56. Id.
57. Id. For example. studies consistently show that race and gender stcreotypes
impact memory recall and mistake. See, e.g., Alison P. Lenton et al., 1lusions of Gende
Stereotypes Evoke False Memories, 37 j. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 3, 11 (2001)
(showing that subjects created false memories based on gender stereotypes); Richard L.
Marsh & Gabriel I. Cook, Gender and Orientation Stereotypes Bias Source-Monitoring
Attributions, 14 MEMORY 148, 157-58 (2006) (illustrating that participants misremember
facts that are consistent with gender and racial stereotypes); see also Jeanine L. Skorinko
& Barbara A. Spellman, Stereotypic Crimes: How Group-Crime Associations Affect
Memory and (Sometimes) Verdicts and Sentencing (June 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), cited in Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equat Ity Anplicit Bias,
Decsion making, and Misreebrg, 57 D1KE LJ. 345, 375 n.154. 378 (2007) (showing
that sub ects were more like to accurately recall race in instances that wvere consistent
with a racial stereotype, such as Caucasian perpetuator of the stereotypical white crime
of identity fraud). In addition, memory may be impacted by non-stereotypical schemas.
See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastic, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision
MWaking, 51 1. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242, 251 (1986) (mock jurors not only
forget incongruent facts, but also misremember facts that wvere not in evidence to
support a pre-cxisting judgmcnt).
58. (hen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 54, at 1125. In fact. jokes can
be predicated on cultural schemas, wvith the punch line of the joke playing on a
presumed shared schema; some such schcmas include women as shoppers,. and men as
disinclined to commit to personal relationships. Id at 1111-12.
59. See, e.g., J. Scott Armstrong, Unintelligible Management Research and Academic
Prestige 10 INTERFACES 80, 84-85 (1980) (finding that management faculty from
several prestigious institutions had a bias toward more complkx language that resulted
in academics rating more complex conclusion sections of research as superior in
quality). In addition. students and educators alike have a schema that strongly favors
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example, a philosophy that values market self-regulation over
government regulation can be considered a schema.co
All individuals rely on schemas. For example, Justice Joseph
P. Bradley of the United States Supreme Court evidenced a
schema about the inferiority of women when he commented
that "[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life."bl More recently, there is a growing
body of literature that shows that while our society may be more
egalitarian than in the 1800s, stereotypes, such as racial bias
against blacks continue, albeit often at a more unconscious level.
For example, a physical bump may be viewed as aggressive when
done by a black actor, but innocuous when done by a white
actor; this difference exists even in individuals who display no
conscious animus against blacks.62 Such bias is shown by
individuals in a variety of professions including police officers,
teacher charisma and other non-substantive content in evaluating the teacher or
lecturer. A famous study of an actor posing as "Dr. Fox" suggested that even trained
academics are susceptible to a common bias that ascribes weight to a teacher's
[personal traits] more than content. Donald H. Naftulin et al., The Doctor Fox Lecture: A
Paradigm of Educational Seduction, 48 J. MED. EDLC. 630, 633-34 (1973). The "Dr. Fox"
study may also demonstrate a related schema that speakers have authority if they act
with authority and are given authoritative titles. This is also depicted in the movie The
Yes MWen, in which two individuals embody fake personas and make controversial points
that are generally accepted without question by well-educated audiences. THE YES MEN
(Yes Men Films, LLC 2003).
60. See Chen & Hanson, The Illusion ofLaw, supra note 54. at 87-89.
61. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872). The impact of schemas on the
Court was shown in a more contemporary case in which Justices held different views of
the same video of a police officer that riamined his car into a fleeing motorist. Scott V.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). The justices held dramatically different interpretations of
the view that was of critical importance to whether to affirm a lower courLts denial of a
summiary judgmtnt motion by an officer that his use of admittedly deadly force did not
constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 379, 395-96. A
subsequent study revealed that the views likely reflected different cultural values-
which can be considered a schema-that played a prominent rolk in perception of the
same facts. See Dan M. Kahan et al., 1Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris
and the Perils of CognitiveIlliberalism, 122 HARV. L REV. 837, 860-61 (2009).
62. H. Andrew Sagar & Jantt Ward Schofield. Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black
and White Childrers Perceptions ofAmbiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 j PERSONALITY & SOc.
PSYCHOL. 590, 593-97 (1980); see also Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and
Attribution of Intergoup Violence, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 590 (1976).
The fact that individuals may subconsciously view facts differently, depending on the
race of an actor, is considered implicit racial bias-as opposed to conscious bias against
blacks. Christine Jolls &- Cass R. Sunstein, The Law ofaiplicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. RL. 969.
970 (2006).
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judges, and doctors. Although stereotypes are commonly
studied, there are additional schemas that influence individuals.
For example, studies have shown social science academics to
favor studies consistent with their own beliefs64 or prevailing
wisdom;65 they also perceive work from individuals at prestigious
schools as more worthy of publication.66
2. Confirmation Bias
People tend to interpret new information consistent with
their schemas. For example, a teacher who believes a certain
student is smart is likely to interpret subsequent performance
consistent with this schema.67 This tendency to view new
63. See, e.g., Alexander R. Green et al., Inplicit Bias among Physicians and Its
Prediction oj Thrombolysis Decisionsfor Black and 1hite Patients, 22J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
1231, 1234-35 (2007) (documenting implicit racial bias among doctors that resulted in
more appropriate treatment to whites than blacks); jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trialjudges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2009)
(describing implicit racial bias in judges); L. Song Richardson, Airest Efficienc and the
Forith Am ndmn t, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2060-98 (2011) (detailing implicit racial bias
in police offcers); janice A. Sabin et al., Physicians' Implicit and Explicit Attitudes about
Race by AID Race, Ethnicity, and Gender. 20 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED
896, 907 (2009) (indicating that most doctors have implicit racial bias against blacks).
64. See, e.g., Andreas Hergovich et al., Bised Evaluation of Abstracts Depending on
Topic and Conclusion: Further Evidence of a Confirmation Bias Within Scientific Psychology 29
CURRENT PSYCHOL. 188, 188-89 (2010) (showing that psychologists reviewing abstracts
of research were more likely to evaluate research as higher quality when consistent with
their own beliefs); Michael J. Mahoney, Publication Prejudices: An Experimental Study of
Confirmato)y Bias in the Peer Review System, 1 COGNITIVE THElRAPY AND REs. 161 (1977).
5 See, e.g:, J. Scott Armstrong, Publication of Research on Controversial Topics: The
Eali Acceptance Procedure. 12 INT'L.J. FORLCASTING 299. 299 (1996); David F. Horrobin,
The Philosophical Basis oJ Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 jAMA, 1438,
1441 (1990).
66. In one study, twelve papers published by individuals from prestigious
psychology departments at various colleges and universities were resubmitted to the
same highly regarded journals in which the work had appeared, but with false author
names and affiliations (c.g., Tri-Valley (enter for Human Potential). Almost all (cight
of nine) of the papers not detected as previously published work. were rejected on the
basis of negative recommendations from most reviewers-even though the identical
papers were previously worthy of publication. Stephen J. Ceci & Douglas P. Peters, Peer
Review Practices ofPsychologicaljournal: The Fate oJ Published Articles, Submitted Again, 5
liEHAV. & 1RAIN SCL, 187, 187-255 (1982).
67. Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Econom)ics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 26 (1998).
Similarly, counselors in clinical settings become increasingl more confident in initial
judgments, although research shows that the confidence is not correlated with
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information to confirm existing schemas is referred to as
"confirmation bias."68 Although this may seem to be inferior
cognitive processing, it has also been explained as an adaptive
survival skill.6 For example, an individual who has a schema that
snakes are dangerous has an "advantage" over someone who
insists on testing every snake to determine its dangerousness.
Even though not all snakes are dangerous, the individual with
the snake danger schema will more likely avoid physical harm.
When information is ambiguous, it is especially likely to be
interpreted consistent with confirmation bias, thereby
preserving the pre-existing schema. When evidence is
ambiguous, individuals emphasize the strength and reliability of
confirming evidence, but deemphasize the weakness and
unreliability of disconfirming evidence, such that prior views are
strengthened.' For example, in evaluating research, individuals
are more likely to overlook the problem of small sample sizes if
the conclusion is consistent with their beliefs, yet suggest that
lack of rigor is a problem if the conclusion is contrary to their
beliefs.72
The confirmation bias exists even in cases where the
ambiguous evidence is minimal in nature. For example, one
study showed confirmation bias of pre-existing schemas
concerning academic abilities of children from rich or poor
backgrounds based solely on an ambiguous videotape of a
child's performance.7 In the videotape, the child answered
increased accuracy. See, e.g., Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case Studyfudgments, 29J.
CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 261, 264-65 (1965).
68. The same phenomenon has alternatively been called belief perseverance,
biased assimrilation, conservatismL, confirnational response bias, or agreement effect.
See, e.g., Hergovich et al., supra note 64, at 188. It is suggestcd that individuals are lost
susceptible to this phenomenon when the schema is easily "activated," strong, or
consistent with a "franework of related opinions and values." Charles G. Lord & Cheryl
A. Taylor, Biased Assimilation: Effects of Assumptions and Expectations on the Interpretation of
New Evidence, 3 SOc. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPAss 827, 831 (2009).
69. E.g., Hal R. Aikes. Costs and Benefits ofJudgment Lrrors: Implicationsfor Debiasing,
110 PSCYHOL. BULL 486 (1991); Lord & Taylor, supra note 68, at 831.
70. Lord & Taylor, supra note 68, at 831.
71. The reason this occurs is that peoplc have an inherent need to ignore,
discredit, or rationalize inconsistent inforination to avoid the discomrfort of cognitive
dissonance. E.g., LEON FESTINGER, ATHEORYOF COGNITIVE DISSONANCF 2-3 (1957).
72. See KLNDA, supra note 3, at 229.
73. See John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling
Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 20 (1983). Subjects in two groups wvere
2011] 23
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questions with mixed success, but subjects came to differing
conclusions based on whether they believed the child was from a
wealthy or poor background. In particular, subjects who
believed that a child was from a wealthy home interpreted the
child's ambiguous performance to support their belief that the
child had above average reading ability whereas subjects who
believed the child was from a poor home interpreted the same
ambiguous performance to support a belief that the child had
below average reading ability.7 4
In addition, individuals may become more polarized in
their views after "interpreting" the same ambiguous evidence. In
a study on the deterrent effects of capital punishment, subjects
were randomly provided ambiguous "evidence" about the
deterrent effects of capital punishment and later asked whether
the evidence supported or discredited their views.7 The subjects
became more entrenched in their views; for example, those who
were already positively disposed to capital punishment believed
more in its deterrent effect.76 The same effect was found in a
study focused on subjects with pro- and anti-nuclear views.
Confirmation bias may result in ambiguous information
being perceived differently by those with different group
identities, such that prior schemas are maintained. A famous
example of this involves the impact of school allegiance as a
group identity. In particular, college students shown a film of a
football game in which officials made a series of controversial
decisions were viewed differently by students of two different
shown different videos of the child playing-cither in a wealthy suburban area or an
impoverished inner-city school. Id. at 23. In addition. subjects who viewed the child in
the wealthy neighborhood were told that the parents were college educated with white-
collar Jobs whereas those who viewed the child in the poor neighborhood were told
that the parents were college graduates with blue-collar jobs. Id.
74. Id. at 20.
75. Charles G. Lord et al., BiasedAssimilation and Attitude Polaizaton The EJfects oJ
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONAIFY & SOC. PSCYHOL.
2098, 2098 (1979).
76. Id.
77. S. Plous, Biases in the Assimnlation of Technological Breakdowns: Do Accidents Make
Us Safer? 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1058, 1068 (1991) (finding that fifty-four percent
of pro-nuclear sub ects became more pro-nuclear and fourty-liye percent of anti-
nuclear subjects became more anti-nuclear).
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schools.78 Students who attended the offending team's college
reported seeing half as many illegal plays as did students from
the opposing institution.79 In other words, group ties had an
unconscious, yet powerful effect in viewing the facts to favor
their group affiliation.so The same effect has been found outside
of experimental settings. For example, democratic and
republican partisans who watched the same presidential debate
each viewed their preferred candidate as performing better.81
Schemas are sufficiently powerful that they not only shape
views of ambiguous evidence, but may even serve as a prism to
either find ambiguity or entirely disregard inconsistent
evidence. For example, despite substantial scientific support for
the global warming phenomenon,82 some believe that the
evidence is either ambiguous or supports a contrary
conclusion.8 Although this contemporary controversy may be
difficult for some readers who consider one view or another to
be "clearly" false, history can provide evidence of the impact of
schemas through a now generally discarded schema. For
78. See generally Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study,
49 . ABNORM. & SOC. PSCYHOL. 129 (1954).
79. Id. at 132.
80. For an additional examplc of this phenomenon, see generally Robert P.
Vallone et al., The Hostile Aedia Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media
Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre, 49 j. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 577 (1985)
(finding that pro-Aiab and pro-Israeli students watching the same news coverage of a
massacre of civilians viewed the coverage as consistent with their pre-existing schemas).
81. Geoffrey 1). Munro et al., Biasd -7Assilaton of Sociopolitical Argunents:
Evaluating the 1996 US. Presidential Debate, 24 BASIC & APpIiTED Soc. PSYCHOi. 15, lI
(2002).
82. See, e.g., jOINT SCIENCE ACADEMIES,JOINT SCIENCE ACADEMIES' STATEMENT ON
GROWT[H AND RESPONSIBILITY: S -STAINABILYTY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND CLIMATE
PROTECTION (2007). http:'//mw.nationalacademies.org/includes/G8Statement
Energy_07_May.pdf; G8+5 ACADEMIES, G8+5 ACADEMIES' JOINT STATEMENT: CLIMATE
CHANGE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENERGY TECHNOLOGTES FOR A LOW CARBON
FUTURE (2009), http://www.inationalacademies.org/intludes /G8+5nergy-
climate09.pdf; see also The Consensu on Global Warming: Fr Science to Indushy &
Reliion, LOGICAL SCIENCE, http://www.Iogicalscience.com scontensus/consensus
Dl.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
83. See, e.g., Mike Hulme, The Science and Politics of Climate Change, WAL. ST. J.,
Dec. 2. 2009, http://online.wsj.com /article/SB100014240527487041071045745716
13215771336.htmnl: Leslic Kaufman. Among Weathercasters, Doubt on Warming. N.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at Al; Andrew C Revkin, Hacked E-WaillIs New Fodder for Climate
Change Dispute, N.Y. TIMES. Mar. 20, 2009, at Al: The Truth about Denial NLWSWLK
(Aug. 12, 2007. 8:00 PM), ltt://ww.tLhedailyb)east.coil/lewsweek/2007/08/13/ite-
truth-about-denial.htn.
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example, in the late 1800s when there was a common schema
that women were inferior to men, that schema seemed to prevail
even when women defied expectations. In particular, in the late
1800s, a female student who excelled at Cambridge University
did not receive the same recognition as her male cohorts;
whereas her male cohorts had their name published in the
official class list, hers was not, prohibiting her from including
the initials "B.A." after her name.84 In this case, the inconsistent
information about a female student was simply ignored.
Moreover, the process of articulating support for a certain
schema, such as a particular theory, may serve to reinforce that
schema. Studies have shown this effect to exist in general and
even in the extreme case where the schema was subsequently
discredited.85 This has important implications for the
reinforcement of schemas in individuals in some occupations.
For example, academics and judges may reinforce schemas by
documenting their rationale. This may seem counterintuitive
since some suggest that writing promotes careful reasoning.8
Although the process of writing may help with the reasoning
84. Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 54, at 1116 (citing RITA
MCWILLIAMS TULLBERG, W\OMLN AT CAMBRIDGL 58 (1998)).
85. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson et al., Perseverance oJ Social Theories: The Role oJ
Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Infor mation, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1037, 1039, 1041 (1980) (describing an experiment in which subjects who
were told to provide a written explanation of a case study suggesting a relationship
between risk taking and success as a fire fighter continued to believe in the relationship
even after told that information was false); Timothy D. Wilson & Suzanne j. LaFleur,
Knowing What You'll Do: Effects ofAnalyzing Reasons on SelfPrediction, 68J. IERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 21. 23, 26 (1995) (examining a study involving members of sororities
who were asked to predict their own behavior toward fuiture sorority members, with
some randomly assigned to explain why in writing; those who "reasoned" their
predictions were significantly more overconfident in their evaluations than those who
did not); Lee Ross et al., Social Explanation and Social Expectation: EfJects of Real and
Hypothetical Explanations on Subjective Likelihood 35.j. PERSONALITY & SOC. PYSCHOiL 817
(1977) (asserting that subjects who were provided a case study and were asked to
explain why it reached a certain result, then were told that there was actually no
information about any result, were more likely to predict the occurrence of the event
they had explained than those who were not asked to give any explanation).
86. See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather, iting, Cogn ition, ad the Nature of the Judicial
Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1284 (2008).
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process in general, it may simultaneously reinforce some
schemas.
3. Naive Realism
The operation of schemas is further complicated by the fact
that individuals are generally unaware of their own schemas,
frequently referred to as biases, yet have a heightened sensitivity
to the presumed biases of others; this is referred to as naive
realism.88 For example, an individual will assume that their
position on how to address the US budget deficit is based solely
on an objective analysis, such that they are likely to believe that
others who are objective will share the same position; those that
do not will be presumed to lack essential information,
intelligence, or objectivity." The lack of objectivity could be
attributable to multiple factors including, but not limited to,
political ideology, self-interest, or other bias.o
Individuals are not completely oblivious to possible flaws in
perceptions, but when they actually perceive new information,
87. In particular, if writing is considered a form of increased thought, that may
not necessarily reduce operation of schemas. See gene rally Duane T. Wegner et al., Not
All StereotypigIs Created Equal: Difern tial Conequen es of Thoughtful versus Aonthoughtful
Sterot'yping 90J. PERSONAITY & Soc. P'CHOL 42 (2006) (suggesting that the process of
writing down impressions does not necessarily I ad to reduction of stereotype schema
and may produce stereotypic per eptions with long lasting effects).
88. See, e.g., Robert J. Robinson ct al., Actual versus Assumed Differences in Construal:
"Naive Realism" in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
404, 404 (1995); see also Adarn Benforado & Jon Hanson, Narve Cynicism: Maintaining
False Perceptions in Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499, 513-14 (2008). In addition, the sarne
phenomenon has been observed without the use of this term. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHL IL RFV. 1175, 1182-84 (1997) (referring to "[s] elf-
[s]eiving [b]ias, [u]nirealistic [o]ptinisin. and [o]verconfidence" in licu of the term
"naive realism"). Furthermore, although not identical, a related trend that most peoplc
acknowledge, albeit not in themselves, is the tendency for individuals to be overly
optimistic about their own situation. For examplc, although entering law students know
that not everyone can be at the top of their class, most students believe that they will
near the top of the class. See, e.g , Ari I. Kaplan, tMuwld Law, School arningLabe Help?,
N\T i .J., Mar. 8, 2010; ee als Kaplan Survey: Despite Challenging job Market,
Tomorrow's Lawyers Appear to Have a Healthy Outlook on Their Own Job Prospects,
but Not Their Classmates', KAPIAN (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.kaplan.com/
aboutkaplan/newsroom /Pages/ne wsrooin.aspxID=5 71 (reporting that law students
are More confideit about hecir eniploymient prospects Iin- thosc of hicr pcer's).
89. See, e.g., Erily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment,
11 TRLNDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 37, 40 (2006) (using an examplc of bias based on
position on latest welfare reform bill).
90. Id.
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they are oblivious to possible distortions in thinking. "
Individuals are not consciously aware of bias that may impact the
process of makingjudgments and inferences, such that they are
inclined to believe that their judgments are neutral; those who
disagree, on the other hand, are assumed to be biased as an
explanation for a difference in opinion. Moreover, individuals
can recall sometimes struggling to be objective and thus have a
perception that this struggle reflects a cognitive process that is
fair and balanced.' Accordingly, although individuals recognize
that biases exist, they generally consider themselves less
vulnerable to biases than others. For example, in one
experiment where subjects were informed that all individuals
suffer from a self-serving bias, subjects nonetheless believed that
only other subjects, not themselves, were in fact vulnerable to
such a bias.>4
The problems of naive realism are also compounded in
cases of disagreements. There is a tendency to assume that the
cause of the disagreement is that the other party is subject to
bias.95 Individuals are quick to assume that the political
affiliations of others bias them toward certain positions, yet deny
that their own political affiliation might impact their views.'@ For
example, in a study of students concerning terrorism responses
after 9/11, students were more likely to view other students as
biased when their views differed from their own.9 7
91. See Enily Pronin et al., Objetiv ty in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions
ofBias in Selfversus Others, 111 PSY HOL. RLV. 781, 783-84 (2004).
92. See Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self versus
Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BiLL 369, 378 (2002).
93. Pronin, supra note 91. at 784.
94. Pronin, supra note 92, at 378.
95. See, e.g., id. at 379: see also Kathleen A. Kennedy & Emily Pronin. Wen
Disagreement Gets Ugly: Perceptions ofBias and the Escalation of Conflict, 34 PLRSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 833. 834 (2008) (suggesting that the assumption that others are
biased is especially relevant to disagreements).
96. Pronin, supra note 89, at 38 (Citing Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Polic The
Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 808
(2003)): Pronin, supra note 91, at 783 (suggesting that opposing partisans can suggest a
range of biases including scf interest, peer group pressure, and media brainwashing to
account for the difference of opinion that is presumed to be erroneous).
97. Pronin, supra note 89. at 39.
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B. The Two Patent Policy Schemas
This Article builds upon this rich literature concerning the
existence and operation of schemas, confirmation bias, and
naive realism to show how two different patent schemas have
impacted the interpretation of facts and laws concerning in-
transit suspensions. However, before presenting the case study
of these schemas in the context of in-transit suspensions, this
section first presents two schemas of patent policy:" patents as
either an uber-right or as a privilege."
This Section focuses on two fundamental schemas
concerning patent policy that are essential to the question of the
proper scope of patent rights in light of issues concerning access
to affordable medicine. Although there is an arguable schema
that considers all patents to be problematic and improper, the
two schemas presented here both assume that patents can and
98. In addition, there may be complementary schemas at issue. For example, the
privilege view may also have a schema that is suspicious of profit-making corporations
that own patents: on the other hand, individuals with an uber-right view may consider
anyone advocating greater access to drugs as an anti-property activist or hooligan.
99. As noted earlier, all individuals, this author included, are subject to schemas.
There seems to be a schema perpetuated by the pharmaceutical industry that patents
are essential to innovation and necessarily outwveigh societal harm from the
exclusionary power of patents. This schema is a widespread view among politicians and
much of the general public. I myself held this schema and was influenced by it in
writing my iirst article as a law professor; although some professors challenged some of
my assumptions concerning the social impact of patent rights, I generally maintained
my schema that patent rights were not generally a problem and found comfort in the
comments of those that did not question my schema. See Cynthia M. Ho, Patents,
Patients and Public Polic,. 33 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 601, 645-50 (2000) (arguing that the
patent right to exclude is fundamental and should not be disturbed because of its
possible negative impact on innovation). Although those initial comments did not
immediately change my view, greater exposure to more information about how drugs
are developed, as well as different approaches to patent rights and the impact of such
rights has changed my views. Although I believe that I now have a more balanced
perspective of patent rights, although I likely still suffer from a schema-albeit
probably tilted somewhat more in the direction towards favoring exceptions to patent
rights. Although my changing views are anecdotal, they are consistent wvith research
that indicatcs that individuals may become less influenced by schcmas as they are more
cognizant of them. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Richeson & Richard J. Nussbaum, The anpact of
Multicu ltualis'm versus Color Blndnes on Racial Bias, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
417, 421 (2004) (showing that participants who learned about the virtues of
imiulticulturalisi had lower implicit racial bias than participants exposed to race-ncutral
information).
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should exist in at least some cases. 100 Focusing only on schemas
that assume patents should exist is most consistent with the
current reality in which most nations provide patent rights, yet
the scope of current patent rights may be at odds with patent
schemas. In particular, although WTO member nations are
required to provide patent rights pursuant to TRIPS,o'0 the
scope of those rights may create tensions for countries to the
extent that those rights vary in scope from a domestic patent
perspective. To some degree, tensions that reflect different
patent schemas are more likely now than when TRIPS was first
concluded. Alter all, the language in TRIPS was sufficiently
ambiguous such that it could be interpreted consistently with
both patent policy schemas. However, the different schemas are
more readily apparent when interpreting how certain TRIPS
provisions apply to specific issues. As will be discussed later, the
TRIPS provisions concerning border measures could be
interpreted differently based on different patent perspectives. 0
Before turning to the legal questions, however, this section first
aims to clarify the patent schemas.
1. The Privilege Perspective
One side of the spectrum asserts that patents are a
privilege, inherently subject to limitations and exceptions. As
stated by Professor Brook Baker,o10 " [p]atents are not 'property'
in the traditional sense-they are government granted rights
that are intended to balance the interests of innovators and the
100. Of course, another possibility is that the schema of patents as privilege is a
subset of the schema that believes all patents are improper, or that patents are
improper for developing Countries, without regard to what TRIPS preseny requires.
See generally Alan V. DeardorlT, Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Developing
Countries? 13 WORLD ECON. 497 (1990) (suggesting that developing countries be
exempt fron patent protection): Jean Olson Lanjouw, Beyond TRIPS: A New Global
Patent Regim, I C(GD BRIEF ((t. for Global Dev., Washington, DC), Aug. 2002, at 3,
available at http://wwW.iprsonlinoC.rg/ictsd/docs/cgdbrief003.pdf (suggesting that
comrpanies choose between patent protettion in wealthy or poor countries. but not
both, in the case of global diseases).
101. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27.
102. See infra Part IV.A..
103. Professor Brook liaker is associated wvith Health Global Access Project, which
is dedicated to climinating barriers to access to H1V treatncnt.
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public at large, and which are granted by governments with
many express and implied conditions . . . ."104 The United
Nations Commissioner of Human Rights supports the idea of
patents as a privilege that must be "subject to limitations in the
public interest."'o1 In particular, the United Nations ("UN") has
suggested that certain human rights, such as the right to health,
are "inalienable and universal," and must be recognized over
state-granted rights, such as patents.onb Moreover, the UN
Commissioner has suggested that, to the extent there is an
"actual or potential conflict," patent rights should yield to the
right to public health. 07
The view of patents as a privilege, rather than an absolute
right, suggests that the patent privilege should give way to other
important social interests-such as a societal interest in
promoting low-cost access to medicine. This view does not
necessarily reject the idea that patent rights can promote
innovation. It is a view, however, that requires a more balanced
consideration of the extent to which innovation should be
promoted if it negatively impacts access to medicine.
Prior to TRIPS, the patent laws of a number of countries
seemed to reflect this view of patents as a privilege. In particular,
even in countries that provided patent rights, a number of them
excluded drugs from patentabilit. 10s This would be consistent
with the patents as a privilege view that patents should be
limited when necessary to promote public health. For example,
India's prior patent laws permitting patents on methods of
104. Brook K Baker, Pharnas Seven Deadly Lies about Thai Compulsory Licenses,
CONSUMER PROJFCT ON TECH. (Feb. 1, 2007, 11:14 AM), http:/,/vww.cptech.org/
blogs/ipdisputesiniedicine/2007/02/phairias-seve n-deadIly-lics-about-thai.htil.
105. U.N. High Conm'r for Human Rights, Sub-Commn'n on the Promotion &
Prot. of Human Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, 1 1, U.N. Doc.
E/(N.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (2000) [hereinafter Resolution 2000/7].
106. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council. Sub-Conm'n on Promotion and Prot.
of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 14, U.N. Doc.
E/CNA/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001) (suggesting that rights under TRIPS, which are state-
granted rather than inalienable, should. where appropriate, bow to the more universal
human rights, such as the right to health); accord Resolution 2000/7, supra note 105,
1 3, (reminding "all governments of the primacy of human rights obligations over
economic policies and agreceents").
107. See Resolution 2000/7, supra note 105, pmbl. para. 11.
108. See Cynthia M. Ho, A Naew World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public
Health, 82 CHIL. KLNT L. RLV. 1469. 1511-13 (2007) (discussing the exceptions that India
created to limit drug patentability, albeit subsequent to TRIPS).
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creating drugs, but not the drugs themselves, fully embodies this
view. This system maximized innovation in drug development
while minimizing negative impacts on access to medicine. In
particular, a patent on a method of creating a drug would not
prevent others from developing new and improved methods. At
the same time, since only the method was patented, and not the
drug itself, the unpatented drug would likely be affordable.
Similarly, this view of patents as a privilege, subservient to
providing low-cost drugs, is consistent with compulsory licenses
of issued patents. A compulsory license is a widespread
exception to traditional patent rights, which permits a nation to
force a patent owner to accept a license, subject to a state-
determined royalty, in certain situations that a country considers
appropriate. 1001 Countries that grant patents on food and drugs,
but permit automatic compulsory licenses of such patents would
be consistent with the privilege view of patents. Although
automatic licenses are no longer permissible pursuant to
TRIPS,11 more limited licenses of patented drugs to promote
public access to drugs similarly reflect the view of patents as
privilege. This would be especially true with respect to drugs that
are considered essential, or in the case where a nation had
promised universal access to essential drugs. Accordingly, those
with a privilege view would strongly support and even
109. See Robert C. Bird, Developing Nations and the Compulsoy License: Maximizing
Access to Essential Medicines while Minimiing Investment Side Effects, 37J. L. MLD. & ETHICS
209, 209-210 (2009) (discussing the development and importance of compulsory
licenses in developing countries to promote the manufacture and sale of patented
drugs within its borders); see generally Adi Gillat, Compulsoty Licensing to Regulated
Licensing: Effects on the Conflict between Innovation and Access in the Pharmaceutical Industy,
58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 711 (2003) (explaining compulsory licenses generally and, in
particular, the US approach).
110. See, e.g., GERVAlS, supra note 26, at 391 (stating that TRIPS does not permit
categories of inventions to be automatically licensed); CARLoS M. CORREA. TRADE
RELATED ASPLCTS OF INTELLLCTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 320 (2007) (noting that licenses cannot be granted by sub'ec matter
because of the requirement for individual consideration); UN(TAI)/I(TSD,
RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 468 (2005) (noting that governments
should avoid "blanket authorizations" for entire technologies).
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congratulate nations that issued compulsory licenses to promote
broader access to patented drugs."'
The view of patents as a privilege not only suggests that
patent rights should be flexible in general, but also that they
should necessarily be modified to promote access to patented
drugs. Opinions on the extent to which patent rights should be
modified may differ, even among individuals that consider
patents a privilege. For example, some may consider a right to
health to necessarily include a right to any and all medical
treatment that might improve health. Alternatively, others might
hold a more tempered view that would only suggest modifying
patent rights on drugs that are considered "essential" in some
capacity. Regardless of these differences, there is a uniform
belief that patented drugs necessarily impede affordable access
to drugs during the patent term, such that patent rights should
be modified.
The view of patents as privilege may be accompanied by
related views, whether they are considered part of the overall
privilege schema, or complementary schemas. For example,
since patents are often owned by large companies that are seen
to spend substantial amounts of money on promoting drug
sales, patent rights could be considered to simply fill the coffers
of greedy companies.11 Suspicion of drug companies could
promote naive realism in that any actions and statements made
by such companies would be assumed to be biased. In addition,
there may be a related schema concerning wealthy countries
where patent owners tend to reside. In particular, such countries
could also be viewed sceptically as only being interested in
111. For example, in hailing Thailand's issuance of comrpulsory licenses. Dr. David
Wilson of M6decins Sans Frontieres ("MSF") stated that "the lives of patients have to
come before the patents of drug companies," in support of the compulsory license as
an appropriate modification to the default patent rights. Press Release, M6dccins Sans
Frontieres, MSF Welcomes Move to Overcome Patent on AIDS Drug in Thailand,
Campaign for Access to Essential Medicine (Nov. 29, 2006), available at
http://wwwmsfaccess.org/our-work/hiv-aids/artick/389.
112. P'atent-owning companies are frequently criticized for spending more money
on the advertisement and promotion of drugs than on scientific research. See, e.g.,
Mac-Andrd Gagnon & Joel Lexchin. The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of
Phamaceutical Promotio Expen diues in the United States, 5 P1 OS MED. 29, 32 (2008).
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maximizing their own wealth and possibly doing so at the
expense of other countries and their health."
2. The Uber-Right Perspective
The alternative perspective views a patent as a very strong
property right that should in fact be stronger than most
property rights, such that it will be referred to as an "uber-
right." 114 For example, Professors Richard A. Epstein and F.
Scott Keiff have stated "patents are praised as a spur to
innovation, which is made possible only with the predictable
enforcement of rights of exclusion for the patented
technology.""5 In other words, the uber-right perspective
similarly views patents as a special type of property right, but in a
very different manner than the privilege view. Patents are
considered special in that they are much more limited in time,
such that the strength of patent rights during that limited term
is considered paramount.
The uber-right perspective of patents also has some basis in
human rights norms. In particular, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as well as the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights include a clause about
how everyone should enjoy the benefits of scientific progress
and benefit from protection of interests from any scientific
113. See Jerome Reichinan. From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition
unr th TRIPS Agreeme t, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11 25 (1997) (suggesting that
coinumers and others are "held hostage" to the political influence of powerful industry
forces that are eager to "cxpand market power"). In fact, some have noted that the
genesis of TRIPS can be traced to a group of powerful CEOs in a range of industries
(including, but not limited to, pharmaccuticals), who argued in favor of broader global
protection of intellectual property rights, which would result in greater profits for
them. See genrally SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER. PUBLIC L.w: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL POWER (2003) (arguing that the successfil conclusion of TRIPS reflects
the effective efforts of private groups in traming their interests as consistent with
domestic policies in the global economy); Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite,
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO O)WNS THE kNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 7 (2002) (arguing
that a small group of multinational companies conceived of and orchestrated the
creation of TRIPS as a matter of self-interest).
114. This view of patents as an uber-right is proposed to exist in general, although
it has more specific implications for the issue of access to affordable medicine.
1 15. Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Quetioning the Frequency and 1Wisdom of
Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI L REV. 71, 72 (2011).
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production of which she is the author.116 These statements have
been used to suggest that if patent rights are minimized, the
author is improperly deprived of the protection of his or her
interests. 117
The uber-right view also considers balance of interests an
important part of patent rights, although what is balanced is
inherently distinct from the privilege view of patents. In
particular, the uber-right perspective considers strong patent
rights as paramount to promote innovation. Although the uber-
right may recognize that patent rights have the potential to
create challenges to accessing patented drugs in the short-term,
these challenges are considered less important than maintaining
long-term innovations.118 Exceptions to patent rights are
considered a threat to crucial incentives needed to develop new
drugs that involve "huge, lengthy and risky investments" of over
a billion dollars per drug.'0  For those with an uber-right
perspective, short-term access issues can and should be resolved
outside the patent system because reduced patent protection
necessarily compromises long-term innovation. Accordingly,
those with an uber-right view frequently suggest that access to
116. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 27(2),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(111), (Dec. 10. 1948) ("Everyone has the right to the protection
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author."); International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, G.A. Rcs. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI), art. 15(1)
(Dec. 16. 1966).
117. The same article, however, has been read to support the perception of
patents as a privilege-that consumers arc entitled to enjoy the results of scientific
progress in drug discovery such that they have actual access to medicine, not merely
theoretical access based upon economic conditions beyond their control. See HOLGER
HESTERMEYER, HUNIAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO
MEDICINES 112 (2007) (stating that ICESCR article 15(1)(b) supports access to
medicine); see also Philip Cullet, Patents and Medicines: The Relationship between TRIPS
and the Human Right to Health, 79 INTI. XFFAIRS 139, 150-51 (2003) (suggesting that the
ICESCR is focused on end user access).
118. E.g:, AID MENIORIE, COMPULSORY LICENSES IN THAILAND ON
PHARMACEUTICALS UNDER PATENT PROTECTION, available at http://w/Nl.keionline.org/
misc-docs/ 1/swiss2thailand-cl.pdf (stating that patents are part of the solution to "long
term access" to medicine and suggesting that mechanisms to increase short term access
may negatively impact long tcrm development, as well as access).
119. Epstein & Kieff, supra note 115. at 78. Others with an uber-right view similarly
acknowledge the high cost of patented drugs, but tend to emphasize that drug
discovery is lengthy and expcnsive. See, e.g., Amir Attaran & Lee Gilkespic-A hite, Do
Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA
1886, 1886 (2001); Bird, supra note 109, at 216.
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affordable medicine is not precluded by patents, but by
poverty.120
Although an uber-right view of patents recognizes that
access to affordable medicine may be limited during the patent
term by prices set by patent owners, they suggest that strong
patent rights nonetheless benefit all. Professor Martin Adelman
has suggested that the question of access to medicine often
overlooks the fact that "without patents there would be far fewer
drugs around for people to access. One cannot have access to
something that does not exist."'1 Similarly, Fred Hassan,
Chairman and CEO of major pharmaceutical company Schering
Plough, suggests patent protection is the important first step
toward low-cost generics by considering generics to be the
"direct result of IP-fuelled innovation."1 22
Those who view patents as an uber-right may consider any
exceptions to this right as not only improper, but in fact
"stealing." For example, the traditionally recognized and
internationally sanctioned doctrine of compulsory licenses have
nonetheless been characterized as "stealing" or "piracy" by
those with an uber-right perspective.2 In addition, those that
impose compulsory licenses are referred to as "anti-property
hooligans" or free-riders who want to benefit from innovations
encouraged by the patent system without paying their due. 4
The uber-right view of patents may consider any
modification of patent rights to not only be improper, but also
to inappropriately destroy incentives to create new drugs. The
importance of a strong patent right may be considered so
120. See, e.g., Richard P. Rozek. The Effects of Compulsor Licensin on Innovation and
Access to Health Care, 3 J. WORLD INTLLL. PROP. 889, 896-99 (2000) (pointing to other
barriers to access to affordable medicine).
121. Martin J. Adchnan, Compulsory Licensing of Drugs: TRIPS Context, INT'L As'N
FOR ADLANCEMNT TEACHING & RLS. INTLLL. PROP. (Aug. 4, 2003),
http://www.atrip.org/(ontent/Activities/s202Adchnianartdoc.
122. Caroline Joiner, Building a Better World through Innovation, CHAMBERPOST
(Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.chamberpost.com/2008/10/building-a-bett/.
123. See, e.g., Christopher C. Horner. Thailand Stealing out of WTO?, VASH. TIMFS,
May 17, 2007, at A15: Ronald A. Cass. Drug Patent Pirac, WALL ST.J., May 7, 2007, at 15.
124. iditorial, Bangkok's Drug 1ar Goes Global, WALL ST. J. ASIA, Mar. 7, 2007, at
13; Ronald A. Cass, Op-Ed., Patent Remedy,. WALL ST.J. ASIA, Aug. 28, 2007, at 13.
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sacrosanct to the uber-right that any potential limit of patent
rights is considered equivalent to no patent rights at all. Notably,
those with an uber-right view tend to suggest that there will be
no innovation without patents in response to the suggestion to
modify, but not eliminate patent rights.12 However, evidence
does not unequivocally support this schema. After all, there are
notable inventions that were created without any patent
incentive, such as the Polio vaccine.12
The uber-right view of patents (or a complementary
schema) may believe so strongly in the power of patents to
promote socially productive innovation that broad patent rights
for all countries are assumed as necessarily desirable. In other
words, the uber-right view advocates not just patent rights for
wealthy countries, but also advances the idea that patent rights
in developing countries will necessarily promote wealth in those
countries. Indeed, in promoting global patent standards under
TRIPS, some suggested that requiring developing countries to
provide patents on all inventions would promote foreign direct
investment from wealthy countries as well as spur local
innovation despite more modest evidence.12 Although TRIPS
125. This frequently occurs in the context of compulsory licenses. See, e.g., Cass,
supra note 124, at 13 (asserting that Thailand's conpulsory licenses threaten the
worldwide system for the protection of innovation); see also A Gathering Storm,
ECONOMIST, june 7, 2007, http:/,/m .economist.comnnode/9302864 (quoting Fred
Hassan of Schering-Plough saying "without intellectual property there is no
innov ation"). In addition, the saine phenomenon occurs in defending laws that
provide stronger patent rights. See, e.g., GSK's Position on the Anti-Counterfiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA), GLAXOSMITHKLINE (Dec. 10, 2010), http:,/,/m.gsk.com,/policies/
GSK-Public-Position-on-(TA.pdf (in a statement supporting the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement, GlaxoSnithKline (GSK) asserted " [w] ithout IP laws, GSK would not
be able to fund new R&D and to provide new innovativc products" even though the
discussion was not about eliminating IP laws, but only about the extent to which such
laws should be lurther strengthened) (emphasis added).
126. See, e.g., Melody Petersen, Our Daily Meds: How the Pharmaceutical Companies
Transformed Themselves into Slick Marketing Machines ch. 6 (2009); AboutJonas Salk. SALK
INSTIT TE, http:w//Nwy.salk.ediu/about/jonas salk.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2011); see
also Frianois Bonpart et al., Ia I P -P Parnerships to Ma x imi ' l th D r
of'tAi-Malar'al MIdicnes: Lessons Lan from t ASA Wnt hrop Experie, i0 ARiAL
J. 143, 13 , N20; (describing a successitl collaboration that resulted in the
dcvelopment of the anti-malarial ASAQ without patent protection by DnDI).
127. See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent
Proison in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case ojIndia, 29 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'1 I. 507, 517,
530 (1996) (suggesting that patent provisions of TRIPS will spur India to innovation);
Michelc McGrath, The Patent Provisions in TRIPS: Protecting Reasonable Renuneration for
Services Rendered-Or the Latest Development in Western Colonialism, 18 ELR. INTELI.
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has not clearly had this impact, those who believe in an uber-
right view of patents may nonetheless continue to hold this view
since they continue to promote ever-increasing global standards
of patent protection.2' This could be consistent with social
science evidence concerning schemas, even when there is no
evidence that patents promote progress, any possible ambiguity
is still interpreted in favor of the schema of strong patent rights
as a necessary good. For example, US officials have repeatedly
stated that increased patent rights in Jordan have encouraged
foreign direct investment and stimulated local research,
consistent with the uber-right view that these are benefits of
strong patent protection.1' However, although Jordan has
developed its own medicines, providing more patent rights has
not increased innovation or resulted in greater collaboration
PROP. RLV. 398, 400 (1996); Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents
Induce More Jnnov ation? E idence o the 1988 Japane Patent Law Reforms, 32 RAND. J.
ECON. 77, 78 (2001).
128. Studies concerning whether increased patent rights increase foreign direct
investrent are not conclusive. See, e.g., I)arnita York Akers & Sencer Ecer, The TRIPS
Agreement and Its Effects on the R&D Spending of US-Owned MWultinational Companies in
Developing Countries, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 1173, 1174 (2009); Paeicla J. Smith, "How Do
Foign Patent Rights A (ct . S. Exports, Ajjiliate Sales, and Licenses?" 55.J. O INTL ECON.
411, 411 (2001); see also Keith E. Maskus, The Role oJ Intellectual Property Rights in
Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer. 9 DLKL J. C(OMP. & INTL L.
109, 118 (1998) (noting the large amount of foreign investment in Latin American
countries, in part due to tax and operating advantages). Moreover, as pointed out by
Professor Carlos Correa, countries such as Brazil and Thailand have received
substantial foreign direct investment at tirnes when they had low levels of patent
protection. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONs 27 (2000); see
also Arnan S. Kirim, Reonsiderng Patents and Economnic Developmnent: A Case Study of the
Turkish Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 WORIL 1) DEV. 219 (1985) (finding that foreign direct
mvestment in Korea increased after patents were climinated on pharmaceuticals).
129. See US-Bahrain FTA: Fact Sheet on Access to Medicines, OFFICE OF THE U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVTE (Sept. 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreernents/free-
trade-agrecmen s/bahrain -fta (asserting that Jordan has developed its own medicine
since the enactment of Free Trade Agreement ("FTA") wvith the United States as
evidence that stronger patent protection helps developing countries); Marilyn Chase &
Sarah Lucck, In New Trade Pacts, US. Seeks to Limit Reach of Generic Drugs, NVALL. ST. J.,
july 6, 2004, at Al (quoting USTR spokesperson that jordan had a blossoming of its
pharmaceutical industry after implementation of the FTA with the United StatCs).
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with multinational pharmaceutical companies. 1s0 This is another
example of rejecting information that is inconsistent with a
schema.
III. EXPOSING THE IMPACT OF PERSPECTIVES ON FACTS
This Part shows how the competing patent perspectives may
view facts concerning suspensions of generic drugs in-transit
differently. In particular, this Part begins by providing
background on the legal framework permitting such
suspensions, as well as facts concerning the actual suspensions.
Then, the facts are re-considered through two vignettes written
from the lens of each perspective.
A. Background
This Section begins with the EU Regulation that gave rise to
suspensions of in-transit drugs on the ground of patent
infringement. Then, it describes the actual suspensions. Finally,
it discusses more current international developments that
further threaten global trade in generic drugs, focusing in
particular on the recently-concluded ACTA.
1. EU Regulation
The EU Regulation permitting suspension of goods that
allegedly infringe patents is a relatively recent expansion of a
regulation first designed to address counterfeit trademarks that
entered into free circulation in Member States.'-, It was
subsequently expanded to address not only pirated copyrighted
goods,12 but also both counterfeit and pirated goods in
130. Hiamed El-Said & Mohammed El-Said, TRIPS-Plus Implications for Access to
Medicines in Developing Countries: LessonsJomfJordan-United States Free Trade Agreenent, 10
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 438, 438-57 (2007).
131. See Council Regulation No. 3842/86/EEC on Laying Down Measures to
Prohibit the Release for Free Circulation of Counterfeit Goods, 1999 O.J. L 27/ 1; see
also Conmission of the European Conmunities, Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy
in the Single Market: Green Paper, COM (98) 569 Final (Oct. 1998) (identifying a
need to address counterfeiting and piracy).
132. See Council Regulation No. 3295/94/EC on Laying Down Measures to
Prohibit the Release for Free Circulation, Export, Re-Export or Entry for a Suspensive
Procedure of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, 1994 0.J. L 341 /8.
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transit.' In addition, the regulation was expanded to permit
customs officials to take action on their own initiative without
awaiting a specific request from the right holder.134
The expansion to include patent infringements was made
in 1999135 and may have been in response to industry interest in
including them.1 1' Extending the scope to patented inventions
was also justified as important to "safeguarding innovation" and
permitting European products to be internationally
competitive;'37 although safeguarding innovation does not
appear to have previously played a prominent role in the history
of the regulation.'38 However, this inclusion was admitted to be
an "experiment" in that identifying patent infringement was
admittedly more difficult than identifying counterfeit
trademarked or pirated copyrighted goods.
Under the current EU Regulation, customs officials may act
either on behalf of a specific application by a rights-holder or on
their own initiative in suspending goods that infringe an
intellectual property right based on local right. In other words,
although the Regulation applies to all EU member countries,
whether an intellectual property right is being violated is a
function of national law. For example, German customs officials
133. See id.
134. See id. The ex officio provisions were included in 1994. There are, howcvcr,
mechanisms in the regulation intended to prevent abuse of the system. For example,
the owner should be able to obtain release by cither objecting to a patent owner's
request to destroy the goods or by notifying the customs office that legal procedures
have been initiated to evaluate whether patent infringement is occurring. See Customs
Action Regulation, supra note 4, arts. 13-14, at 12.
135. Council Regulation No. 241/1999/EC Amending Regulation (EC) No
3295/94 Laying Down Measures to Prohibit the Release for Free Circulation, Export,
Rc-Export or Entry for a Suspensive Procedure of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, 1999
O.J. L 27/1.
136. See Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) Amending Regulation (EC) No.
3295/94 Laying Down Measures to Prohibit the Release for Free Circulation, Export,
Rc-Export or Entry for a Suspensive Procedure of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, 1998
O.J. C 108/63, 1 7.1 [hereinafter Amending Regulation].
137. Id.
138. Innovation was not previously mentioned in the 1986 nor the 1994
regulations.
139. Amending Regulation, supra note 136, 6.4-6.5.
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apply German patent law to assess whether in-transit goods
infringe patent laws.140
However, there is a wrinkle in assessing local patent
infringement of in-transit goods. In particular, no EU member
state has patent laws that specifically include in-transit goods as
goods that violate the patent owner's right to exclude imports.
Nonetheless, Dutch courts have interpreted the EU regulation
to create a similar effect. In particular, recital 8 of the
Regulation suggests that infringement is assessed based on
whether the goods would infringe if made in the Member
State.141 Based on this recital, Dutch courts have held that in-
transit products can infringe Dutch patents based on an
admitted legal fiction that the products were made in the
Netherlands.14 2 In other words, although Dutch patent law does
not consider in-transit goods to be imported, the Dutch
interpretation of the EU regulation considers in-transit goods to
nonetheless infringe its patent law for purposes of permitting
customs to suspend the drugs based on a fiction that the in-
transit products are made in the Netherlands.
The Dutch case law has been criticized as inappropriate
and inconsistent with the EU regulation, as well as prior
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union("Court of Justice").14" The Dutch law, however, has not been
specifically overruled., While there are some cases before the
Court of Justice that challenge the application and
140. Customs Action Regulation, supra note 4, art. 10.
141. See id., pmbl. recital 8 ("Proceedings initiated to deterimine whether an
intellectual property right has been infringed under national law wvill be conducted
with reference to the critLeria used to cstablish whether goods produced in that
Member State infringe intellectual property rights.").
142. See, e.g., Rechtbank 's-Gravenhage 18juli 2008, 311378/KG ZA 2008, 08-617
m.int. (Sosecal/Sisvel) (Neth.), 1 4.14.
143. See, e.g., Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan & Thomas Jaeger, Policing Patents
W.orldwide? EC Border Measures against Tansiting Geic DRugs under EC and 110
Intellectual Property Regimnes 40 INT'L REV. INTEll. PROP. & COMPETITION L 502, (2009);
Frederick M\. Abbott, Seizure of Generic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on Allegations of
Patent Infringement: A Threat to In ternatio nal Trade, Development and Public W4elfare, I
WORLD INTLLL. PROP. OR(. J. 43 (2009). In particular, some suggest that Montex
Holdings Ltd. v. Diesel SpA, a trademark case that precluded seizure of in-transit goods
without evidence of likely diversion into the EU markets, suggests that there can be no
infringemecnt of in-transit goods without evidence of likely diversion E.g., Abbott, supra,
at 47-48; see also Montex Holdings Ltd. v. Diesel SpA, Case C-281/05. [2006] E.C.R. 1-
10,881.
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interpretation of the EU Regulation, they do not directly
challenge the Dutch suspension of in-transit goods based on
patent infringement. 4 4 There is one pending case before the
Court of Justice that does question whether an analogous
provision should be interpreted to avoid the legal fiction.145 The
Court of Justice might eventually find that in-transit goods
should not be considered to infringe copyrights, the intellectual
property right at issue, such that perhaps in-transit infringement
of patents would also cease to be an issue in the EU.14b However,
even if that were to occur, the basic principle of suspending in-
transit goods on grounds of patent or trademark infringement is
possible in the international realm under the ACTA, as
discussed in a later section. 47
2. EU Seizures
Although EU customs officials were permitted to suspend
alleged patent infringements in 1999, actual suspension of
goods did not happen for another decade. In 2008, EU customs
officials began using their authority to detain drugs that
allegedly infringed patent rights.14s Over a period of about
eighteen months, almost twenty shipments were detained, with
144. See Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Lucheng Meijing Indus. Co.. Joined Cases
C-446/09 & C-495/09, [2011] E.C.R. I (delivered Feb. 3, 2011).
145. See id. 1[ 113.
146. See id. Although the Court of justice of the European Union ("Court of
Justice") has not yet ruled, the Advocate General ("AG") has advised that the provision
that relates to the problematic recital be interpreted as meaning that incinber states
should not discount the transitory status of goods and in particular, should not apply
the kgal fiction that the good was manufactured in the transitory state. Id. Even before
the AG opinion, some had suggested that existing Court of Justice jurisprudence
should compel the same conclusion despite the fact that no Court of justice case
involved patents. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
147. See infra Part I.B.
148. See e.g, XAVIER SELBA, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DLV., FREE
TRADE OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS: THE IAMITS OF INTEITECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT AT THE BORDER, ISSUE PAPER No. 27 at 1 (2010); THOMAS JAEGER ET AL,
MAx PLANCK INST. FOR INTLLL. PROP., COMPETITION & TAX L.. STATEMENT OF THL MAX
PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INTEILECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION AND TAX LAW ON THE
RLVIEW oF EU LEGISLATION ON CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLLCTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS, RESEARCH PAPER No. 10-08 para. 3 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id=1622619.
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many delayed for months and some even destroyed.14" Most
shipments originated from India, Where they were legally made
as unpatented generics.150 The shipments were predominantly
destined for developing countries where the drugs were also
considered unpatented generics.'5' The drugs were most often
suspended in the Netherlands, where courts have construed the
EU regulation to consider in-transit goods to infringe Dutch
patent rights based on an admitted legal fiction.152 However,
there were also suspensions of generic goods in France and
Germany. 15
The seized drugs treated a variety of conditions including
HIV, heart disease, dementia, and schizophrenia.5 4 Some of the
seized drugs were major profit-makers for patent owners. For
example, Sanofi-Aventis aggressively enforces its patent on the
heart medication it sells as Plavix,' 5 which is a blockbuster
drug.'15 In addition, the antipsychotic drug olanzapine, sold as
149. See. e.g., Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Wember
State-Seizure of Geneic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1, at 1 (May 19, 2010) (noting
nineteen confirmed shipments).
150. See id.
151. See id., Annex (noting shipments to Brazil, Columbia, Nigeria, and Peru).
152. Id.
153. The suspension in Germany was actually based upon an inappropriate
assumption of trademark infringement, as discussed later in this section. However, the
suspension in France was for a generic anti-platelet drug called clopidogrel (the
generic forim of what is sold as Plavix) from India destined for Venezuela; a shipment
was suspended at the Paris airport in October 2009. See, e.g., MWacleod's Clopidogrel Generic
Pills Consignment Seized at Paris: Reports, DANCE WITH SHADOWS (Nov. 3, 2009, 3:12 PM),
http://ww,.danccwithshadows.comn/pillscribc/racicods-clopidogrel-generic-pills-
co)nsignint e-scized-at-paris-reports/. Although the French have not historically
interpreted the EU Regulation as considering in-transit drugs as violative of patent
rights, this shipment was suspended nonetheless.
154. Letter fron J. van der Vlist, Mgmt. Tearn Member. Neth. MinistIy of Fin., to
S. Bloemen, Health Action Int'l Eur. (HAI) (May 7, 2009) [hereinafter HAI Letter
fron Netherlands]. available at http://www.haiweb.org/ 19062009/7%20May%202009%
20Dutch% 20goverineicnt% 20respoinsc%20to%20Frecdomn%20of% 20nformiiation%
20request% 20 (EN).pdf.
155. See, e.g., IMS Health, Top 10 Global Products-2007, IMS HEALTH (last
updated Feb. 26. 2008), available at http://ww.imshealth.com/deploycdfiles/
inmshealth/Global/Content/StaticFile/TopLine I)ata/Top I 0(;lobalProducts.pdf
(noting indicating that Plavix was the second most profitable drug in global sales in
2007); Peter Loftus & Shirley S. Wang, Bristol Posts a Profit As Drugs MWake Gains. WALL
ST. J., jan. 28, 2009, at B3 (noting that Plavix brought in US$1.47 billion in fourth-
quarter sales in 2009).
156. In tie pharmaccutical industry, a blockbuster drug is one that has annual
world wide sales exceeding US$I million. E.g, STAN FINKELSTEIN & PETER TEMIN,
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Zyprexa by Eli Lilly, is a global best-seller.157 Similarly,
Rivastigmine, a dementia treatment sold under the trademark
Exelon by Novartis, is considered a top-performing drug for
Novartis,'5 and Losartan potassium, a high blood pressure
treatment sold by Merck under the trademark Cozaar, is a
similarly profitable drug for Merck.'5
Many of the suspended drugs never reached their final
destination. About half of the seized drugs were destroyed.o
The destruction was often due to the lack of response from the
manufacturer to a notification of the seizure; pursuant to the
EU regulation, authorization to destroy goods is presumed if
there is no response.161 While full details are not known about
each case, in at least one case, the shipment was abandoned
because the estimated cost of litigation was deemed to exceed
the cost of the shipment.'16
REASONABLE RX: SOLVING THE DRUG PRICE CRTSS 6 (2008); European Commission,
Pharma eutical Sector Inquir. Preliminary Report 17 (DG Conpetition Staff, 'Working
Paper, N. 28, 2008). Companies substantially rely on sales of blockbuster drugs since
they have large profit margins and also focus research and development efforts on such
drugs. E.g., FINKELSTLIN & TEMIN, supra, at 5-6: see also European Commission, supra,
at 33 (noting that companies rely substantially on blockbuster drugs for profits).
157. John W. Miller & Geeta Anand, India Prepares EU Trade Complaint, WAIL
ST.J., Aug. 6. 2009, http://ists.csscntial.org/piperimail/ip-hcalth/2009-August/
01411 0.html.
158. See, e.g., Financial Report, NOVARTIS INT'L AG, 7, 14, http:/w/wy.annual
reports.comiI/HostcdData/AnnualReports/PDFkrchive/nvs2009.pdf (reporting that
global Exelon sales were over US$900 million); Daniela Sigrist, Novartis Posts 32 P-eren
Rise in 3Q Net Profit. USA TODAY (Oct. 20, 2008. 3:10 PM), http:/'/ww.usatoday.com/
mfloncy/economy/2008-10-20-715205609_x.htm (naming Exclon as a top-perforiming
drug contributing to net profits).
159. See Press Release, Merck, Merck Reports Second Quarter 2008 Financial
Results July 21, 2008), available at http://wmy\.merck.com/newsroom/press-rcleases/
financial/2008_072 1a.html (noting global sales of Merck's antihypertensive medicines
COZAAR (losartan potassium) and HYZAAR (losartan potassiun and
hydrochlorothiazide) were USS941 million for the second quarter of 2008).
160. E.g:, Miller & Anand, supra note 157; Daniel Pruzin, Brazil Cites Growing
Instances of Illegal' Dutch Geneic MedIcine Seizures, 2009 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
L. DAILY (BNA) (Mar. 4, 2009).
161. Customs Action Regulation, supra note 4, art. 11, at 12.
162. E.g., Cipla Export Consignment Too Seized at Amsterdam, MONEYCONTROL.COM
(Feb. 4 2009) http://www.moneycontirol.com/news/business/cipla-exporL-
consignment-too-seized-at-ansterdan-_383598-1 htn. In general, the known value of
shipments ranges from USS50,000 to USS100,000. See, e.g., Jyothi Datta. Amsterdam
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The grounds for seizing the drugs are often confusing as
they conflate issues, or at least loosely use the term "counterfeit"
when referring to generic drugs. For example, in the first
reported seizure of in-transit drugs, Sanofi-Aventis informed the
company anticipating a shipment of generic heart medication
(comparable to Sanofi-Aventis' Plavix-brand drug) that the
goods were seized on suspicion that they were "counterfeit."11
However, subsequent correspondence refers to the problem as
one of patent infringement.164 In a different situation, patent
owner Eli Lilly did not go so far as to call generic versions of its
antipsychotic drug olanzapine counterfeit, but nonetheless
suggested that the generic Indian versions "may not be safe or
effective" because they were not made by Eli Lilly.165 Similarly,
the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and
Associations ("EFPLA"), which represents pharmaceutical
companies in Europe, stated that EU Member States have the
right to stop products suspected of being counterfeit and that
customs authorities play an important role in "protecting
patients from the danger of counterfeit medicine."166 In
addition, an EU official was quoted as stating that "[m]any
countries actually should be grateful to European customs, who
most likely have saved lives and certainly in developing
countries, because fake medicines are more spread in
Authorities Release Ind-Swift Exports. HINDu BLs. LINL, May 23. 2009,
http://www.thehindubusinessline.con/2009/05/23/stories/2009052350971500.htrn
(stating that the Ind-Swift consignment of clopidogrel was worth US$50,000).
163. Eli Lilly Letter, supra note 8.
164. The letter explains that infringement exists under Netherlands law because
of case law that finds goods in transit destined for countries outside the EU to
nonetheless be considered infringing if they would have been infringing if
manufactured in the Netherlands-with full acknowledgment that this is a legal fiction.
Id.
165. Sanofi Letter 2, supra note 7.
166. Press Release, Eur. Fed'n of Pharm. Indus. and Ass'ns, Customs Seizures oJln-
Transit Mledicines (Mar. 13, 2009) [hereinafter EFPIA Press Release], available at
http://www.cfpia.cu/contcnt/default.asp?PageID=559&DocID=6574. The membership
of the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations ("EFPIA")
includes Eli Lilly, March, and Sanofi-all companies that have been involved with in-
transiL seizures. EFPIA M4embership, EFPIA, http: //www.cfpia.cu/ C onten/
Default.aspPagelD)=353 (last visited Aug. 25, 2011).
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developing countries than developed countries."67 However, in
no case were the suspended drugs in-fact fake.168
Although most of the suspended drugs were held on
grounds of alleged patent infringement, there was one instance
where generic drugs were suspended for alleged trademark
infringement. On May 5, 2009, a shipment of amoxicillin, the
non-proprietary name for a generic antibiotic used to treat a
wide range of infections, was suspended in the Frankfurt airport
on grounds that it might infringe the trademark antibiotic sold
as Amoxil by GlaxoSmithKline ("GSK").'69 When contacted,
GSK clarified that there was no trademark problem and the
goods were ultimately released to their final destination in
Vanuatu, a least-developed country.i70 Although GSK did not
initiate the suspension and in fact timely indicated that there
were no intellectual property problems,'7 ' the shipment was
nonetheless delayed for four weeks-a time period that may
have delayed effective treatment. This suspension prompted
further calls for change.12
There have been no seizures since Brazil and India brought
a formal challenge to the WTO in May 2010. However, unless
and until there is a change in the laws, there remains a threat to
trade in generic drugs because of legal uncertainty. Even before
the formal challenge, some Indian companies had rerouted
167. Fight over Generic Drug Seizure Takes Centre Stage at TRIPS Council Meeting, 13
INTL CLNTRL FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. (2009), 1-2,
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/42823/.
168. See id.
169. See. e.g., Khomba Singh, Row over Generic Drugs Intensifies after Seizure i
German ECON. TIMES (India), june 8, 2009; Kaitlin Mara, Drug Seizures in F),rkfur
Spark Fears of EU-Vide Pattern, IP-VATCH (June 5, 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblog/ 2009 /06/ 05/ drug-seiziures-in-fran kfu rt-spark-fears-of-eu-wide-pattern/ print/.
170. Id.
171. Glaxo is reported to have informed German customs authorities that there
was no trademark infringement within seven days of notiication. press Release, Health
Action Int'l et al., Another Scizure of Generic Medicines Destined for a Developing
Coultry, This Time in Frankfurt (june 5, 2009), available at http://whw.haiweb.org/
19062009/5%20jun% 202009%20Press%20release%20Seizure%20oiN 20generic%
20inedicincs%20in%20Friankfuirt.pdf.
172. See, e.g., id. (quoting Sophic Bloemen, from Health Action International-
Europe ("HAI"), as saying "this suggests that the detainment of legitimate generics in
transit "is not just a Dutch issue, but rather a European problem").
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their global trade to avoid the EU, even though that meant
shipping costs were twice as expensive." This action is likely a
function not only of the Dutch law, but also the actions of patent
owners. For example, in at least one case, a European patent
owner requested an Indian manufacturer of generic drugs that
had been suspended to sign a declaration that it would "not
send other consignments containing products which
infringe."1 74
3. The ACTA and Beyond
Even if the EU regulation, or its interpretation, is modified
to eliminate in-transit infringement of patents, the problematic
result may be exported to other countries through an
international agreement that the EU helped negotiate.175 In
particular, concurrent with suspensions of in-transit drugs in
Europe, some countries negotiated the ACTA. As will be later
explained, the ACTA requires members to police certain types
of infringement at its borders that may result in suspensions of
in-transit drugs.
B. A Case Study of Patent Perspectives
This Section considers how the views of patents as either a
limited privilege or uber-right may play a role in conflicts
concerning the relevant facts of the EU seizures, as well as
subsequent agreements, such as the ACTA. This Section focuses
primarily on factual issues, although some information
concerning whether the facts represent extraterritorial
173. Eg, MillerS Anand, supra note 157.
174. Eli Lilly Letter, supra note 8.
175. The EU recently proposed amendments to the regulation at issue here.
Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council Concerning Customs Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, COM (11) 285 Final (May 2011). However, the amendients do not
prevent in transit generic drugs from being suspended for patent infringement. See
Catherine Saez, Proposed EU Custonts Regulation May Not Dispel Fear oJ 1Wrongful Drug
Seizures, IP-WATCH (May 31, 2011), http:'/ww.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/05/31/
proposed- cu-custons-regulation- may- not -dispel-fe ar-of-wrongful-drug-scizure s/ Letter
from Peter Maybarduk, Access to Meds. Program Dir., Public Citizen, to the
Directorate-Gen. for Taxation and Customs Union, Eur. Commn'n (May 25, 2010),
available at hip: //www.citizen.org/docuntls/Public%20( itizeln %20conints %20
submitted%20to%20G)(%20TAXUDL%20on%201383.pdf.
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applications of law or are inconsistent with TRIPS are included
as a preview of a later discussion of the impact of perspectives on
legal interpretations. This section is written as a case study with
vignettes representing the privilege versus uber-right views of
patents. While some liberties were taken to create cohesive
statements from a variety of different documents over several
years, each vignette should overall represent what has been
actually stated, as clarified by the quotes in the accompanying
footnotes.
1. The Privilege View
The EU is putting public health at risk by its aggressive and
abusive implementation of its EU Regulation. Any law that
permits seizure of in-transit generic drugs presents a serious risk
to public health as treatment delays are not merely undesirable,
but potentially life-threatening. Indeed, the UN Special
Rapporteur recently expressed concern that the seizures
jeopardize achievement of human rights norms.17 6 Accordingly,
the seizures must be condemned as unacceptable and the EU
Regulationpromptly reviewed and altered.1 77
The EU Regulation creates barriers to the export of quality,
low-cost generic drugs. Patients in the developing world are
deprived of access to affordable life-saving drugs due to the EU
Regulation.'17 Generic drugs from India have been a "lifeline for
176. See Intervention by IndiaJ une 2009, supra note 5.
177. See, e.g., Press Relcase, Health Action Int'l et al., Scizure of
UNITANID/Clinton Foundation Anti-Retroviral Medicines by Dutch Customs
Authorities "Unaceptabic (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.haiweb.org/06032009/
6% 20Mar%202009% 20Press%(20rcleasc% 2OMorc%20generic% 20icdicines%
20intercepted%20in% 20the%20Netherlands%20 (English).pdf [hereinafter HAI, Dutch
Scizure of Drugs] ("Oxfan Ilnternational, Health Action International and Knowledge
Ecology International condemn the unacceptable seizure of lkgitimate generic
antiretroviral medicines in transit from India to Nigeria by Dutch customs officials, and
call on the European Commission to nimediately review and modify its
regulations ... to allow lawful trade of generic imedicines.").
178. See Radhieka Pandeya, Dr. Reddy's Consignment oj Drags to Brazil Seized,
LIVEMINT.COM (Jan. 15, 2009, 12:09 AM), http://www.1ivemint.com/2009/01/
14220926/dr-reddy8217s-consignment-o.htmli (quoting MSF attorney Leena
Menghaney, who stated that "' [t] he fallout will be on patients' lives in the developing
world who will not be able to access affordable life-saving drugs froin India").
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countries" that cannot afford patented drugs-a lifeline that is
now in jeopardy.M1 Trade in legitimate medicines is critical to
ensuring access to medicines for millions.180
The EU is repeatedly placing embargos on medicines at the
behest of drug company "bullies" under a law they
masterminded to give them authority to harass generic drug
companies.181 The EU Regulation allows "corporate criminals"182
to act with impunity when making frivolous intellectual property
rights claims concerning goods.' 8 These claims have no legal
basis. If the goods were intended for actual sale in any EU
Member State, there might be grounds for patent infringement.
However, all the seized goods were merely part of the regular
and legitimate flow of products in transit that do not infringe
patents. 84 The fact that some suspended drugs have been
released after protracted delay simply underscores that the
patent allegations are baseless.18
179. See Miller & Anand, supra note 157 (quoting Sophic Bloemen of HAI).
180. See Priyanka Golikeri, EU Seizes Another Generic Package, DATIY NFW/S &
ANAI YSTS (Nov. 3, 2009, 2:13 PM), http:/,/vTy.dnaindia.com/money/report-eu-seizes-
another-generic-package 1306411 ((uoting an official from an Indian pharmaceutical
company, who stated that "trade in legitimate medicines between countries is
fundamental to ensuring access to medicines for millions").
181. See Brook K Baker, Pointing the Finger at Big Pharna-Dutch Seizure of Generic
Medicines, PROGRAM ON INFO. jUST. & INTELL. PROP. (Feb. 10, 2009),
http://wmy.wcl.american.cdu/pijip/go/blog-post/pointing-the-figer-at-big-pharima-
dutch-scizure-of-generic-imedicines.
182. See id. (" [T]oo little attention has been directed at these corporate criminals
who are acting with impunity to thwart lawful generic competition even in countries
where their patents and marketing rights have no effect.").
183. See id. (noting that the EU Regulation "gives impunity to Big Pharma to
make frivolous claims of its 'Suspicion' that the products 'might' violate intellectual
property rights in the Netherlands").
184. See id. (noting that the shipment would infringe on patent-holder rights if
intended for sale in the Netherlands but neglecting to mention any Dutch patent law
that would consider in-transit goods an infringincnt); see also Michael Day, WHO Angry
at Seizure by Dutch of HIV Drug Shipment, PHARMATIMSF (Mar. 12, 2009),
http://wmy.catg.org/catg/Global-HIV-Nes /Access-to-treatlcnt/W-H-angry-at-
seizure -by-Dutch-of-HIV-dirug-shipment (noting that the WHO has condemned the
shipment's suspension as "farcical"); UNITAID Statenent on Dutch Coniscation of
MWedicines Shipment, UNITAID, http://ww~unitaid.eu/cni/resources/news/156-unitaid-
statetilnt-on-dutch-confiscation-of-medicines-shipment.htmli (last visited Sept. 7, 2011)
(stating that a seized shipment did not infringe on any form of intellectual property).
185. See Intervention by India, June 2009 supra note 5 (Stating that India takes
srious exception to such unsubstantiated and wild allegations [that seized drugs were
counterfeits, fake drugs, patent violations, et cetera]. The fact that the drugs were
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The EU repeatedly conflates generic drugs with counterfeit
and suggests that it is somehow protecting the public against
dangerous counterfeit drugs.1s However, the EU is confusing
multiple issues. Counterfeit drugs are ones that improperly use
the trademark of another; they may pose health risks if they are
substandard drugs, but the word counterfeit by itself does not
mean that the drug is of poor quality.
Even if the EU were genuinely concerned about counterfeit
trademark drugs, its procedure is seriously flawed as EU customs
officials seem unable to distinguish legitimate generic drugs
from counterfeit products.There was at least one shipment of
drugs that was improperly suspended on the grounds of a
purported counterfeit trademark.187 The supposed counterfeit
trademark-amoxicillin-was in fact the internationally
recognized nonproprietary (i.e., non-trademark) name of the
drug. Notably, counterfeit trademarks should be easy to identify,
as that is one of the reasons they have been considered
appropriate for customs officials to police. The inability of EU
customs officials to distinguish between a nonproprietary name
from a counterfeit trademark-a supposed "easy" task-is not
reassuring to generic drug manufacturers. To the contrary, this
suggests that EU customs officials are seriously misguided in
their enforcement attempts.
The EU is evidencing a deep-yet wrongly held-belief that
violation of intellectual property rights, including patent rights,
subsequently released are [sic] a proof that the allegations were baseless") (emphasis
omitted).
186. See Kaitlin Mara, Medicines Access Again Captures Attention at 170 as Progress
Urged in Round, 1P-WATCH (Oct. 30, 2009, 12:52 PM), http://www.ip-vatch.org/
weblog/2009/10/3)/medicines-access-again-captures-attention-at -w~to-as-progress-in-
round-urged (quoting India's statement that ulnderlying the drug seizures is also a
deliberate mixing up of the issue of spurious/sub-standard drugs ... with [intellectual
property rights 'IPRs") (internal quotation marks omitted); Sanjay Suri, EU Blocking
Medicines fir the Poor, IPS, Oct. 20, 2009, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnevs=48935
(quoting Sophie Blocnen from IAI who stated that although ' [t]he EU has argued it
needs to check for counterfeits as these are dangerous for public hcalth,'. ..
counterfeits actually relate to a trademark infringement, not a patent infringement'").
187. See Intervention by Brazil, June 2009 supra note 5, at 2.
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must necessarily involve potentially dangerous substances.188
Such a linkage is not only overly simplistic, but just wrong.189
Generic medicines neither infringe on intellectual property nor
are dangerous.90 Generic medicines are "not substandard or
illegal."'1' Rather, generic drugs are by definition legal drugs
that have been properly evaluated and certified as being
equivalent in safety and efficacy to the original brand name
version.
EU claims about saving lives are a transparent attempt to
misrepresent the facts; in none of the cases of seized drugs was
quality an issue.'9 This underscores that the EU is not truly
worried about quality; rather, their concern is in overzealous
enforcement of EU patents.'" The EU Regulation is a thinly
disguised trade barrier that protects the European
pharmaceutical industry while undermining the Indian generics
industry.194
The EU seizures violate the concept of territoriality that is a
"key stone in the edifice of the TRIPS Agreement" as well as a
"widely understood and accepted principle."9 Only the country
of final destination should be involved in enforcing its own
patent laws. It is "farfetched" to claim that the in-transit country
will understand the laws of a destination country and have the
authority to enforce them; each country should only enforce its
188. See Intervention by India, June 2009, supra note 5 ("it seems that it has been
ingrained very deeply within the EC authorities that IP violative products are synonymous
with potentially dangerous substances. ").
189. See id. ("This clearly is an untenablc logic.").
190. See id. ("[W]c arc talking about generic medicines. which neither infringe
I PRs nor are they 'potentially dangerous.'").
191. Intervention by Brazil,June 2009 supra note 5, at 1.
192. See id. at 2 ("This is a blatant attcinpt to confound the issue.... In none of
the cases ... was there any issue with the quality of the drugs."); see also Intervention by
India, June 2009. supra note 5.
193. See id.
194. See Pallavi Aiyar, Ao Cure in Sight for India-EU Drug Seizure Controversy, Bus.
STANDARD, Nov. 14, 2009, at 8 (suggesting that India "maintains that European
countrics are creating trade barriers against Indian drug companies to protect the
interests of their firms"); Miller & Anand, supra note 157 (quoting Rajeev Kher, joint
Secretary of Commerce in India. who stated that the country views the in-transit
scizures "'as an attack on the Indian generics industry'").
195. Intervention by India, je 2009, supra note 5 (emphasis omitted).
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own laws. 196 The EU Regulation thus constitutes an improper
extraterritorial enforcement of patent rights.197 Moreover, such
action simply cannot be reconciled with the Doha Declaration,
which requires member states to promote access to medicine.'0 9
The EU seizure of goods, as well as its broader international
efforts to associate generics with counterfeit medicines, go
beyond TRIPS and negate steps that the international
community-including the EU-has taken or promised to take
to promote access to medicine.'0 9 For example, the EU
Regulation that authorizes seizures of generic goods threatens a
global accord (recognized by the EU) that permits compulsory
licensing of goods for export to developing countries.200 in
196. See id. ("[S]overeign functions of the country of destination should be
exercised by the country itself and other countries may assist in enforcement of their
law if requested. It may be farfetched to claim that the country of transit will have
sound understanding of the IPR laws of country of destination or origin and wvill have
the authority to enforce thcm during transit.").
197. See Intervention by Brazil. WTO General Council IP 'WATCH, para. 7 (Feb. 3-4,
2008), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/iles,/RemediosIntervencao-do-Brasil-
Conselho%20(;cial 03% 2002%202008.doc [hereinafter Intervention bT Brazil, Feb. 2009]
("Brazil is grav cly concerned with the Setting of a precedent for extraterritorial
enforcement of IP1 rights."); I-n ere non by Brazil, June 2009, supra note 5, at 3 (" [T]he
TRIPS Agrecncnt does not allow the detention of goods in transit. The seizure of
goods in transit on grounds that they may be violating IP rights in the country of transit
violates the principle of territoriality, a keystone of the international I1) system.").
198. See Interention by Brazil, Feb. 2009, supra note 197, para. 8 ("Extraterritorial
enforcement of patent rights cannot be reconciled with the terms of the Doha
Declaration . . . .").
199. See, e.g., Inteention by India, WTO General Council, IP WATCH (Feb. 3, 2008),
http://ww .ip-watchor g/ilesIndia% 20Stateient% 20to% 20General%20(ouncil(
20jan2009.doc [hereinafter I teventon by India, Feb. 2008] (noting that the intellectual
property maximalist trend, including efforts to link generics with counterfeit
medicines, circumscribes TRIPS flexibilities and is "counter to the spirit of the TRIPS
Agreement which is a minimum standards agreement").
200. See, e.g., Intervention by India, June 2009, supra note 5 ("It is ironical that while
on one hand W1O has taken steps to promote access to affordable medicines and
remove obstacles to proper use of TRIPS 1lexibilities, on the other hand some Members
seek to negate the same by seizing drug consignments in transit and creating barriers to
legitimate trade."); see also VWilliam New, Concern Erupts over WTO System and Mledicines
Shipments: TRIPS Talks Rehindling, IP WATCH (Feb. 3, 2009 11:16 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2009/02/03/concern-crupts-over-wito-systi-and-medicines-
shipments-trips-talks-rekindling/ (noting that the in transit suspensions in the
Netherlands could undermine the WTO agreement to permit countries lacking
manufacturing ability to import needed medicines from other countries under a
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addition, the seizures are inconsistent with a recent resolution
adopted by members of the World Health Assembly-again
including the EU-suggesting that public health be considered
when adopting rules that exceed the minimums required under
TRIPS.20' Moreover, the same resolution declared a
commitment to improving access to health products and
overcoming access barriers; commitments that are clearly
undermined by the EU seizures.20
The EU seizures are not only unacceptable, but they set a
dangerous precedent in the global arena.20s Patent holders and
those who support them are promoting a coordinated and
global approach toward maximizing intellectual property rights
while simultaneously threatening the delicate balance under
TRIPS. 04 The in-transit seizures in the EU are a mere symptom
of a much larger and more dangerous phenomenon that
involves creating new laws to control generic drugs and unduly
confusing low-cost, but high-quality generics with counterfeit
medicine that is substandard.2 * Such actions are inconsistent
with the spirit of the TRIPS Agreement, which sets minimum
comLpulsory cross-licensing arrangement). The global accord that removes an obstacle
to use of the TRIPS f1exibility of compulsory license is a WTO measure that creates an
exception to one of the usual TRIPS rules for compulsory licenses based on broad
consensus that this was necessary. See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 1, 1 6
(indicating a need to address the fact that countries without manufacturing capacities
for pharmaceuticals could not effectively use comnpulsory licenses to promote access to
cheaper patented drugs): Council for TRIPS, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003). The
EU has alrcady modified its domestic laws to effectuate this mneasure. See Council for
TRIPS, Annual Review of the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreenent and Public Health 5, IP/C/42, (Nov. 2, 2006).
201. See NGO Letter to Chan, Feb. 2009, supra note 5, at 3 (Citing W7HO
resolution VHA61.21).
202. See Statement, Access to Medicines, WHO (Mar. 13, 2009),
http://www.who.intmcdiacentre/cnews/ statenmcnts/2009/acccss-mcdicincs-
20090313/cn /index.htil.
203. See Intervention by Brazil, Feb. 2009, supra note 197, para. 4 (noting that the
Dutch seizure was unacceptable and Sets a dangerous precedent).
204. See Intervention by India. KNOWLEDGL ECOLOGY INT'L (Mar. 3, 2009),
http://keionline.org/node/309 (noting the trend "to implement the protection and
enforcement of IPRs in a maxinmalist manner and thereby upset the delicate balance
between rights of IPR holders and the public policy objectivcs under the TRIPS
Agreement").
205. See Intervention by India, Feb. 2008. supra note 199, at 2 (arguing that seizure is
cldearly an unfounded attempt to "cnlarge the definition of counterfeits" beyond its
accepted definition under TRIPS).
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standards,2ob and have disastrous implications for access to
medicine.2 " Moreover, as the EU well knows, drug quality is
controlled by laws directly regulating such drugs and not by
intellectual property laws. However, the EU has shown no efforts
to aid in promoting stronger regulatory systems in developing
countries and instead improperly suggests that stronger
intellectual property rights will somehow protect consumers
from poor quality medicines.
The negotiation of the ACTA is only the latest example of
its improper action. While the EU was asserting that there was
no problem with in-transit suspensions in the EU, it was
simultaneously negotiating the ACTA, and one issue during the
negotiation was the scope of border measures, which would
include whether member countries could suspend in-transit
goods for patent infringement in a manner similar to the EU
Regulation 2" The EU never honestly addressed how the ACTA
would impact in-transit goods in the context of addressing
questions by those who criticized the EU Regulation and sought
206. See id. (noting that the actions " run counter to the spirit of the TRIPS
Agreement which is a minimum standards agreement"); Intervention by India, June 2009,
supra note 5 ("Enforcement of IPRs in disregard of [TRIPS] Objectives and Principles
and efforts to enshrine new, maximalist TRIPS plus enforcement provisions in other
multilateral foruns will seriously undermine the delicate balance in the TRIPS
Agreement . . .").
207. See HAI, Dutch Seizure of Drugs, supra note 177 (quoting Sophie Bloemen
from HAI saying that "the European Commission ... I'must modify the way it applies IP
enforcement globally, because it is even demanding exactly the same provisions of IP
enforcement in developing countries through free trade agreements. This could prove
to be disastrous for access to medicines in their regions").
208. As noted earlier, the in-transit suspensions happened in 2008-09 and the
ACTA wvas simultaneously negotiated in that time frame. See, e.g, European
Cornmission, THE ANTT-C OUNTERFETING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) FACT SHEET,
available at http:/Lrade.cc.curopa.cu/doclib/docs/2009/january/tradoc_142039.pdf
(indicating that ACTA negotiations began in 2007 and were still ongoing in 2009); tr.
Int'l Enyti. L., The Dangers of Including Patent Infringements in ACTA: Some Inplications for
Access to Medecines, Intellectual Property Law Quarterly, Second Quarter, 2008. available
at http://wyv.ciel.org/Publications/IPUpdate_2Q08.pdf; see also PETLR MAYBARDUK.
ACTA's SCOPE AND ACCESS TO MEDICINE (2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/
docurnent s/ACTAScopcAccessbyPublicC itizen.pdf (noting continued discussion in
2010 of whether the ACTA should include patents within the scope of border
measures).
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a clear answer on the ACTA.20o In fact, the EU repeatedly
asserted that trade in generic medicines would not be impacted
by the ACTA even when draft provisions did not foreclose this
possibility.21u
209. See European Conmunities Statement to TRIPS Council, IPEG (June 8-9, 2009),
http://www.ipeg.eu/blog/wp-content/uploads/EU-comments-on-use-of-BDO-against-
seized-inedicines.pdf [hereinafter EC Statement, June 2009] (stating that "the EU does
not intend to hamper trade in generic medicines" in the context of defending the EU
regulation permitting suspension of in-transit drugs, but without mention of pending
ACTA negotiations); Explanatory Note on the Application of Council Regulation (EC) No
1383/2003 Concerning Customs Action against Goods Suspected of Infringing Certain
L/tellectual Property Rights and the Weasures to be Taken against Goods Found to Have
Infringed Such Rights. HuNG. INTELL. PROP. OFFICE 1 1-4 (July 13, 2009),
http: /wwwsitnh.gov.hiu/hirek/kapcsolodo/Ixplan-note_1383_2003_EN.pdf
[hereinafter EU Explanatory Note, july 2009] (clarifying and defending application of
EU Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 without any mention of international issues beyond
compliance with the Doha Public Health Declaration); EC Statement. June 2009, supra,
at 4 (defending EU Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 and its application by customs
officials and stating that it is "fully in line with WT1O/TRIPS requirements," but not
mentioning the pending ACTA discussions); see also Letter from Christian Wagner-
AhIfs, BUKO PHarna-Kampagne, et al. to Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO (Feb. 18,
2009), http://ww.kcionline.org/misc-docs/scizures/WTOscizures_18feb.pdf; Letter
from Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., WTO, to Christian Wagner-Ahlfs, BUKO Pharma-
Kampagne, et al. (Mar. 4, 2009), http://ww.kcionline.org/misc-docs/scizures/
dglamyrcsponsc.pdf (acknowledging a letter from public health advocates concerning
suspensions of generic drugs from India and asserting that the EU has "reiterated its
commitment to the efforts being made to facilitate access to medicines," but failing to
address the letter's specific concern that ACTA negotiations might challenge the goal
of "providing medicine to all" pursuant to the Doha Declaration").
210. For example, in the August 2010 draft of the ACL1, the section on border
measures indicates that it could apply to goods infringing any intellectual property
right covered by TRIPS, which would include patents. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement: Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft, art. 2.X(2) (Aug. 25, 2010)
[hereinafter AC4T Draft, Aug. 2010], available at http: /publicintelligence.net/anti-
counterfeiting-trade-agreement-acta-august-2010-draft/. Granted, this same draft
suggested that parties "may" decide to exclude patents, but patents were definitely at
play. Id. (stating that members may exclude rights "other than trademarks, copyrights
and (Is;" the key intellectual property right that could be excluded is patents).
However, despite the fact that broader measures to include patents werei under
discussion. the EU, and other countries,suggested that the ACTA would not impact
trade in generic medicine. E.g. Press Release, Negotiation Participants, joint-Statement
on Anti -Counterfeiiting Trade Agreement (ACLT), IP/10/437 (Apr. 16, 2010)
[hereinafter Press Release, IP/10/437] ("ACTA will not address the cross-border
transit of legitimate generic medicines"); FFII, ACTA UnderminingAccess to Wedicines (E-
292/2010), FF11 ACL1 BLOG (Oct. 22. 2010), http://acta.ffii.org/?p=131 ("The
nii c e t Ht th
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2. The Uber-Right View
There has been great confusion and many overstatements
made concerning a few shipments of drugs that were
temporarily detained.2II There is a critical need to put these
limited situations into their proper perspective rather than have
them continue to be misconstrued.21'
The EU has been improperly and incorrectly criticized by
overly zealous healthcare advocates and misguided news
reporters as "seizing" drugs. The EU does not seize goods.2'
Rather, small shipments of goods are merely temporarily
detained. It is incorrect and unfair to characterize the EU as
seizing generic drugs when it is only temporarily detaining them
for further investigation.
In addition, the number of shipments that have been
detained is miniscule compared to the number of counterfeit
drugs that have been seized; 14 the detained generic drugs are
likely only a "nano-percentage" of medicine passing through the
EU.215 Moreover, most of the detained drugs are not essential
ones, so claims that the detainments created life-threatening
Couies to deid frteslswhtyPes of IP right t inclutd()
211. See E PIA Press Relcase, supra note 166 (acknowledging "a certain amount of
media coverage" concerning detained in-transit drugs).
212. See id. (stressing that "[i]t is important that these events are not
misconstrued").
2 13. See Intervention by the European Conmunities. 110 General Council, IP WATCH,
[ 4 (Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/files/HTOGENERAL
COUNCILdoc [hereinafter Intervention by EC, Feb. 2009]. In an official statement to
the WTO, the EU stated that "Dutch authorities temporrly detained (which does not
mean seize, confiscate or destroy) a small shipment of drugs" in a Dutch airport and
underscored that this was consistent with TRIPS. See id.
214. See, e.g., EFPIA Press Release, supra note 166 (characterizing the number of
detentions as "minuscule relative to the massive flow of medicines ... transiting
through the EU" while noting that the number of "counterfeit pharmaccutical items"
seized numbers over thirty-four million).
215. See Catherine Sacz, WVTO Forum: Bypassing International Agreements May
Hamper Medicines Access, IP VATCH (Oct. 11 2009), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
2009/10/11 /wto-forurn-bypassing-international-agreements-may-hamper-medicines-
access/ (quoting Luc Devigne of the European Commission trade directorate).
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delays to treatment are simply unwarranted.2lb The detained
drugs include treatments for dementia and schizophrenia,
which are not life-threatening conditions. In addition, not all
treatments are for life-threatening illnesses-a substantial
number are for lifestyle conditions217 Although some drugs
were for heart treatments, unpatented and affordable
alternatives existed. For example, aspirin has been used as a
substitute for the heart drug sold as Plavix by its patent owner.
Objections to the temporary delays are an "over-
exploitation" of limited instances.2B If there were an actual
problem with the EU Regulation permitting suspensions, all EU
Member States would have continuously stopped medicines
since the Regulation was enacted. To the contrary, goods have
only been detained in a handful of countries that elected to
consider in-transit goods as violating patent laws.219 Moreover,
the few instances all occurred a number of years ago, such that
they are no longer relevant.22o This is especially true since
European patent owners have clarified that although they
recognize they have the legal authority to stop goods in some
EU countries, it is not their policy or practice to detain
legitimate generic drugs intended for shipment to customers in
developing countries.221
216. Although there were two instances of HIV treatments being temporarily
detained in 2008, they comprised a mere cleven percent of all goods detained in the
EU. See HAI Letter from Netherlands, supra note 154, Annex 1 (noting that two out of
seventeen drugs were AIDS inhibitors). Moreover, one of the HIV shipments was
destined for Brazil, which has its own generic drug industry such that it could have
easily made the desired drug. See, e.g., Daniel Pruzin, Brazil Cites Growing hastances of
'Illegal' Dutch Generic Medicine Seizures, 2009 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAITY
(1HNA), Mar. 4, 2009, available at 2009 WL 524673.
217. In 2008, there were five life-style drugs seized out of a total of seventeen
suspended shipments; in other words, twenty nine percent were for life style
conditions. H-AI Letter from Netherlands, supra note 154, Annex 1.
218. See, e.g., Jonathan Lynn, Developing States Attack EU on Generic Drug Seizure,
REUTERS, Feb. 4, 2009, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/idIN India-
37821420090203 (noting that EU ambassador Eckart Guth warned WTO members not
to blow the Dutch seizure case out of proportion).
219. See EU Explanatory Note, July 2009, supra note 209 (noting that in several
member states, patent rights do not extend to goods in transit).
220. See Sacz, supra note 215 (mcntioning that Luc Devigne of the European
Commission trade directorate noted that there were only a few cases of detention in
2008, creating "much noise about nothing").
221. See EFPIA Press Release, supra note 166 ("[I]t is neither the policy nor
practice of [EFPIA] members to encourage Member States to use the powers of
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Indian companies and organizations have loudly protested
detention of drugs from India, yet failed to note their own
complicity in any unnecessary delay of drugs to developing
countries. In at least one case after a temporarily detained
shipment was released, the Indian company returned the
shipment to India rather than continuing it on the original
route.222 In other cases, Indian companies have abandoned their
shipments after those shipments have been released.223
Even some of the examples that advocates put forth as
being illustrative of a problem suggest otherwise. For example,
public health advocates strongly protested the temporary
detention by German customs of a shipment of antibiotics from
India destined for Vanuatu.224 However, the shipment was
detained for suspected infringement of trademark rights, so this
event has no bearing on the issue of trade in generic drugs
based on patent rights.225 Moreover, once customs received
information that there was no trademark infringement, the
goods were promptly released and reached their final
destination.22 6
The EU has an interest in safeguarding the health of its
own citizens, as well as all the citizens of the world. Counterfeit
drugs pose serious risks to health and constitute a major
problem. Customs officials are acting properly when they detain
drugs that may be counterfeit.227 The EU has no intent to
detention available to thcn to prevent the flow of lcgitinatc gencric products fron
manufacturer to custorner outside the EU. This applies even where goods transit
through EU countries where intellectual property legislation could be applied.").
222. See Intervention by EC, Feb. 2009, supra note 213 (indicating that the owner of
the released generic drug returned the shipment of the hypertension drug losartan
potassium to India rather than continuing on to Brazil).
223. See, e.g., id.; Cipla Export Consignment Too Seized at Amsterdam, supra note 162
(noting that Cipla abandoned a shipincnt that was suspended while in transit because
litigation costs were considered "disproportionate to the value of the consignincnt").
224. See, e.g., Aiyar, supra note 194.
225. See EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209, at 2 ("This shipicnt was
suspected to infringe a tradenark, not a patent. Therefore, it did not involve the issue
of generics, which is a patent matter in the present context.").
226. See id. (characterizing the issue as "solved quite swiftly" since the shipment
was initially detained on May 5 and released by May 28).
227. See id. (suggesting that customs officials act within their authority to control
goods in transit to address "global trade in counterfeit products").
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hamper legitimate trade in generic drugs, and its laws do not
have this effect.228 The EU supports the goal of promoting low-
cost drugs to developing countries.N However, counterfeit
drugs are not beneficial to anyone. EU customs authorities play
an important role in addressing the global trade in counterfeit
products, especially fake medicines whose effects
disproportionately impact developing countries.2 o In fact, fake
medicines are often shipped to developing countries through
Europe and forty percent of the seventy-six million counterfeit
and pirated goods stopped in the EU in a single year were in-
transit goods.
Accordingly, EU customs officials have played an important
role in protecting consumers from dangerous counterfeit
medicines such that consumers should be grateful to the EU for
its laws and policies2 Contrary to repeated allegations, the EU
is not confused concerning the distinction between generic
medicines and fake medicines233 Although generics may be
distinct from fakes, "EU customs probably saved lives around the
world by stopping fakes" pursuant to the EU Regulation.2"
The EU Regulation does not constitute extraterritorial
enforcement of patent rights-and all claims to the contrary are
228. See, e.g., lnterention by EC, Feb. 2009, supra note 213.
229. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolution on the TRIPS Agreement and
Access to Medicines, C 175 E/591.
230. See EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209, at 2 (noting that "it is important
to continue to allow the Customs Authorities to control goods in transit and ensure
that measures can be taken against global trade in counterfeit products. and in
particular fake medicines whose effects mainly hit developing countries"): see also id.
("EU customs statistics for 2007 have revealed a significant increase-compared to
2006--in trade of fake medicines (+51%). Although customs controls of this kind of
goods are often difficult, their role is crucial to prevent the flow of fake medicines in
transit from reaching the populations of EU and other countries, in particular
developing countries.").
231. See id. (" [Many dangerous goods. such as fake medicines, are shipped to
developing countries, often via European ports and airports. In 2007, out of seventy-six
million counterfeit and pirated goods stopped by the European customs, 40 percent
were goods in transit.").
232. See. e.g., EFPIA Press Release, supra note 166.
233. See EC Statenentfune 2009 supra note 209, at 2-3 (" [T]o respond to what has
been said I want to insist that we do not make any confusion between generic
medicines, which are legitimate quality products, and fake medicines, which are too
often sub-standard products aiming at confusing the consumer about its quality.").
234. Sacz, supra note 215 (quoting Luc Devigne of the European Commission
trade directorate).
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erroneous.235 Any goods seized must be in violation of domestic
laws.236 In addition, the EU Regulation provides procedures to
protect against overzealous enforcement. EU customs officials
do not make any final decision on whether goods infringe
intellectual property rights. 1 Customs officials merely detain
goods if there is a suspicion of infringement of an intellectual
property right, and it is up to the right holder to pursue the
matter in national courts.238 Moreover, if goods are found to be
improperly detained, compensation is provided.2 ' These
procedures are fully in compliance with TRIPS. TRIPS permits
border measures to cover patent infringements, including in-
transit infringement.240 In addition, border enforcement by
customs is expressly contemplated by both the WTO and the
World Customs Organization.24 1 Although the EU believes that
its actions have always been consistent with domestic and
international laws, it has nonetheless clarified that customs
authorities should avoid actions that would delay or
unnecessarily disrupt legitimate trade in generic drugs.242
The EU remains committed to combating counterfeit drugs
that pose deadly dangers to consumers and especially consumers
in developing countries. The EU's commitment is reflected in its
leading role in establishing a new international framework
under the ACTA to "combat more effectively the proliferation of
counterfeit and pirated goods" that not only undermine
235. EC Statement, June 2009 supra note 209, at 4 (noting that "regarding the
principle of territoriality let ine reassure you that the EU Custons Regulation has no
extra-Lerritorial effect).
236. See EC Statement, june 2009, supra note 209, at 3 (noting that the final
decision of whether goods suspended by custons constittL infringement is decided
under national laws).
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id. ("TRIPS foresees that border enforcement measures may apply not
only to inports of goods infringing any IPR, including patents, but also to goods
introduced into the custons territory or leaving that territory, including transit.").
241. See id.
242. See EU Explanatory Note, july 2009 supra note 209, at 2 (noting that
"[c]ustons [a] uthoritics ... are invited to pay particular attention when controlling
pharmaceutical products in transit in order to avoid actions that wvould delay or cause
unnecesary disruption of legitimate trade in generic drugs.").
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legitimate trade but also pose serious health risks.24" Trade in
illegitimate goods is not only inconsistent with legitimate trade,
but may also contribute to organized crime and increased
numbers of dangerous fake products.244 The ACTA will not
interfere with fundamental rights and liberties.245 In particular,
the ACTA is consistent with TRIPS and the Doha Declaration,
but it will not hinder global trade in legitimate generic drugs
since patents are not covered in the section on border
measures.24 6
3. Reflections on the Perspectives
As the vignettes above illustrate, different perspectives on
patents can lead to dramatically different portrayals of the same
facts. Just as citizens of a Presidential debate may come to
different conclusions concerning whose candidate "won" after
watching the same debate, so too advocates on different "sides"
of the in-transit trade in drugs have come to differing
conclusions concerning recent events. This section aims to recap
how different views of the same facts are consistent with social
science evidence concerning the operation and power of
schemas.
The vignettes repeatedly show that the same information
may be viewed differently by both sides. For example, to the
privilege view, all suspended drugs are a problem. This is
consistent with a broad privilege view that wants to modify
patent rights to accommodate access to any medication.
However, those with an uber-right view are less inclined to find a
problem when the drugs are for "lifestyle conditions." As noted
earlier, the uber-right does not believe that patent rights should
243. See. e.g., Press Release, European Union, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) Moves Forward, No. 25/09 (June 12 2009)
http://wwv.eurunion.org/eu/2009-Newvs-Rrleases,/EU/NIR-25/09-ANTI-
(OUNTERFEITING-TRADE-AkGREEMENT-A(TA-MOVES-FORT\ 4RD.hiil ("Trade
in these illegitimate goods undermines kgitinate trade and the growth of the world
economy, and in some cases, may contribute to funding organized crime and exposing
American Consumers to dangerous fake products.").
244. Id.
245. Press Release, IPl/10/437, supra note 210 ("ACTA wvill not interfere with a
signatory's ability to respect its Citizens' fundamental rights nad liberties.")
246. See, e.g., id. ("ACTA will not address the cross-border transit of legitimnate
generic medicines.").
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ever be altered to promote access to affordable medicine at all.
The only situation in which the uber-right has acknowledged
that patent rights might be modified is in the case of an
epidemic involving an infectious disease; drugs for lifestyle
conditions would be the exact opposite situation 47 That is still,
however, a limited situation. Accordingly, the different views of
the impact of the suspended drugs are consistent with the
patent perspectives.
In addition, the vignettes are consistent with social science
evidence that individuals tend to ignore facts inconsistent with
schemas and selectively use facts that support their schema. For
example, the most extreme privilege view of patents ignores the
existence of Dutch law that permits suspensions of in-transit
drugs for patent infringement.248 In addition to ignoring the
Dutch law that conflicts with the privilege schema, selected facts
are also relied upon to support the privilege view conception of
what the Dutch law should be. For example, since some
suspended drugs have been released, the privilege view
considers these releases to prove that there were no viable legal
claims regarding in-transit drugs.249 However, release of the
247. See, e.g., Roger Bate, Editorial, Thaian d's Patent At ack, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 13,
2007, http: /www.nysun.com/opinion/thailands-patent-attack/48499 (asserting that
heart disease and leukemia are not epidemics, such that Thailand's compulsory license
was not justified).
248. See supra notcs 103-13 and accompanying text (describing the privilege view
of patents); supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (showing that Dutch law finds
that in-transit products can interfere with Dutch patents). However. not all groups with
similar intrcests will necessarily share the same schema or be similarly impacted by the
same schema. For example, the European Generic Medicines Association, which
generally promotes generic drugs, did not make the mistake of some with a privilege
view in completely dismissing relevant law. Rather. it stated that "the EU is cntitled
under TRIPS to detain products under alleged patent infringement," although it
nonctheclss urged caution to avoid public health risk. See Letter from Greg Perry, Dir.
Gen. of Eur. Generic Mcds. Ass'n, to Mr. Laszl6 Kovacs, Eur. Comm'r for Taxation &
Customs Union (Feb. 20, 2009), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/wveblog/wp-
content/uploads/2009/03/rottcrdam-scizure-lettCr-to-customs-commissioncr-09)pdf.
249. Interestingly, although there is a decision from the Court of Justice of the
European Union that suggests trademark rights do not encompass in-transit goods, the
most extreme privilege view does not consider this since it may be easier to simply
ignore the undesirable Dutch law rather than to acknowledge its existence and
advocate for an extension from an analogous area of law. However, scholars wvho may
have a privilege view may conclusively determine that the Dutch law is inconsistent with
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goods does not mean that there are no rights that are violated-
they may be released despite legal authority to suspend them.
This is especially true if there is public pressure and controversy.
Moreover, the lack of acknowledgement of the Dutch law
may reveal an additional nuance to the patents as privilege
schema. Some additional nuance is probably expectable since
the basic privilege view of patents focuses only on exceptions to
patent rights within a single country. However, the issue with in-
transit suspensions is that countries have an interest in the scope
of patent rights beyond their borders; for example, India does
not want Dutch patent law to suspend drugs made in India
destined for a third country. The privilege view of in-transit
drugs appears to be that a drug made as a generic must
necessarily continue to be generic in global trade-at least when
it is destined for a market that would similarly consider the drug
generic. This conclusion would be consistent with the general
privilege view that patents should be limited to permit access to
affordable medicine. At the same time, it is an expansion on that
basic principle to suggest that global patent rights should be
interpreted to enable trade in generic drugs. Accordingly, as
noted in the vignettes, some have asserted that a drug not sold
in the Netherlands cannot violate patent law without regard for
the actual Dutch law that would hold otherwise. Although this
view deviates from the Dutch law, it is consistent with the
complementary schema that patent laws must be construed to
promote global trade in drugs that are generic where made and
at their final destination.
The vignettes also suggest an additional schema to
complement the traditional uber-right schema concerning
patents. As discussed above, the uber-right traditionally focuses
on promoting patent rights in the name of innovation while
suggesting that public health issues are beyond the patent
system. However, in discussions concerning in-transit drugs, the
law of the Court of justice, even though there is no specific case on in-transit patents.
See, e.g., Ruse-Khan & Jaeger, supra note 143, at 518-19 (although admitting that the
Court of Justice has not specifically ruled in this area. concluding that there is no
reason to assume analogous case law "should not be applicable to patents"); see also
SLUBA, supra note 148, at 18. (suggesting that the Dutch law "contravenes" Court of
Justice jurisprudence). This is admittedly a much sinaller deviation from ignoring tehe
Dutch law entirely.
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uber-right view emphasizes the importance of policing
counterfeit drugs that are suspected to be unsafe. Another
complementary schema to the traditional uber-right narrative
may be that the only truly safe and effective drugs are those
made by the original patent owner, regardless of whether a
national regulatory agency has found a generic to be
bioequivalent.25 o
These vignettes are also consistent with the phenomenon of
naive realism251 Each side assumes that the other-and only the
other-is biased. For example, those with a privilege view
assume that the EU is acting at the behest of "corporate
criminals" whereas those with an uber-right view assert that
public health advocates are over-stating the facts by focusing on
a "nanopercentage" of drugs. These views are not only
consistent with naive realism but also with other social science
evidence suggesting that divergent views on the same socially-
charged topic may cause increasing polarization.252 This has
important implications not only for the issues concerning in-
transit suspensions of generic drugs, but for the broader topic of
how to address access to medicine when there are clearly
polarized views.
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
This Part explains the legal framework that applies to
whether countries can or must police in-transit goods for
infringing patent or trademark rights. In particular, this Part
explains the legal framework under both TRIPS and the ACTA.
This Part provides an important backdrop to understanding and
250. See, for exanple, Eli Lilly Letter, supra note 8, in which Eli Lilly's attorney
contacted a generic Indian manufacturer whose tablets had been suspended by Dutch
customns authoritics for violating Eli Lilly's patent, stating that "the [t]ablets are not
genuine Eli Lilly products and they have not been produced by Eli Lilly or any of its
licensees worldwide. As such. the [t]ablets iay not be safe or effective."
251. See supra, Part II.A..
252. See Pronin, supra note 89, at 41; see also Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal
State, 60 STAN. L. REVT. 115, 130-42 (2007) (showing that when individuals perceive
others to be the only group distorting facts. this breeds rescntm1ent and distrust, which
leads to further entrenchment regarding a variety of controversial topics, such as
sodony, guns, smoking, nuclear energy, and global warming).
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evaluating the extent to which patent perspectives diverge from
the proper legal interpretation, as further explained in Part V.
A. TRIPS
This Section first explains the basic requirements and then
considers whether members can properly exceed these
minimum requirements by considering in-transit goods to
infringe patent rights while temporarily in a country. As
explained below, although members can generally exceed the
minimum requirements of TRIPS, they can only do so to the
extent that would not "contravene" another provision of TRIPS.
1. TRIPS Border Measures-Articles 51 and 52
The fundamental provision under TRIPS concerning
border measures is Article 51. This provision states as follows:
Members shall, in conformity with the provisions set out
below, adopt procedures to enable a right holder, who has
valid grounds for suspecting that the importation of
counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright goods may take
place, to lodge an application in writing with competent
authorities, administrative or judicial, for the suspension by
the customs authorities of the release into free circulation of
such goods. Members may enable such an application to be
made in respect of goods which involve other infringements
of intellectual property rights, provided that the
requirements of this Section are met. Members may also
provide for corresponding procedures concerning the
suspension by the customs authorities of the release of
infringing goods destined for exportation from their
territories. 2
In essence, Article 51 only requires member states to
suspend goods intended to be imported into a country for free
circulation if they are counterfeit, trademark, or pirated
copyrighted goods. However, pursuant to the second sentence,
members may also suspend imported goods that violate other
intellectual property rights, such as patents and non-counterfeit
253. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 51 (citations omitted).
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trademarks.254 Moreover, although not required, members may
also suspend goods in transit. In particular, a footnote to Article
51 states that "there shall be no obligation to apply such
procedures ... to goods in transit."255 In the context of a
minimum obligation treaty such as TRIPS, the lack of an
obligation does not mean that exceeding minimum obligations
is prohibited. To the contrary, this clarifying footnote seems to
suggest that applying suspensive procedures to in-transit goods is
expressly contemplated.25 6
However, Article 51 alone does not define which in-transit
goods member states can police. After all, Article 51 only
permits customs authorities to act "in conformity with the
provisions set out below," which refers to the related TRIPS
provisions, such as Article 52. Article 52 is of critical importance
because it refers to the relevant proof to establish infringement.
Article 52 states: "Any right holder initiating the procedures
under Article 51 shall be required to provide adequate evidence
to satisfy the competent authorities that, under the laws of the
country of importation, there is prima facie an infringement of
the right holder's intellectual property right . . . ."257
The critical question with respect to in-transit goods is what
constitutes infringement "under the laws of the country of
importation." Although the Article 51 footnote clarifies that in-
transit goods may be suspended, that footnote is of no assistance
to evaluate which country's laws should apply in assessing
whether infringement has occurred. This is a critical issue for
global trade in generic goods because a drug may be considered
generic at the points of origin and destination, but not where it
254. See id. (stating explicitly that members may apply the same procedures to
goods which involve other infringements of intellectual property rights")
255. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 51 n.13 ("It is understood that there shall be no
obligation to apply such procedures to imports of goods put on the market in another
country by or with the consent of the right holder, or to goods in transit.").
256. While one commentator has argued that in-transit goods should not be
within the scope of Article 51 because such goods are not generally "released" by
customs, see SEUBA, supra note 148, at 13-14, a coherent reading of the entirety of
Artile 51, including the clarifying footnote, suggests that TRIPS intended to permit
such action whether or not customs officials formally "release" goods.
257. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 52.
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is in transit. This was true for each of the drug shipments
suspended in the Netherlands-although patent owners had
rights in the Netherlands, there were no patent rights in the
country of origin (India) or final destination (mostly South
American countries). Accordingly, the key question is whether
"country of importation" should refer to the final destination-
in which case there would be no infringement-or whether it
should refer to an in-transit country.
According to traditional tools of treaty interpretation, the
proper starting place for interpretation is with the ordinary
meaning of terms.258 In this case, the issue is the ordinary
meaning of the phrase "law of the country of importation." In
particular, the issue is what constitutes "importation." This word
is broad enough to include both goods that are imported
permanently for sale as well as in-transit goods.259 Indeed, some
countries have occasionally interpreted in-transit goods-that
are not sold in transit-to be imports that violate domestic
intellectual property laws.260
258. See Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.").
259. See Import, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.com/
delinition/import region=us#m en usl 257355.015 (lastvisted Sept. 7, 2011) (defining
the word import as to "bring (goods or services) into a country from abroad"); BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 647 (9th ed. 2009) (defining import as to bring merchandise from a
foreign source, without specifically requiring a sale).
260. For example, in Gramophone Co. of India v. PandeT. the Indian Court found
that the right of a copyright owner to exclude imports included the case of an import
within Indian territory en route to Nepal. See Gramophone Co. of India v. Pandey,
(1984) 2 S.C.C. 534, 1[ 32 (India). In addition, in a trademark case, a US court
concluded that merchandise was adequately imported for the purpose of applying
trademark laws banning trafficking in counterfeit goods, even though the merchandise
was not intended to enter for free-circulation; the goods were considered to have been
imported into the United States even though duties were not assessed or paid. See
United States v. Watches, Watch Parts, Calculators & Misc. Parts, 692 F. Supp. 1317,
1321, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 1988). In addition, the World Customs Organization's ("WCO")
model kgislation recommends that customs officials take action against goods in
transit. See WCO, MODEL PROVISTONS FOR NATIONAL LEGISIATION TO IMPLEMENT FATR
AND EFFLCTIVE BORDER MEASURES CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS art. 1(1) (2007) ("A rights
holder may submit applications to Customs, in accordance with the procedures and
under the conditions set out in this law, for the suspension of the customs clearance
and tie deceiion of imporLtd goods, goods destined for exportation and goods in transit."
(emphasis added)); see also WCO, PROVTSIONAL STANDARDS EMPI OYED BY CUSTOMS FOR
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However, the ordinary meaning of terms must also be
considered in light of the broader interpretive TRIPS context.
The TRIPS provision on enforcement of intellectual
property rights in general provides some context that might
suggest that "country of importation" should mean the country
of final destination. In particular, Article 41 requires that
enforcement of intellectual property rights should not be a
barrier to "legitimate trade."261 Arguably, if global trade in
generic drugs constituted "legitimate trade," then "country of
importation" should be interpreted to prevent border measures
from disrupting such legitimate trade. While those sympathetic
to global trade in generic drugs may consider this argument
intuitive and obvious, it is not the only possibility. After all, this
would depend on the meaning of "legitimate trade," which is
again an important, yet undefined term. In addition, intellectual
property rights generally inhibit trade, so it is unclear how to
interpret this term.262 Moreover, if countries may only suspend
in-transit goods that infringe at the point of final destination,
this would seem at odds with the traditional territorial limits of
patent protection since the in-transit country would be
enforcing foreign law.
There is another part of the TRIPS context that may also
lend support to interpreting "country of importation" as the
final destination. The TRIPS Council has created a mechanism
permitting drugs to be made under a compulsory license in one
country for export to a country unable to make its own low-cost
generic drugs.263 Arguably, this mechanism cannot be effective if
drugs made for export never reach the final destination because
of in-transit infringement. Accordingly, the successful use of this
UNIFORM RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT (SECURE) 1 10 (2007) (recommending Customs
enforcement action against any goods under custon supcvision, which would include
transshipment, as well as free zones).
261. See TRIPS, supra note 2. art. 41.
262. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to
International Trade?: ACTA Border Measures and Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. INTL L. RLV.
645, 696-97 (2011).
263. See Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, Implementation of
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 2,
WT/L/540 (Sept. 2. 2003).
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mechanism could suggest that "country of importation" should
be interpreted as the country of final destination. However, this
mechanism technically only applies to a very narrow subset of
global trade in generic drugs; thus far, there has only been a
single time this has happened.264 An important interpretive
question is whether the existence of this TRIPS mechanism
should mean that "country of importation" under Article 52
should be interpreted as the country of final destination only for
trade initiated under this mechanism, or under all cases. If
applied to all cases, customs officials would once again be
applying the laws of other countries; this application extends
beyond the traditional norms of territoriality inherent in patent
rights.
Another part of the broader interpretive context that could
be consulted is the Doha Public Health Declaration
("Declaration").265 Although the Declaration does not address
in-transit goods, it does suggest that public health interests are
important to countries. There may be a tendency to assume that
this Declaration necessarily weighs in favor of interpreting
"country of importation" to mean the final destination so that
public health is promoted. However, the Declaration could be
read differently. In particular, the Declaration generally
supports the rights of countries to make their own decisions
concerning the scope of intellectual property rights at their
borders; most of the provisions concern the sovereign ability of
countries to decide how to apply exceptions to patent rights.2 66
None of the specific provisions of the Declaration discuss the
basic scope of patent rights or potential limits to patent rights.
Importantly, nothing in the Declaration suggests that a nation
such as India should be able to decide how a nation such as the
Netherlands defines the scope of its patent rights. Any such
264. See Catherine Saez, Patentable Subject Matter, IP Waiver jor Health Discussed at
VTO. IP WATCH (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.ip-vatch.org/veblog/2011/03/02/
patentable-subject-mattLr-ip-waivcr-for-ihealth-discussed-at-wto/ (noting that dclegations
have expressed concern that the mechanism has only ever been used once since 2003
and that when it was used it took about threc ycars for a Canadian generic
manufacturer to delivcr drugs effctively to Rwanda).
265. See generally Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 1.
266. See Doha Public Hcalth Declaration, supra notc 1, 1 5(b)-(d) (clarifying thc
ability of nations to decide thc basis for issuing compulsory licenses, as well as whther
to permit international exhaustion of intellectual property rights).
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suggestion is inconsistent with the territorial limits of patent
rights.
As noted above, TRIPS Articles 51 and 52 do not clearly
explain when a nation can suspend in-transit goods at its
borders. Under Article 51 of TRIPS, it seems that nations can
enact laws that consider in-transit goods to infringe patent and
non-counterfeit trademarks. However, what constitutes
infringement under Article 52 is far from clear; infringement
could be based on either infringement in the in-transit country
or in the country of final destination.
2. TRIPS Ceiling?--Article 1
According to Article 1 of TRIPS, member states may exceed
the minimum standards in TRIPS but only to the extent that
other "provisions" of TRIPS are not "contravene[ed]."267 In
other words, even if Articles 51 and 52 may suggest that nations
can suspend in-transit goods for patent infringement, Article 1
may provide an independent basis to preclude such action-if
other provisions are contravened.
An initial inquiry must be what it means to "contravene" a
"provision" of TRIPS. As with many other critical terms under
TRIPS, neither term is defined. The Oxford English Dictionary
defines contravene as something that is "counter to" or "in
conflict with."268 Although these definitions do not clearly
resolve what it means to "contravene," when they are considered
together with the ordinary definition of a "provision," things are
a bit clearer. The Oxford Dictionary definition of "provision"
includes "a condition or requirement in a legal document."'26
Given that a treaty, such as TRIPS, is a legal document, a
"condition or requirement" would suggest some type of
obligatory part of TRIPS. In addition, given that the customary
interpretation includes the preamble and objects and purposes
as the appropriate context, it would seem redundant to also
267. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1.
268. Contravene. THE OXIORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 847 (2d ed. 1989).
269. See Provision, OxTORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries.coim
definition/provision?region us (last visited Sept. 4, 2011).
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include them in the definition of "provisions" of TRIPS. Since
general principles of treaty interpretation require favoring
interpretations that give meaning to all provisions and avoiding
redundancy, the phrase "other provisions" should refer to other
substantive articles of TRIPS that provide affirmative
requirements on member states.270 Accordingly, to "contravene"
a provision of TRIPS should refer to actions that are inconsistent
with affirmative obligations under TRIPS rather than actions
that are inconsistent with general principles and policies.
Importantly, although the Doha Public Health Declaration
contains some positive statements concerning the importance of
public health, it does not contain a clear affirmative obligation
that can be expressly violated.
There are affirmative obligations under TRIPS that could
be contravened. In fact, two aspects of TRIPS discussed earlier as
possibly supporting an interpretation of "country of
importation" to mean the country of final destination could
alternatively be TRIPS provisions that would be contravened. In
particular, Article 41 of TRIPS, which requires that enforcement
of intellectual property rights not be a barrier to "legitimate
trade," as well as the TRIPS Council mechanism for providing
generic drugs to countries, could both be considered TRIPS
provisions that might be contravened if member states exceeded
the minimum TRIPS border measures.2 71 In particular, although
these provisions did not clearly determine how to define
"country of importation," when these provisions are considered
in light of the Article 1 prohibition against contravening
provisions of TRIPS they may suggest that member states should
not be permitted to consider in-transit goods to infringe. In
other words, although the TRIPS border measures arguably
permit countries to suspend in-transit goods for infringing
patent rights, which could be interpreted to mean patent rights
of the in-transit country, Article 1 may nonetheless suggest that
this is impermissible.
270. In addition, even if it wvere not redundant to consider such provisions, it
would be difficult to "contravene" general principles and policies since such principles
under TRIPS often assert competing principles that cannot be sinultaneously promoted.
See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 7-8. Also, these provisions are couched as things that
should be promoted, which makes them more difficult to contravene.
271. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 41; Decision of the General Council of 30 August
2003, supra note 263, 11 4-5.
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Although this application of Article 1 of TRIPS would
provide a powerful limit to exceeding the minimum standards of
TRIPS, as well as an important resolution of the otherwise
ambiguous interpretation of the border measures, there is still
some ambiguity. Although Article 41 and the TRIPS Council
mechanism both easily qualify as "provisions" that can be
contravened, there are still some interpretive difficulties. As
noted earlier, it is not clear that trade in drugs that are generic
at point of origin and destination always constitute "legitimate
trade." The TRIPS Council mechanism suggests that at least in
one case, where goods are made under compulsory license for
export, such drugs are legitimate.
B. The ACTA
This Section explains the relevant ACTA provisions
concerning policing of intellectual property infringement to
provide a foundation for later analysis of how the ACTA has
been interpreted based on patent perspectives. This Section first
explains that border measures include basic trademark
infringement, with patent infringement possible but not
required. The Section then explains that the ACTA clearly
permits-but does not require-Member States to police in-
transit goods that violate trademark or patent rights based on
the law of the in-transit country. Finally, this Section discusses
the implications of the ACTA border measure provisions for
trade in generic goods.
1. Scope of Intellectual Property Rights Covered
The basic ACTA provision concerning the scope of border
measures provides as follows:
In providing, as appropriate, and consistent with its
domestic system of intellectual property rights protection
and without prejudice to the requirements of the TRIPS
Agreement, for effective border enforcement of intellectual
property rights, a Party should do so in a manner that does
not discriminate unjustifiably between intellectual property
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rights and that avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate
trade.272
As highlighted above, the border measure requirements
apply to intellectual property rights, defined in the ACTA to
include intellectual property rights under TRIPS, which would
generally include patents and trademarks.273
Although patents are a type of intellectual property right
under TRIPS, there is a footnote that states: "The Parties agree
that patents ... do not fall within the scope" of Section 3.2 4 1u
other words, although patents would ordinarily be included as
an intellectual property right, members need not extend border
measures to patents. However, since the ACTA is a miuimum
standards agreement, like TRIPS, the lack of an obligation does
not necessarily preclude a country from exceeding that
minimum.275
An important question to proponents of global trade in
generic drugs is whether the ACTA can prevent member states
from extending border measures to patents-despite the
minimum standard framework of the ACTA. According to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaty terms-such
as the aforementioned ACTA footnote-are to be interpreted
"in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose."276 Here, there is a question
concerning the "ordinary meaning" of the footnote that says
that patents are not within the scope of the section. In
particular, the question is whether this footnote not only
excludes patents from the minimum ACTA standard, but
precludes member states from extending border measures to
include patents. The language notably does not use any word
similar to "preclude" to suggest that members are prohibited.
Additional interpretive context for the meaning of the
patent footnote to the border enforcement section might be
found in comparing this footnote to the footnote of the civil
272. ACTA, supra note 10, art. 13 (cmphasis added).
273. See id. art. 5(h) (defining intellectual property as all categories under TRIPS
Pt. II, §§ 1-7).
274. Id. art. 13 n.6.
275. See id. art. 2(1).
276. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 257, art. 31(1).
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enforcement section. Whereas the border enforcement section
states that patents "do not fall within the scope" of the section,
the civil enforcement section states that parties "may exclude
patents."277 The different language suggests that the footnotes
have differing meaning. The ordinary meaning of "may exclude
patents" in the civil enforcement section suggests that parties
can, but need not, apply the ACTA civil enforcement provisions
to patents. The different wording for the border measures could
be interpreted to suggest that patents are intended to be
precluded rather than merely excluded. However, that would
seem inconsistent with the generally accepted wisdom that
parties can exceed stated minimums, especially when the
language does not clearly prohibit exceeding the minimums. As
noted above, drafters could have stated something to the effect
that "border measures can not be applied to patents" for more
clarity.
Even if the border section footnote does not clearly
preclude members from policing patent infringement,
additional interpretive context within the ACTA could suggest
that members are barred from policing such infringement.
Although the ACTA is a minimum standard agreement, more
extensive enforcement cannot "contravene" provisions of the
agreement. In addition, the border measures section explicitly
states that border enforcement should "avoid[] the creation of
barriers to legitimate trade."278 This could be interpreted to
argue that trade in generic drugs should not be barred.
However, as discussed with respect to TRIPS, this could be
interpreted differently, depending on whether generic drugs are
considered "legitimate" trade. The argument for considering
global trade in generic drugs as legitimate may be weaker in the
context of the ACTA since the border provisions explicitly
define infringement to be based on the laws of the in-transit
country, as discussed below.
Arguably, the meaning of the patent footnote in the border
measures section is not clear based on a textual interpretation.
277. See AC TA, supra note 10 § 2, n.2.
278. See id., art. 13; see also id., art. 6(1).
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Accordingly, resorting to "supplementary means" of
interpretation, such as preparatory work of the treaty, would be
appropriate. Prior drafts of the ACTA included suggestions to
both explicitly include in-transit patent infringement as well as
to exclude in-transit patent infringement from the scope.27 In
rejecting language that either clearly included or excluded
patents from the scope of border measures, perhaps the most
appropriate interpretation is that the final language permits
countries to include patents among border measures but is
intended to clarify that there is no obligation to do so, such that
it embraces the desires of all countries. This would be consistent
with statements from negotiating parties that they did not
intend for the ACTA to prevent trade in global generic drugs.
2. In-Transit Policing
A second issue is the procedures the ACTA requires its
member ststes to have at their borders. Member states are
required to police all imports and exports that infringe on the
applicable intellectual property rights.2so In addition, members
may, but need not, similarly police goods that merely pass
through "in transit" to a final destination. 2 1 In particular, the
ACTA states as follows:
A Party may adopt or maintain procedures with respect to
suspect in-transit goods . . . under which: (a) its customs
authorities may act upon their own initiative to suspend the
release of or to detain, suspect goods; and(b) where
279. See, e.g., Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Public Predecisional/
Deliberative Draft, 2, art. 2.X(2) (Apr. 21, 2010) [hereinafter ACTA Draft, Apr.
2010]. available at http://Lrade.cc.curopa.cu/doclib/docs/april/tradoc_146029.pdf
("Parties may decide to exclude from the scope of this section, certain rights other
than trade marks, copyrights and GIs . . . ."). In the August 2010 draft, the last version
that did not have a footnote stating that parties agreed patCnts were not encompassed,
some countries proposed different language. For examplc, whereas some countries
suggested that the border measures should be applied to trademark counterfeiting and
copyright piracy, a few countries suggested adding the language "at least" and also
stating explicitly that countries may provide border measures "to be applied in other
cases of infringement of intellectual property rights." See ACTA Draft, Aug. 2010, supra
note 210, § 2, art. 2.X(2).
280. See ACTA, supra note 10, art. 16(1) (referring to "import and export
shipments" when discussing each member state's ACTAk-mandated border
requirements).
281. See id. art. 16(2) (referring to "in-transiLt goods" when discussing each
member state's ACTA-permitted border requirements).
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appropriate, a right holder may request its competent
authorities to suspend the release of, or to detain, suspect
goods.28
Although it is clear that member states may police in-transit
goods that infringe intellectual property rights, there is a critical
issue for global trade in generic goods concerning which
country's law applies to assessing infringement. Article 17 of the
ACTA, entitled "Application by the Right Holder," states:
Each Party shall provide that its competent authorities
require a right holder that requests the procedures
described in subparagraphs 1(b) and 2(b) of Article 16
(Border Measures) to provide adequate evidence to satisfy
the competent authorities that, under the law of the Party
providing the procedures. there is prima facie an infringement
of the right holder's intellectual property right . . . .28
By specifying that the relevant law to assess prima facie
infringement is the law "of the party providing the procedures,"
this suggests that in the case of a country that permits policing
of in-transit goods, the in-transit country would use its own laws
to assess infringement. Importantly, this would mean that a
good that did not infringe at point of origin or final destination
could nonetheless be legitimately stopped by border officials for
infringement of in-transit goods. In addition, this would not be a
mere delay. If the goods infringe within the in-transit country,
the ACTA requires that "competent authorities have the
authority to order the destruction of [the] goods."2 4
3. Impact on Global Trade in Generic Drugs
The ACTA has more serious repercussions for trade in
generic goods than TRIPS. There are two important issues with
respect to the border provisions. First, although the ACTA
members do not have to adopt border measures for in-transit
282. Id.
283. Id. art. 17(1) (first emphasis added).
284. See id. art. 20(1).
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goods, the ACTA clearly permits this28 5 In addition, although
members are not required to police patent infringement at their
borders, the ACTA does not preclude them from doing so. In
fact, as a minimum standard agreement, members should
generally be able to exceed the standards in the ACTA-so long
as they do not contravene any other provision. In addition,
whereas there is arguable ambiguity concerning which country's
law applies to find in-transit infringement under TRIPS, the
ACTA clearly permits the in-transit country to use its own laws.
However, even if members did not police in-transit patent
infringement, there would be major problems if they policed in-
transit trademark infringement-as permitted under the ACTA.
Whereas TRIPS only required member states to police
counterfeit (virtually identical) trademarks, the ACTA requires
policing of goods for basic trademark infringement (based on
mere likelihood of confusion) if a country elects to extend
border provisions to in-transit goods.
A major challenge for trade in generic drugs is that the
nonproprietary generic name may be somewhat similar to the
trademark-at least based on a cursory inspection by customs
officials. As noted earlier, there was one shipment of drugs in
the EU that was suspended for suspected counterfeit trademark
because of its use of the word amoxicillin that was actually a
nonproprietary name for a drug sold by the brand owner as
Amoxil. 8 Importantly, the generic name "amoxicillin" is the
international nonproprietary name ("INN") for the drug. INNs
are by definition not owned by any single company and
intended to facilitate easy identification of drugs world-wide
without trademark problems.288 Although the WHO, which
designates global INNs, has suggested that companies not
choose brand names that are similar to INNs, it nonetheless
285. See id. art. 16(2) ("A [plarty rnay adopt or maintain procedures wvith respect
to suspect in-transit goods . . . .").
286. See supra notes 253-54, 273-74 and accompanying text.
287. S, esra notes 169-71 and accornpanying text.
288. See 1WHO. GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROPRIETARY
NAMES (INNS) FOR PHARMACEUTICAL SUBSTANCES 1.1 2.2, WHO) Doc.
WHO/PHARMS/NOM 1570 (1997).
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occurs, as underscored by the similarities between amoxicillin
and Amoxil.2
V. EXPOSING THE IMPACT OF PERSPECTIVES ONT THE LAW
This Part shows how patent perspective schemas impact
how laws are interpreted. As noted earlier, schemas are
particularly important when information is ambiguous. This Part
extends this principle to the interpretation of law. In particular,
although there are canons of treaty interpretation, they are basic
principles that do not always yield clear answers, as noted in Part
IV. This Part shows how interpretations of TRIPS and the ACTA
may be especially influenced by schemas to result in conclusions
that are not firmly supported by proper means of treaty
interpretation. This Part is an important complement to the
prior Part concerning the operation of schemas to perceptions
of facts concerning in-transit suspensions. In particular, whereas
factual interpretations highlighted schemas beyond the
traditional patent perspectives, legal interpretations of TRIPS
and the ACTA emphasize the traditional patent perspectives.
A. Privilege View
The view that patents are a privilege that should be
modified to ensure access to affordable medicine may play a
strong role in some asserted interpretations of TRIPS that may
appear to lack firm grounding in TRIPS provisions that are
interpreted according to customary principles of international
law. This Section first addresses interpretations of the specific
TRIPS border measures and then considers the contextual
provisions such as the TRIPS preamble, TRIPS articles relating
to the "objectives and purposes," of TRIPS and the Doha Public
Health Declaration.
289. See, e.g., World Health Assembly Res. WHA46.19, 1(3), in WHO,
GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL NONPROPRIETARY NAMES (INNS) FOR
PHARNMCLUTICAL SUBSTANCES. WO-I( Doc. WHO/PHARMS/NOM 1570 (1997)
(discouraging trademarks based on INNs).
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1. TRIPS
This Section focuses on the two fundamental TRIPS
provisions governing member obligations to police intellectual
property violations at their borders. In particular, this section
focuses on how the requirements of Articles 51 and 52 of TRIPS
have been interpreted from a privilege view.
a. TRIPS Article 51
As explained earlier, although TRIPS does not require
member states to suspend goods for allegedly infringing patents,
there is a footnote that explicitly contemplates in-transit goods.
Nonetheless, those who hold a privilege view may reach
conclusions that seem to contradict the clear text.
b. TRIPS Article 51 Footnote
The best example of the impact of how a privilege view may
lead to incorrect interpretations of Article 51 of TRIPS is a
listserv post by Daya Shanker, a scholar in the area of
international business. He correctly stated that the footnote to
Article 51 "specifically mention[s] that there shall be no
obligation to apply such provision to [suspend] the goods in
transit."29o However, he then asserts that "use of the term 'shall
be' does not leave any doubt that the provision of Article 51 is
not to be applied to the case ofgoods in transit."29' In other words, he
is suggesting that the "shall be" reference means that countries
are precluded from policing in-transit goods."9 Such an
290. See I)aya Shanker, Re: Can India, Brazil Take on EU over Regulation , I P-
HEALTH (Feb. 8, 2009, 2:35 PM), http:ists.cssential.org/piperinail/ip-health/2009-
February/013452.html I)aya Shanker is a lecturer at I)eakin University. See Dr. I)aya
Shanker, Deakin University, http://wwwdcakin.edu.au/buslaw/manageICnt-
imarketing/staff/profiles/shanker.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
291. See Shanker, supra note 290; see also Nirmalya Syam, Seizures of Drugs in
Transit: Why Europe's Law and Actions are Wrong, S. BULL. (S. CTR., GENEVA, SwilTZ.),
Sept. 22. 2009, at 3 (stating that the footnote "clearly obliges WTO Members ... not to
apply border measures to goods in transit"); NGO Letter to Chan, Feb. 2009, supra
note 5, at 2 (relying on footnote thirteen of Article 51 of TRIPS to state that " [u] nder
some legal traditions and consistent with O1 0 rules," goods in transit arc exempt from
normal restrictions associated with IPR when in transit).
292. This intcrpretation is confirmed by the fact that thc states that the footnote
makes it "clear" that the ability to police intellectual property goods besides countcrfCit
trademarks and pirated copyrights "shall not be applicable in the case of losartan which
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interpretation would be inconsistent with the fact that TRIPS is
generally a "minimum standards" agreement.93 In other words,
while the footnote does say that members are not required to
police in-transit goods, member states may do so since TRIPS
generally permits member states to provide more extensive
protection than its minimums.294 Shanker's contrary reading
could reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the fact that
TRIPS provides minimum standards that countries can exceed.
However, given that Shanker is a scholar in the area of
international business, it is unlikely that he misunderstands a
fundamental concept of TRIPS.
A more plausible interpretation is that despite his
understanding of the minimum standards framework of TRIPS,
he nonetheless arrived at an inconsistent reading of the
footnote because he has a view of patents as a privilege, which
may result in reading TRIPS in a way that is most consistent with
his world view that patents-and provisions implicating
patents-should be narrowly construed to promote access to
health. This would be consistent with the social science
literature that individuals perceive information in a way most
consistent with their pre-existing views. This could be true even
if he does not explicitly endorse a privilege view of patents, since
social science literature suggests that some "biases" are in fact
not conscious.29
A privilege view of patents may alternatively lead to a
different yet still questionable interpretation of the same Article
51 footnote. For example, Professor Frederick Abbott, a noted
was in transit in Amsterdam." See Shanker, supra note 290, at 2. Similarly, he later states
that the EU regulation permitting suspension of goods infringing all intellectual
property rights, including patents, "is in direct violation of the TRIPS agreement." See
id. at 4.
293. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1(1) ("Members may, but shall not be obliged
to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this
Agreement."); see also Intervention by India, Feb. 2008, supra note 199 (describing TRIPS
as a "minimum standards agreement").
294. See TRIPS. supra note 2. art. 1(1) (establishing TRIPS as a minmum
standards agreement); id. art. 51 ni. 13.
295. See Pronin, supra note 92. at 378.
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scholar in international intellectual property law, states that " [i]t
places too much weight on footnote 13 to suggest that it was
intended to authorize the seizure of patented goods in transit
when the practice was almost certainly outside the
contemplation of the drafters of the TRIPS Agreement." 2 He
seems to suggest that while the footnote does not explicitly bar
members from considering in-transit goods, this should be the
effect nonetheless. This is at odds with the fundamental tenet of
treaty interpretation that gives controlling weight to the final
language rather than whether the language was consistent with
accepted practice. Moreover, Professor Abbott's belief that there
was no contemplation of in-transit infringement is not consistent
with contemporaneous documents concerning TRIPS
negotiations.97 His comments are perhaps better explained as
revealing not only a view of patents as privilege, but a schema
that a drug created as a generic should always be a non-
infringing generic, regardless of domestic or international laws.
As discussed above, schemas persist because individuals are
prone to focus only on confirming evidence. In addition,
disconfirming evidence-such as the contemporaneous
documents-could be forgotten as information that is not
consistent with a desired schema.
c. TRIPS Article 52
The privilege perspective is clearly seen in interpretations
of what constitutes the "country of importation" upon which
prima facie infringement must be established under Article 52
of TRIPS . As noted earlier, interpretation of this term is far
from clear or simple. Nonetheless, there have been statements
and assumptions that the country of importation must
necessarily be the final destination. For example, during the
296. Frederick M. Abbott, Seizure oj Geneic Pharmaceuticals in Transit Based on
Allegations of Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade, Development and Public
Welfare. 2009 WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.J. 43. 46.
297. See Secretariat, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property
Rights including Trade in Counterfeit Goods. 1 51, MTN.GNG/NG11/17 (Jan. 23, 1990);
Submnission from Hong Kong, GATT Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectal Property Rights. including Trad in Counterfei Goods, 2 2, 34,
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/54 (Dec. 7, 1989): (AlTT Secretariat. Negotiating Group on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Propert Rights including Trade in Counterfeit Goods,
11 30(9.a), 30(10), 31, MTN.(N(,/N(GI 1/13 (Aug. 16, 1989).
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ACTA negotiations, some suggested that the language "country
of importation" be used in the ACTA provisions of border
measures based on the assumption that this language must
necessarily mean the country of final destination.29 This
interpretation would be consistent with a privilege schema that
would interpret ambiguous information-such as the undefined
term "country of importation "-consistent with a pre-existing
schema. In this case, country of importation is assumed to
necessarily mean the country of final destination since that
would promote global trade in generic drugs. Importantly, those
operating under this schema believe so strongly in it that they
do not see that there is ambiguity and assume that there can
only be a single proper interpretation.
In addition, some statements made by India and Brazil
assume that the country of importation is the final
destination."' For example, India asserted that it was
"farfetched" to claim that the in-transit country will understand
the laws of a destination country." oo Moreover, the Indian Joint
Secretary of Commerce asserted that "international law says you
can't stop anything in transit if there's no evidence that the
products aren't destined for those countries," without citing any
actual supporting law.so' Brazil similarly asserted without any
specific authority that under TRIPS, medicines are generic
under the law of market in which they are meant to be
commercialized. ,o= Moreover, Brazil asserted that " [w] hether or
not the medicines were generic under the law of the country of
298. See, e.g., Scan Flynn, Amend ACTA: Defining Terms by County of Importation,
PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (Sept. 9, 2010),
http://www.wl.arnerican.cdu/pijip/go/blog-post/aicnd-acta-dcfiin-teris-by-
country-of-importation.
299. This is admittedly an assumption since India and Brazil cited no specific
provisions of TRIPS. However, Article 52 of TRIPS is the most plausible TRIPS
provision to support their assertion that the country of importation is the final
dcstination, especially in light of the fact that this would be consistent with the stated
schema to consider a drug generic based on where it is made and sold only.
300. See Intervention by IndiaJ une 2009, supra note 5.
301. See Miller & Anand, supra note 157 (internal (uotationi marks omitted).
302. See Intervention by Brazil, Feb. 2009, supra note 197. 1 6: see also Da), supra note
184 ("Aid agencies note that under World Trade Organisation rules, intellectual
property rights only apply at a shipincnts point of origin and its dcstination.").
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transit is an irrelevant question. " 3 In both cases, there is no
relevant provision that directly supports these interpretations.
TRIPS never uses the term "generic;" TRIPS simply requires
members to provide patent rights and leaves it up to members to
decide what is patent infringement. 0 4 In addition, the footnote
to the TRIPS border provisions explicitly permits suspension of
in-transit goods but does not clearly state how to assess
infringement; as noted earlier, infringement is based on the
ambiguous phrase "country of importation." The statements by
Brazil and India assume that "country of importation" must
necessarily mean the final destination, despite the fact that this
is ambiguous. Similarly, Brazil's claim that whether a drug is
generic under the law of country is irrelevant is only one
possible view of the ambiguous term "country of importation."
Nonetheless, these interpretations are consistent with the
schema that a drug is generic based on where it is made and
sold.
d. TRIPS Articles 1 & 41
Those with a privilege view may also be inclined to assume
that Article 1 of TRIPS read in conjunction with Ar ticle 41 must
necessarily prohibit suspensions of in-transit generic drugs.
However, as discussed above, this is not a foregone conclusion;
to the contrary, it hinges on the interpretation of key terms,
such as what constitutes "legitimate trade" as well as a "barrier"
to such trade. To those with a privilege view, a drug that is made
and sold as generic is necessarily legitimate trade. Indeed, some
have claimed that such trade is "not contested at all." 0
However, the fact that the EU repeatedly expresses an interest in
303. See intervention by Brazil, Feb. 2009, supra note 197, 1 6.
304. See TRIPS, supra note 2. arts. 28, 52.
305. See, e.g:, Xavier Seuba, Border Measures Concern ing Goods Allegedly Infringing
Intellectual Property Rights: The Seizures of Generic Medicines in Transit 9 (Int'l C(t. For
Tiadc & Sustainable Dev., Working Paper, June 2009) (on file with author and the
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development); see also Intervention by
Brazil, June 2009, supra note 5, at 1 ("[T]rade in generic medicines is perfectly lkgal
fron the intellectual property point of view."); Shamnad Bashccr, India's "TRIPS" Case
Against the E: How Strong is it?, SPICY IP (Jan. 30, 2009, 11:39 PM),
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2009/01/indias-trips-case-against-cu-iho-
strong.hinI (asserting that drugs that are not patented in country of export or import
easily qualify as 'legitimate trade'").
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promoting "legitimate trade in generic medicines," yet defends
its regulation permitting in-transit suspension of generics
suggests that there is more than one view. o
e. TRIPS Context-Doha (Over-Reliance)
Those with a privilege view seem to also place undue
reliance on other contexts, especially the Doha Public Health
Declaration. For example, some have suggested that the EU
Regulation permitting suspension of drugs for alleged in-transit
patent infringement is "clearly inconsistent" with or a "direct
violation" of Doha?" Similarly, Professor Abbott stated in an
early article that the Doha Declaration "should preclude"
member states from suspending goods that allegedly infringe
patents in transit.os Although Professor Abbott is correct that
the Doha Declaration is an interpretive agreement, his
306. See, e.g., Intervention by EC, Feb. 2009, supra note 213 (stating that "the EU has
absolutely no intention to hamper any legitimate trade in generic medicines or to
create legal barriers to prevent movement of drugs to developing countries, nor have
our measures had this effect"): EC Statement, June 2009 supra note 209, at 3-4 (Stating
that "the EU does not intend to hamper trade in generic medicines" while
simultaneously defending the EU regulation permitting suspension of in-transit drugs).
307. See, e.g., NGO Letter to Chan, Feb. 2009. supra note 5, at 2: see also
lftervention by Brazil, Feb. 2009, supra note 197, para. 8 (asserting that " [c]xtraterritorial
enforcement of patent rights cannot be reconciled with the terms of the Doha
Declaration" and that TRIPS "can and should be interpreted and implemented in a
manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); HAI, Dutch Seizure of Drugs, supra note 177 (quoting
Rohit Malpani from Oxfan International as stating that the seizures are a "'nonsensical
encroachment ... on the WTO's Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which
ensures that intellectual property rules should not interfere with the ability of
developing countries to protect and promote public health' (emphasis added)).
308. See Frederick M. Abbott, Worst Fears Realised: The Dutch Confiscation of
Medicines Bound from India to Brazil, 13 BRIDGES (Int1 Ctr. For Trade & Sustainable
Dev., Geneva, Switz.) Feb--Mar. 2009, at 13, (waalable at
http://www.frederickabbott.coluploads/Abbott - Worsit Fears Realized-
Pages-fromBridges-volI 3-no I.pdf, see also Abbott, supra note 296, at 49 (referring to
the suspension of drugs in transit as a "frontal assault by the EU on the object and
purpose of the Doha Declaration"). Professor Abbott maintains that it is improper to
consider the TRIPS footnote to permit suspension of goods that allegedly infringe
patens in transit. but relies more on the fact that there was no practice of suspending
goods in transit for patent infringement at the time TRIPS was adopted. See id. at 44,
46. In addition, he focuses primarily on arguing that in-transit infringement violates the
principle of limited territoriality of patents.
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subsequent assertion that the EU Regulation conflicts with
Brazil's "right . . . to protect the public health of its citizens
and to promote access to medicines for all of them" borders on
an overbroad interpretation of what the Doha Declaration
provides?" As noted earlier, the Doha Declaration does not
guarantee nations the ability to take any action to promote the
public health of their citizens; after all, it simultaneously
acknowledges TRIPS requirements.- 0 At some level, Professor
Abbott seems to acknowledge that the Doha Declaration does
not provide a carte blanche to nations to take any action that is
supportive of public health. Indeed, he correctly recognizes that
TRIPS does not explicitly bar the EU regulation, although he
nonetheless states that the regulation is "beyond that required"
by TRIPS and is "not 'supportive' of public health." -, However,
the belief that the Doha Declaration provides broader support
for public health may reflect not only the importance of the
privilege schema but also a recollection of originally proposed
language for the Declaration that was not adopted.'2
309. See Abbott, supra note 308, at 13.
310. The complete context states as follows:
"We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirmn that the
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner
supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all."
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN (01)/DEC/W/2, art. 4 (2001). Although the last clause about promoting
access to medicine for all may be tempting to focus on. neither this clause nor the
Sentence in its entirety Sets forith a condition that can be easily violated.
311. See Abbott, supra note 308, at 13. In addition, he states in the same document
that the in-transit seizures may present an opportunity for Brazil and India to claim that
their benefits under TRIPS are nullified or impaired because they had a legitimate
expectation that products unpatented in their territories could be freely traded. See id.
at 14. Although the facts may present a good case for this argument, it is nonetheless
not a permissible one at this time. There is presently a moratorium on so-called "non-
violation" claims under TRIPS, which he duly recognizes. See id. However, the fact
Professor Abbott mentions a non-violation claim suggests that he knows there is no
direct violation of the TRIPS border provisions.
312. See World Trade Organization, Draft Ministerial Declaration: Proposal from a
Group of Developing Countries. 1 1, IP/(/W/312, WT/GC/W/450 (Oct. 4 2001)
(affirmatively stating tLha "nothing in the TRIPS Agreement shall prevent Members
from taking measures to protect public health" without any caveats to this principle).
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f. TRIPS Context-Articles 7 and 8
Another example of the power of schemas is evident in
claims that TRIPS' Articles 7 and 8-the objectives and
principles-would prohibit suspension of in-transit goods
despite the fact that these Articles do not clearly prohibit such
suspension and in fact do not even mention in-transit goods. For
example, Brazil asserted that "the TRIPS Agreement does not
allow the detention of goods in transit" because it is counter to
the objectives and purposes of TRIPS as stated in Articles 7 and
8.31 Brazil cites Article 7 as stating that enforcement of rights
must be done "in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare" while Article 8 "upholds members' rights to 'protect
public health and nutrition. "314 However, Article 7 actually
states that enforcement of rights should contribute to social and
economic welfare; not only is "should" not a mandatory
requirement, but it is also ambiguous what would contribute to
"social and economic welfare."sIs Most likely, "social and
economic welfare" would be interpreted differently by those
with a privilege versus uber-right view. Similarly, Article 8 does
not provide member states an unfettered right to take any action
that promotes public health; to the contrary, an essential caveat
to Article 8 is that measures to protect public health must be
"consistent" with TRIPS. 36 In other words, Article 8 does not
provide a complete loophole from TRIPS obligations. At a
minimum, Articles 7 and 8 are not as clearly breached as Brazil's
statement seems to suggest.
Brazil's focus on Articles 7 and 8 is consistent with the fact
that individuals interpret information consistent with schemas
and selectively focus on information that supports those
schemas. To the extent that the footnote to Article 51 of TRIPS
does not support the schema that a drug is generic based on
where it is made and sold-such that it could not conceivably
infringe in-transit-Brazil ignores this footnote. This is
313. See Intervention by Brazil, June 2009, supra note 5, at 3.
314. See id.
315. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 7.
316. See id. art. 8.
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consistent with social science evidence that individuals ignore
disconfirming evidence. Moreover, Brazil's over-emphasis of the
importance of ambiguous language in Articles 7 and 8 is
similarly consistent with social science evidence that schemas
appear wvhen there is ambiguity.
g. TRIPS "Context"-Territoriality
Along similar lines, the privilege view may result in
arguments that suspensions of in-transit goods for patent
infringement under TRIPS violate territoriality or are
extraterritorial. For example, India has said that the in-transit
seizures violate territoriality principles that are the "key stone in
the edifice" of TRIPS, without citing a specific provision of
TRIPS or explaining the territorial violation. 17 Similarly, Brazil
has asserted that "TRIPS "does not allow the detention of goods
in transit" because it "violates the principle of territoriality, a
keystone of the international IP system," again without citing a
specific provision of TRIPS that is being violated.'I
Although there are territorial limits to patent protection,
both as a historical matter and under TRIPS it is an
overstatement to suggest that suspension of in-transit goods
necessarily violates territorial principles. While each nation must
comply with the minimums of TRIPS, each has the discretion to
decide how to do so; thus, TRIPS can be seen as consistent with
the traditional principle of territoriality that patents granted by
individual nations are independent of each other. 19 However,
the issue with in-transit goods is more nuanced. As noted earlier,
317. See Intervention by India, Feb. 2009, supra note 199; see also Preneet Kaur,
Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Address to High-Level Segment of the
Economic and Social Council at Special Event on Africa and the Least Developed
Countries: Partnerships and Health (July 8. 2009), available at
http://www.keionlineorg/blogs/2009/07/08/india-ccosoc-scizurcs (noting the
seizures contravene the concept of 'territoriality' enshrined in the TRIPS
Agreement").
318. See Intervention by Brazil, June 2009 supra note 5, at 3: see also Intervention by
Brazil, Feb. 2009, supra note 197, para. 8 (stating that "[e]xtraterritorial enforcement of
patent rights cannot be reconciled with the terms of the Doha Dcclaration on TRIPS
and Public Health").
319. See TRIPS, supra note 2, at art. 2 (requiring compliance wvith provisions of the
Paris Convention); see also Paris Convention, supra note 17, at art. 4 bis (1) (stating that
patCns in separa[e countries arc independCL of each other, which is consistent with
the concept of territorial limits to patent protection).
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TRIPS requires each member state to provide certain patent
rights, including the right to exclude imports of the patented
invention; however, TRIPS does not define what constitutes an
"import."s2o The issue raised by in-transit goods is whether a
nation can consider "import" to be a good that is only
temporarily within the its borders.321 As a general matter,
member states have the right to self-define terms that are
undefined under TRIPS. 322 Applying this basic rule suggests that
a country could define "import" to include goods that are
imported only in the customs area. While most nations have not
defined importation in this way, this does not mean that such a
definition would necessarily violate territoriality principles
under TRIPS. At a minimum, such an action is not an
extraterritorial extension of patent rights. Indeed, while there is
no clear precedent under patent laws, nations have previously
considered in-transit goods to be imported and thus
impermissible infringements of the rights of copyright as well as
trademark owners.323
Holders of the privilege perspective may view the national
right to determine patent scope as inviolate so as to disregard
the ability of other countries to consider in-transit goods as
320. See TRIPS, supra note 2. art. 28.
321. The Dutch law that permits suspension of in-transit goods for patent
infringement actually does so based on a fictional assumption that the in-transit goods
were "made" in the Netherlands. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text
(discussing case law in the Netherlands where in-transit products were found to
infringe on Dutch patents based on the lkgal fiction that the products were made in the
Netherlands). Although nations can define TRIPS patent rights, including the right to
"make" an invention within a country, considering in-transit goods to infringe would
seem to more logically be considered a type of "import" that would violate patent
rights. However, in either event, the same principle applies-TRIPS permits countries
to define terns that it acaves undefined.
322. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1(1); see also Rcichman, supra note 113, 30-35
(suggesting that developing countries could choose and interpret the TRIPS patent
requireiments concerning the novelty and invcntivc step consistent, with their goals):
UN CONI. oN TRADE & DLV. & INT'L CTR. FOR TRADL AND SUSTAINABLE DLV.,
RLSOURCL BOOK ON TRIPS AND DLVLLOPMENT 358 (2005) (noting that members have
considerable leeway" in defining the undefined TRIPS criteria of patentability).
323. See supra note 260 (reviewing various instances in which member states have
interpreted in-transit goods to be imports that violate domestic intellectual property
laws).
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infringing patent rights. After all, the action of other countries,
such as the EU, could effectively preempt the ability of other
nations, such as Brazil and India, to take a different view of
patent rights. Not only may this reflect the privilege view's
assumptions about national rights but it may reflect a schema
previously mentioned-that a drug made as a generic and
destined for a country where it is considered generic must
necessarily always be generic. Although this schema does not
reflect basic tenets of patent law that permit individual nations
to determine the scope of patent rights, the schema is
sufficiently strong that some claim a violation of territoriality
that is inconsistent with the facts.
2. The ACTA-Privilege View
Some of the discussion of the ACTA's border provisions
reinforce the prior point that ambiguity-including legal
ambiguity-provides more room for schema-based
interpretations. Whereas TRIPS border provisions were arguably
ambiguous concerning which country's laws were used to
determine in-transit infringement, the ACTA's border provisions
clearly refer to the country where in-transit procedures are
initiated. 24 Although this clarity would not work in favor of
global trade in generic medicines, those with a privilege view
seem to understand that the ACTA permits countries to apply
the law of the in-transit country.125 This could suggest that where
language is clear and unambiguous even inconsistent schemas
will not distort the text. However, there is an alternative
possibility. In particular, those with a privilege view may believe
that member states cannot suspend in-transit goods for patent
324. See supra notes 283-84 and accompany text (discussing the ACTA's border
provisions under Artile 17 and positing that if a country permits policing in-transit
goods, the in-transit country can use its own laws to assess infringement).
325. See jimmy Koo, ACTA December (Final) Draft-Section by Section Analysis
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Jan. 28, 2011), http://inifojustice.org/archives/2912 (noting that
Artile 16 is "dangerous" in that it could result in more in transit suspensions. which
would be consistent wvith an understanding that Article 16 permits in-transit countries
to decide whethier goods infringe); Scan Flynn, Note on ACTA and Access to Medicines,
PROGRAM INFO. JLST. INTELL. PROP., http://www.wcl.american.cdu/pijip/go/blog-
post/ note-on-acta-and-access-to-medicines (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (in discussing a
draft of the ACTA with the saine language, it is noted that the border measure
language suggests that the law violated is the law of the in-transit country, not the
destination country).
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infringement in general, regardless of what law would apply.
Although the ACTA does not explicitly state this, there is a
footnote indicating that "patents are excluded" from the border
measures section. 6 As discussed earlier, a proper interpretation
of this footnote should be that Member States are not required
to, but nonetheless, may police in-transit goods for patent
infringement.32 However, this interpretation would be contrary
to the schema that a good is generic, if generic where
manufactured and sold.
In addition, there are other opportunities for interpreting
the ACTA consistent with certain schemas. In particular,
although the ACTA permits member states to suspend in-transit
goods for the lesser infraction of trademark infringement, there
has nonetheless been the suggestion that the ACTA should be
interpreted in a way to exclude such infringement where it
would impact public health.1 " For example, a group of
European academics concluded that the ACTA "requires re-
wording or, at least, a narrow interpretation" to prevent
members from excluding trademark infringement based on
mere confusion and to ensure global trade in generic
medicines.3 However, as noted earlier, this reflects a schema
that a drug that is considered generic at point of origin and
destination is necessarily legitimate trade-a point that not all
will concede. Further evidence of the strength of the schema is
that the European academics recognized some ambiguity, yet
characterized an alternative interpretation as "misuse." " This is
consistent with naive realism in that others are assumed to be
biased in their interpretations.
326. See ACTA, supra note 10, art. 13 n.6 ("The [p]arties agree that patents ... do
not fall within the scope of this [s]cetion.").
327. See supra notes 271-76 and accompanying text (describing the ACTA's
provisions for policing of in-transit goods by the in-transit country); see also Ruse-Khan.
supra note 262. at 668-69.
328. See Roberto D'Errne et al., Opinion ojEuropean Acadenics on Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreenent, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & LECTRONIC( COM. L 65, 65, 67
(2011).
329. See id. at 67.
330. See id.
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B. Uber-Right View
The uber-right view of patents also plays an important role
in how laws are interpreted. The impact of uber-right view on in-
transit suspensions is more difficult to document since most of
the critique and analysis seem to reflect the views of those with a
privilege view. However, that does not mean that an uber-right
view does not exist with respect to in-transit goods. To the
contrary, considering in-transit goods to infringe in the first
instance would be consistent with an uber-right view that
advocates maximum patent rights to promote improved
innovation and social welfare. In addition, treaty provisions that
promote an uber-right view are less likely to prompt discussion
from those with an uber-right view because such provisions
would be consistent with this view. 1 Nonetheless, there are still
some examples of how the uber-right view may influence
interpretation as well as negotiation of international
agreements.
1. TRIPS Border Measures
An uber-right perspective may be relevant to the EUs
consistent view that its border measures Regulation complies
with TRIPS. 3 2 As noted earlier, interpretation of the relevant
TRIPS provisions on border measures is difficult. To date,
however, the EU has not provided a comprehensive explanation
of how its Regulation complies. While the EU has noted that the
procedures for detaining goods are consistent with TRIPS, it has
never explicitly addressed the critical interpretative question of
what constitutes a "country of importation." Its actions suggest
that it believes that the country of importation should be
331. In contrast, there is more discussion from the uber-right when treaty
provisions are less consistent with their view. For exampic, the uber-right perspective is
inclined to distort the TRIPS requirements concerning compulsory licenses to favor
their preferred view of patents so that in some cases thcy contradict even cear text. See
Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1047, 1081-88
(2009).
332. See, e.g., EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209, at 4 (stating that the
Regulation "is fully in line with WTO)/TRIPS . . . TRIPS foresees that border
enforcement measures may apply not only to imports of goods infringing any IPR,
including patents, but also to goods . . . [in] transit"): World Trade Organization,
General Council, Minutes of Meeting, 1 94. WT/GC/M/118 (2009) (asserting that
suspensions are consistent with Article 51 of TRIPS).
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interpreted as the in-transit country. However, it notably never
articulated this in response to claims from Brazil and India that
this was impermissible under TRIPS.
An uber-right view may also have a different view of what
constitutes an extraterritorial application of laws. As noted
earlier, those with a privilege view suggest that the Dutch law
constitutes an extraterritorial application of the laws.A" The EU
has denied any extraterritorial effect of its customs
Regulation.33 This seems consistent with the EU's view that each
EU member state decides whether to consider in-transit goods
to infringe and thus be potentially suspended under the EU
Regulation. 3 Pursuant to this view, even when suspensions
occur, there is no extraterritorial application of the law because
no country is applying the laws of another country. For example,
the Dutch border officials are applying Dutch law and not the
law of a distant nation such as Brazil or India.
An uber-right perspective may also be relevant to
interpreting Article 1 of TRIPS, which allows member states to
exceed TRIPS requirements only to the extent that they do not
contravene TRIPS. As noted above, there are reasonable
grounds for considering that domestic laws that consider in-
transit drugs to infringe patent (or trademark) rights to violate
the requirement under Article 41 of TRIPS that enforcement
procedures not create barriers to legitimate trade. , The EU's
repeated statements that it is not interested in disturbing
"legitimate trade in generic drugs" suggests that there may be a
view that drugs that infringe while in transit are perhaps not
333. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing the privilege view's
refusal to recognize the Dutch law that considers in-transit goods to infringe on Dutch
patent rights under the iction that the in-transit products were made in the
Netherlands).
334. See, e.g., EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209, at 4 (claiming that the EC
Regulation has "no extra-territorial eflect").
335. See EUExplanatory Note, Jualy 2009 supra note 209, at 1 (Stating that national
courts determine infringement and that different patent laws may result in differing
conclusions among different member states).
336. See id. at 1-2.
[Vol. 35:1
HeinOnline  -- 35 Fordham Int'l L.J. 92 2011-2012
C OMPE TING PA TENT PERSPECTIVES
actually legitimate generics to the extent they might infringe in-
transit.b
In addition, an uber-right view of Article 1 of TRIPS might
discount the relevance of the clause that suggests that additional
protection should not contravene other provisions. Countries
known to promote uber-right views, including the United States
and the EU, have suggested language that would have had no
limitations on stronger rights; both suggested that "nothing ...
shall prevent contracting parties" from granting more extensive
protection without the current caveat in Article 1 concerning
contravening other provisions. * Those with an uber-right view
may believe so strongly in the correctness of their view that they
improperly assume that TRIPS reflects their beliefs. While there
is no clear evidence of this with respect to Ai ticle 1 of TRIPS , an
uber-right view has resulted in interpretations of other TRIPS
provisions that are contrary to TRIPS text and erroneously rely
on past negotiating language rather than on clear text. 3
An uber-right view of patents may also result in a different
view of what international obligations are consistent with the
Doha Public Health Declaration,34() which relates to
337. See, e.g., EC Statement, June 2009, supra note 209 (stating that "the EU does
not intend to hamper trade in generic medicines" while simultaneously defending the
EU regulation permitting suspension of in-transit drugs); Intervention by EC, Feb. 2009,
supra note 213 (stating that "the EU has absolutely no intention to hamper any
legitimate trade in generic medicines or to create legal barriers to prevent movement
of drugs to developing countries, nor have our measures had this ct"et).
338. See GATT Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Draft Agreemnr on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from the Ihnited States, 3,
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 (May 11, 1990) (cnphasis added); GATT Negotiating Group
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights:
Communication from the European Communities, 2, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68 (Mar. 29,
1990) (emphasis added).
339. See Ho, supra note 331, at 1081-88 (discussing the influence of patent
perspectives on TRIPS compulsory license requirements and presenting specific
examples of the uber-right's distortion of clear TRIPS language); CYNTHIA M. 1-10,
ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECNOMY 76-80, 341 (2011) (interpreting TRIPS
provision on data protection and explaining why an uber-right view, as propagated by
the US Trade Representatives Office as well as by patent owners, is incorrect).
340. Similarly, an uber-right view may believe that stronger rights can only bring
social benefits, such that there is no need to address Article 1 of TRIPS concerning
stronger rights that contravene other provisions.
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interpretation of TRIPS as well as the ACTA.341 Governments
that have tended to advocate an uber-right view, such as the
United States and sometimes the EU, have consistently claimed
that rights exceeding the minimums of TRIPS are consistent
with the Doha Declaration.3 42 However, that consistency seems
to be premised on a very narrow view of the Doha Declaration.
In particular, the uber-right view of the Doha Declaration seems
to be that countries fully compliant as long as one paragraph of
the Declaration is complied with-the part relating to waiving
one of the usual compulsory license requirements to enable
generic drugs to be made for poor countries. 4 ' Although health
advocates have suggested that domestic laws permitting
suspension of drugs for alleged infringement in transit are
inherently inconsistent, an uber-right view may find no problem
unless a shipment was actually made pursuant to the
Declaration, which has yet to happen. In fact, in the EU's
explanation and defense of its Regulation, it suggested its
341. See Draft Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement pmble., Dec. 3, 2010,
available at http:'//ww.actawatch.org/blog/final-acta-text-dccciber-3-2010
("Recognizing the principles set forth in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health . . . .").
342. See, e.g., EU Explanatory Note, july 2009, supra note 208, at 2 (asserting that
decision of EU pharmaceutical industries not to exercise right under EU regulation to
suspend "iegitimate generic" drugs is consistent with Doha Declaration).
343. See, e.g., EU-India FTA Negotiations and Access to Aledicines QUA, EUROPEAN
COMM'N TRAIDL (May 26, 2010), available at http://trade.ec.turopa.cu/doclib/docs/
2010/may/tradoc_146191.pdf (showing that in responding to a question concerning
how the proposed Free Trade Agreements will limit access to affordable medicines, the
EU focused solely on the provision permitting compulsory licenses for export while
ignoring the possibility that nations can interpret TRIPS provisions to limit
patentability of drugs and thus promote more generics). Although there are US laws
requiring that the United States negotiate trade agreements consistent with the Doha
Declaration, not all agree that agreements in fact are consistent. See, e.g., H.R. COMMv.
oN Gov. RLORM-MINORInY STAt SPLC. INVLSTIGATIO.NS DIV.. TRADL ARLLMLNTS
AN) ACCLSS TO MEDICATIONS UNDLR THL BUSH ADMINISTRATION 18 (2005), available at
http://dciocrats.oversight.house.gov/imiages/storics/documents/20050609094902-
11945.pdf (stating that US trade agreements "undermine" Doha); Letter from Henry
A. Waxman, Cong. Rep., et al., to Susan Schwab, U.S. Trade Rep. (Mar. 12, 2007),
available at http://www.forumdemocracy.nct/downloads/(ongress%
20to%20USTR% 200n% 20Tradc% 20in% 20Mcdicines.pdf (urging reconsideration of
Free Trade Agreements negotiated with the United States to comply with the Doha
Declaration).
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Regulation was consistent with the Doha Declaration.3**
However, given that there has only been a single shipment of
drugs pursuant to this procedure-and none that were
suspended in the EU-there would be no conflict from an uber-
right perspective.
2. The ACTA and Beyond
The views of the uber-right are better highlighted in
developments beyond TRIPS. The genesis of TRIPS, as well as
the continued proliferation of bilateral and multilateral
agreements requiring stronger patent rights, is consistent with
an uber-right view that more patent rights are better to promote
innovation and other social benefits. In addition, the border
measures under the ACTA may also illustrate an important
issue. Where existing agreements are susceptible to
interpretations inconsistent with an uber-right view, there may
be an incentive to create new agreements that more explicitly
embrace the uber-right view. For example, in the case of border
measures, whereas TRIPS is ambiguous concerning which
country's laws are relevant to assessing infringement for border
measures and those with a privilege view repeatedly suggested
that it must mean the country of final destination, this could
have led to different language under the ACTA. As noted
earlier, the ACTA more clearly states that infringement of in-
transit goods is to be assessed by the in-transit country.
An uber-right view may also consider the ACTA to not pose
any serious problem for global trade of generic problems. 45 For
example, when a draft of the ACTA was first publicly released in
April 2010,346 the EU stated that the ACTA would be consistent
with TRIPS and that it "will not address the cross-border transit
of legitimate generic medicines."' 47 At the time of this
344. See EU Explanatory Note. July 2009, supra note 209, at 2-4 (suggesting that
details of the EU regulation actually minimize problems).
345. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand apparently favored a dcear exclusion of
patents from border protection, whereas others, such as the United States, while not
advocating mandatory suspension based on patent infringement, seemed to be open to
this possibility.
346. ACTA Draft, Apr. 2010, supra note 279.
347. See Press Release, IP/ 10/437. supra note 210; see also Press Rcease, European
Commission, EU Welcomes Conclusion of Negotiations on Russia's W1O Accession
(April 21, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
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statement, however, the draft text did not prevent members
from considering in-transit drugs as infringing on local patent
rights. To the contrary, the draft made clear that enforcement of
patent rights against in-transit goods was explicitly being
considered. 4 hile some health advocates may believe that the
EU statement was made in bad faith, an alternative explanation
is possible when viewed through the uber-right lens. In
particular, an uber-right view might consider the term
"legitimate generic medicines" to only constitute medicines that
do not infringe a patent at any point, including even where it is
only in the customs area of a nation while in-transit. The EU has
never stated this. However, this is consistent with its actual
statements, as well as an uber-right view of patents. After all, if
patents are strong rights, the borders of a country where patents
exist are a natural extension of where patents should be
enforced.
CONCLUSION
This Article provides an important understanding of patent
policy perspectives that operate as key schemas in discussions
concerning the balance between patent rights and access to
affordable medicines. The case study demonstrates that patent
schemas operate similar to other schemas as a lens through
referencc=IP/11/1334: Letter fron Ambassador Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Rep., to Ron
Wyden, U.S. Sen. (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/iles/
ustr acta response.pdf (stating that the ACTA would be consistent with TRIPS and
would respect the Doha Declaration, yet failing to articulate what steps the United
States would take despite the (uestion). Similarly, in July 2010, the EU issued a press
release on ACTA negotiations and again stated that the ACTA would be consistent with
TRIPS. Negotiating participants not only reiterated that "ACTA will not hinder the
cross-border transit of legitimate generic inecdicines," but also that "patents will not be
covered in the [s]cction on [b]order [mn]casures." See Press Release, European
Commission, Anti-Counterlieting Trade Agreenent, Report on the 9th Round of
Negotiations (July 2, 2010), available at http://trade.cc.europa.cu/doclib/press/
index.cfin?id=588&ciric=352&langld cn.
348. See ACTA Draft, Apr. 2010, supra note 279, 2.6; see also id. 2.X(3)
("Parties shall provide for the provisions related to border measures to be applied [at
least] in cases of trade mark counterfeiting and copyright piracy. [Parties may provide
for such provisions to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual property
rights.]" (alteration in original)).
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which individuals interpret information. This Article builds
upon prior social science work to establish that such schemas
play a critical role in how laws are interpreted. Although some
have previously noted that schemas impact evaluation of facts
that may be relevant to subsequent legal interpretations, this
Article shows how schemas may impact the process of treaty
interpretation-a process that has previously been considered to
be objective and not inherently subject to bias. Moreover,
because of the combination of schemas and naive realism,
individuals may not only interpret treaty provisions consistent
with their schemas but also assume that their view is correct and
only others are biased. Although all individuals-including this
author-are subjects to schemas and bias, hopefully the
examples shown here help expose the significance of patent
perspective schemas and naive realism in furthering conflict.
The existence of these perspectives may play a prominent
role in how parties approach specific solutions that attempt to
promote access to medicine. Currently, adherents of each view
propose solutions consistent with their schemas while dismissing
proposals of the other side as inadequate and biased. Although
social scientists have not studied conflicts concerning access to
medicine, they have studied conflicts in other areas of social
conflict that consistently suggest that due to the operation of
nalve realism, individuals tend to not only assume that the other
side is more biased, but also holds more extreme positions than
they in fact do, which can lead to further polarization and
animosity. This seems to perfectly describe discussions
concerning access to medicine. This knowledge can thus lay the
groundwork for subsequent inquiry into how to address
perspectives to promote an improved balance between patent
rights and affordable access to health.
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